195. Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Rush) to the President’s Assistant for
National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1
2
Washington, May 18, 1972
[Page 1]
SUBJECT:
- Talking Papers for the President’s Discussions in Iran
The attached talking papers are submitted for the President’s
consideration and use in his discussions with the Shah of Iran. They
outline Department of Defense positions responding to requests the Shah
is expected to make for purchase of our newest and most sophisticated
weapons systems and for assignment of U.S. uniformed personnel to assist
in their absorption by Iran.
[Page 2]
Attachment
Talking Paper
Washington, undated
TITLE: Laser Guided Bombs
BACKGROUND:
The USG has released certain
information on laser-guided bombs to NATO countries and recently part of this information
has been made available to the Government of Iran. This bombing
system is currently in use by our Air Force in Southeast Asia and
all production for the foreseeable future will be required by the
USAF.
LIKELY IRANIAN POSITION:
The Shah will ask that USG approve
the sale of laser-guided bombs to GOI.
RECOMMENDED U.S. POSITION:
Recommend you inform the Shah that the USG approves in principle the sale of laser-guided
equipment to the GOI and that
details on price and availability can be worked out when our own
requirements are satisfied. This will include the helicopter
launched laser guided antitank missiles.
[Page 3]
Attachment
Talking Paper
Washington, undated
TITLE: Sale of F–15/F–14 Aircraft
BACKGROUND:
Since 1969 the Shah has focused increasingly on the issue of
follow-on aircraft to replace US supplied F–4’s in his Air Force
during the late 1970’s. The Shah argues that a long lead time is
required in the budget and procurement cycle for such a major
defense acquisition, and that third countries have been trying to
interest him in a prototype aircraft, such as the French Mirage
VIII, or other British/German MRCA. In addition, the Shah argues
that he will need an aircraft of the F–15 caliber to counter the
“almost assured” introduction into neighboring countries of the
MIG–2 3 by the Soviet Union. We have briefed representatives of the
Government of Iran on the F–14 and F–15 aircraft but have made no
commitment for the sale. These aircraft are barely out of the
research and development stage, and the F–15’s first flight test is
not scheduled until September 1972.
LIKELY IRANIAN POSITION:
Shah will ask for assurances that the USG will make available 3 squadrons of F–15 and a few
F–14 with Phoenix missiles for sale to the Government of Iran at
some unspecified time in the future as follow-on aircraft or as a
supplement to his F–4 fighter fleet.
[Page 4]
RECOMMENDED U.S. POSITION:
There are two major factors that militate against making a positive
F–14/F–15 sales commitment, particularly with firm numbers and
delivery dates, to the Shah at this time. First, neither of these
aircraft programs has progressed to a point at which we can
accurately predict their availability. Second, we cannot foresee the
world situation in the latter half of this decade sufficient to
permit a positive delivery date and number commitment of these
sophisticated and unique aircraft. Conditions in the region by the
time of aircraft availability might make a sale counterproductive to
USG interests. We must consider
the possibility of priority need by our NATO or other allies and additional requirements of our
own. Therefore, recommend we tell the Shah that we anticipate
favorable action on the sale but the matter must be held in abeyance
until the programs become more stable and predictable. We will,
however, keep the Shah apprised of our progress on the development
of these weapons systems.
[Page 5]
Attachment
Talking Paper
Washington, undated
TITLE: MAVERICK Missile
BACKGROUND:
The MAVERICK Missile is a new electro-optical air-to-ground missile
manufactured by Hughes Aircraft Corp. The missile in pre-testing
proved itself well enough for DoD to
approve production in limited quantities in 1971. However,
additional testing was ordered. Secretary Laird told the NATO Ministerial Council in December
1971 that additional operational tests would be required prior to a
follow-on production decision. After tests are completed, USG will discuss the missile
availability for use on NATO
assigned aircraft. Subsequently, Secretary Laird also included Iran for
possible sale of Maverick under same caveat.
LIKELY IRANIAN POSITION:
Shah will ask for the sale of sufficient MAVERICK Missiles at the
earliest possible time to equip his F–4 squadrons.
RECOMMENDED U.S. POSITION:
That you advise the Shah that our operational testing is nearly
complete and that as soon as test results have been analyzed, and
missile proves out satisfactorily, we intend to act favorably on
Iran’s purchase request. Production and delivery schedules could be
discussed at a later date.
[Page 6]
Attachment
Talking Paper
Washington, undated
TITLE: Additional F–4E/F–5E Sales to
Iran
BACKGROUND:
In the early 1960’s the Shah requested USG assistance in modernizing his fighter aircraft
fleet. At that time he had 3 squadrons of MAP F–86F’s. We assisted the Shah by providing 2
squadrons of F–5A’s under Grant Aid and the GOI purchased 4 additional squadrons. In the late
1960’s the GOI ordered 2 squadrons
of F–4D’s and 2 squadrons of F–4E’s. Almost before the first F–4’s
were delivered the GOI ordered 4
additional squadrons. Recently they have indicated an interest in
buying 2 more squadrons making a total of 10 squadrons when all are
delivered. Last year the Shah decided to replace the older F–5A with
the newer F–5E. He has placed orders with Northrop for 8 squadrons.
Recently the Shah has indicated a desire to purchase 2 more
squadrons of F–5E’s that would produce an inventory of 10 squadrons
of this aircraft as well.
LIKELY IRANIAN POSITION:
The Shah will ask that the USG
approve the sale of two additional squadrons of F–4E’s and two of
F–5E’s.
RECOMMENDED U.S. POSITION:
Recommend you tell the Shah that the USG will approve the sale of these aircraft and that
price and availability is now being studied by the USAF. He will be notified when
negotiations can be expected to commence.
[Page 7]
Attachment
Talking Paper
Washington, undated
TITLE: Technical Assistance by U.S. Armed
Forces Personnel
BACKGROUND:
Since 1969 the U.S. Air Force has made available to the Imperial
Iranian Air Force (IIAF) on a
reimbursable basis a Technical Assistance Field Team to help the
IIAF absorb the F–41s. The team
has varied in size from 54 to 83, and supplements our 200-man
Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG). As Iran takes delivery of increasingly more
complex U.S. military equipment, the strain on the country’s
manpower base may become critical; thus the Shah’s desire for
increased numbers of U.S. military technicians to assist/train his
key maintenance personnel. We have resisted the Shah in this matter
chiefly to keep our military profile low and to encourage the
Iranians to solve their own problems. When additional U.S.
assistance has become unavoidable, we have urged the Shah to hire
technical personnel from U.S. civilian contractors, a route he
considers unduly expensive and not fully responsive to his
needs.
LIKELY IRANIAN POSITION:
The Shah will request a “bank account” of several hundred U.S.
uniformed technicians on which to draw on a fiscally reimbursable
basis. He would like to be assured that we will furnish the GOI a team
[Page 8]
of skilled personnel at any time a
requirement appears.
RECOMMENDED U.S. POSITION:
Although the U.S. generally opposes introducing military items into
the inventory of a country that is incapable of operating and
maintaining them properly, we recognize that political-military
requirements may occasionally dictate such a course. Should Iran
acquire advanced items where short-term technical help is required,
we should try to help it bridge the gap. Recommend you advise the
Shah that, although our policy is to reduce our military presence
overseas and although we are under heavy Congressional pressure in
this regard, the U.S. Government will try to assist the GOI by providing on a case-by-case
basis selective U.S. military technical assistance where such advice
cannot be secured through a civilian contractor.
