274. Telegram 4546 From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State1 2

[Page 1]

Subj:

  • Soviet-Iraq Communique
1.
Joint Soviet-Iraq communique, issued following August 4–12 visit to USSR of Iraqi delegation headed by Saddam Hussein Tikriti, indicates Soviets failed to persuade Iraqis to modify their tough anti-Nasser stand, and that two sides continue to disagree over how to deal with ME situation. Communique contains no mention of agreement on additional Soviet aid to Iraq, noting only that both sides have agreed to continue talks. This suggests that in response to Iraqi refusal to adopt more moderate line on ME, Soviets may have taken tough bargaining stance on aid question and may even have turned down Iraqi requests for [Page 2] extension of loan payments.
2.
Depth of disagreement is most striking in treatment of ME, on which communique says only that sides “exchanged views on situation.” This is standard Soviet communique language for lack of any agreement. Total absence of comment on ME situation strikes us as somewhat surprising. Even assuming fundamental disagreement over situation, two sides might have been expected to come up with some standard language condeming Israeli agression. Extent of differences is also shown by fact Soviets chose to omit any reference to “support for Arab states and peoples.” Only related area on which some agreement was possible is Persian Gulf, which rates paragraph emphasizing necessity of liquidating imperialist presence in region.
3.
Characterization of atmosphere of “openness and mutual understanding” is definitely on cool side and covers widely differing viewpoints. Other noticeably restrained statements include expression of “satisfaction” with state of relations between two countries and characterization of meetings as “useful.” Although Tikriti had officially announced meeting with Kosygin on August 11, communique pointedly fails to mention this in listing Mazurov and Ponomarev as having led Soviet side.
4.
While we would expect Iraqis to have sought additional aid from Soviets, communique gives no hint that Soviets made any new commitment. In phrasing that appears intended to refer mainly to past assistance, Iraqi side expresses gratitude for Soviet assistance in “developing economy, training national cadres and strengthening defense capacity” of Iraq. However, communique contains no clear indication that Soviets will continue supply aid, saying only that sides agreed to continue talks “to conclude agreements on number of concrete matters.”
5.
Perhaps to make up for lack of any discussion of ME situation, portions of communique dealing with other international issues contains unusually large amount of window dressing. Treatment of a number of issues—denunciation of US agression in SEA, abolition of colonialism, support for CES, ban on chemical weapons, support for Sea Bed Treaty and role of UN-closely follows last [Page 3] month’s Soviet-UAR communique (Moscow 3999 Notal). Noteworthy point is pitch, we assume by Soviets, for general recognition of GDR and admission of both Germanies to UN.
6.
In what may have been a minor concession, communique notes that Brezhnev, Podgorny, and Kosygin accepted invitation to visit Iraq. However, statement that timing of visits will be decided through diplomatic channels seems to imply visits are unlikely to take place soon.
Beam
  1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 IRAQ. Confidential. Repeated to Paris, Algiers, Beirut, Amman, Cairo, Dhahran, Jidda, Kuwait, London, Rabat, Tel Aviv, Tripoli, Tunis, and USUN.
  2. The Embassy summarized the content of the new joint Soviet-Iraq communiqué.