Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–4, Documents on Iran and Iraq, 1969–1972

107. Telegram 202975 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran¹ ²

Washington, December 14, 1970, 2238Z

1. Request you take earliest suitable opportunity to inform Shah that decision has been made to approve in principle GOI request to purchase additional 34 F–4E aircraft (Squadrons 7&8).

2. While doing so request you again specify reasons why USG has studied his request so carefully in order dispel any misunderstandings Shah may have gained through informal reports he has received re basic USG attitudes toward Iran and its security requirements. You are well aware of the major reservations that have been held throughout consideration of Shah’s request. We believe it desirable you continue to stress with him our concernr regarding Iran’s manpower requirements and financing of the transaction. Proposed force level of IIAF will require personnel with both great sophistication and long experience. If IIAF unable to meet personnel requirements, it could be forced to place some aircraft in storage. Further, DOD ability provide large-scale F–4 technical assistance over a long term cannot be assured. In addition we had hoped Shah would have benefit of Toufanian-Twitchell study to assist him in making necessary difficult decisions on allocating Iran’s resources.

3. Details of fund requirements is subject septel.

4. You should ensure that Shah recognizes that, despite our reservations, if he wishes to buy the remaining 34 F–4s, the USG will agree. We are only concerned he know that as long-time friend and ally, US desires he be aware of very important factors we believe he would want to consider in making decision of this magnitude.

END

Rogers

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 IRAN. Secret; Priority. Joint State/Defense Message. Repeated to CINCSTRIKE, SECDEF, CSAF, ExIm Bank. Drafted by Robert L. Dowel Jr. (NEA/IRN); cleared by Miklos, Schiff, and in DOD/ISA, JCS, DOD/ISA/MA&S, PM/MAS, ACDA, PM/MC; and approved by Davies.
2. The Department authorized the Embassy to notify the Shah that the Departments of State and Defense had approved in principle the sale of a seventh and eighth squadron of F–4s to Tehran.