30. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security
Affairs (Kissinger),
to President Nixon1
2
Washington, October 22, 1969
SUBJECT:
- Background on Shah’s Oil Proposals
Clark Mollenhoff in the attached explains some of the background of the
Shah’s proposals for the US-import of Iranian oil. He understands that
he has been oversold on this project by a group of American
entrepreneurs now represented by Herbert Brownell. He points out the
domestic political risk of a decision on oil import policy that seemed
to favor one of Mr. Brownell’s clients.
The background Clark describes is consistent with my information.
I would only add that the Shah has now made these proposals very much his
own. He is not just the dupe of American entrepreneurs, although they
may not have been straightforward with him in describing the US
difficulty in changing oil import policy. I have tried to keep Herb
Brownell informed on our side of the problem, but he has apparently not
succeeded in dampening the Shah’s enthusiasm if he has tried.
[Page 2]
Attachment
Memorandum From the President’s Special Counsel
(Mollenhoff) to President Nixon
Washington, October 17, 1969
SUBJECT:
- Potential problem area in connection with the visit of the
Shah of Iran.
It is possible that the Shah of Iran may be oversold before his
arrival on the possibility of some changes in U.S. policy to permit
Iran to exchange crude oil for American goods and products.
I am informed that a Mr. Charles Allen of a firm
known as “Planet Oil and Mineral” has convinced the Shah that he can
increase the income of Iran substantially by such a change in
American policy. While it would probably be good U.S. policy to help
the Shah in some manner, this could constitute a preferential
treatment that could have wide repercussions.
Herbert Brownell, former Attorney General under the Eisenhower
Administration, represents Plant Oil and Minerals. He is apparently
very enthusiastic about his client’s cause, and believes that it
would be a wise course for the United States as well as for Iran.
However, I have had some discussions with persons who are equally
interested in good relations between Iran and the United States who
feel that any special allocation arrangement would have some
long-term bad impact, even if it seemed a good thing to do to please
the Shah while he is here.
It has been explained to me by some familiar with this matter that
the Shah is likely to be disappointed on a number of matters
involving oil policy while he is here and that it is important to
cool his enthusiasm at the earliest possible point in the one area
so there will be less likelihood of repercussions.
[Page 3]
I am not familiar enough with this subject matter to have any firm
judgments one way or the other. It did appear to me that the warning
was a clear and reasonable one that should be passed on for
consideration at the proper level.
I am informed that Nat Samuels, a Deputy Under Secretary of State for
Economic Affairs, is fully conversant with this whole matter, I
would suggest that anyone at the White House level who deals with
this subject contact Mr. Samuels for exploration of the details.
There have been some scandals involving oil allocation decisions in
the recent past. The press has not fully exploited those scandals,
but I’m sure would put the worst possible interpretation on any
decisions by this Administration that might be of substantial
benefit to one of Mr. Brownell’s clients.
