The Eighth Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting was held in Oslo, June
9–20. I am enclosing for your consideration the report of the US Delegation on the outcome of this
meeting.
The Delegation reports that the Consultative Meeting recognized the need
to seek agreed solutions to questions related to the resources of the
Antarctic and also the need to observe restraint while agreed solutions
are sought. This policy of restraint will be kept under review. A
further meeting will be held in 1976.
Attachment:
Report
REPORT BY THE U.S. DELEGATION TO THE
EIGHTH ANTARCTIC TREATY CONSULTATIVE MEETING
Subject:
-
Antarctic Mineral Resources Policy:
Prospects For Agreement on a Resource Regime
The President’s directive of May 20, 1975, instructed the NSC Under Secretaries Committee to
submit a report to the President, following the Eighth Antarctic
Treaty Consultative Meeting, on the prospects for reaching an
acceptable agreement concerning any mineral resources that may be
found in Antarctica in commercially attractive quantities and
recommendations for next steps. This report by the U.S. Delegation analyzes the results of
the meeting, which was held in Oslo, June 9–20, in light of the
U.S. objectives as set forth in
NSDM 263, and proposes next
steps.
BACKGROUND
The U.S. Delegation sought three
specific goals at the Consultative Meeting with respect to
commercial exploration and exploitation of mineral resources in
Antarctica. First, the Delegation sought to develop sufficient
information upon which to base an assessment of the prospects for
reaching an acceptable agreement. Second, the Delegation sought to
obtain an agreed recommendation concerning mineral resource
activities setting forth the principles upon which an
internationally agreed resource regime could be based. Third, a
Delegation objective was to convene an experts meeting prior to the
Ninth Consultative Meeting to begin work on such a regime, if
satisfactory progress was made at Oslo.
The Consultative Meeting produced an agreed recommendation on mineral
resources (at Tab A) which incorporates most of the principles and
objectives sought by the U.S. The
preamble states that the representatives are convinced that the
twelve consultative parties should seek timely agreed solutions to
the problems raised by questions concerning Antarctic mineral
resources and of the need for
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restraint (subject to continuing review) while doing so. The
representatives also resolved to seek to develop an approach to the
problems raised by the possible presence of valuable minerals
bearing in mind the principles and purposes of the Antarctic
Treaty.
The representatives recommended to their governments that the mineral
resources question should be fully studied in all its aspects and
that a special preparatory meeting for the Ninth Consultative
Meeting should be held in 1976. The subject of this meeting was
broadened to address questions of mineral exploitation as well as
exploration. Precise terms of reference for this preparatory meeting
will be determined through diplomatic channels. Studies of the
environmental aspects of the question by governments and by the
International Council of Scientific Unions’ Scientific Committee on
Antarctic Research were also recommended.
The recommendation must now be approved by all twelve Consultative
Parties before formally taking effect. There is no reason to feel it
will not be so approved.
DISCUSSION
Negotiations on the agreed recommendation concerning mineral
resources were arduous and lengthy. The principal negotiating
hurdles were, first, the positions of the hardline territorial
claimants (Chile and Argentina) that mineral resource activities are
prohibited by the Antarctic Treaty for the time being; and second,
the positions of ten of the twelve delegations in favor of some form
of moratorium on such activities (the U.S. and U.K.
dissented). Negotiations were further complicated because some
delegations were inadequately instructed and some could not agree
to-all objectives sought by the U.S.
because necessary high-level policy decisions had not yet been taken
in their capitals.
Compromise solutions to these problems were found only at the
eleventh hour. The position of the hard-line claimants were
accommodated with the U.S. view that
mineral resource activities are a permitted peaceful use of the area
on the basis that it could not be predicted, as a matter of fact,
whether such activities would occur or not. Those who favored a
moratorium accommodated U.S.
insistence
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that there be no
more than “voluntary restraint” expressed in non-binding preambular
language, conditioned on satisfactory progress toward an acceptable
international approach and subject to continuing review in light of
the actions of other nations. The U.S. Delegation was unable to obtain agreement on the
principle that any resource arrangement should guarantee
non-discriminatory access for the U.S. and other nations for exploitation purposes to any
part of the Antarctic because some of the twelve were uninstructed
and others were not yet ready to accept the principle of such
non-discriminatory access.
PROSPECTS FOR AN ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENT
The political will on the part of all participants to seek an agreed
approach among the twelve was striking. This was apparently
motivated in part by the repeatedly expressed fear that the UN or Law of the Sea Conference would
take action that could pre-empt the Antarctic Treaty. General
satisfaction with the implementation of the Treaty and concern for
the need to protect the Antarctic environment added to the general
effort to seek solutions together. Three principles enunciated by
the U.S. were generally acceptable as
a starting point for the consultations:
- —Mineral resource activities in Antarctica should not
become the object of significant international
discord.
- —Exploration for and exploitation of Antarctic mineral
resources should not disrupt the continued implementation of
the Antarctic Treaty.
- —The sensitive Antarctic environment must be protected
from harm caused by any mineral resource activities.
Whether an acceptable agreement on a resource regime will be
obtainable is impossible to predict at this stage since the
delegations were generally unprepared to address seriously the basic
questions of access to the resources, a regime for mineral resource
activities, and participation by others. The interest displayed by
the U.S., France, Norway, the U.K. and, to a lesser extent, Belgium
and South Africa, in possible future mineral activities in
Antarctica
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should encourage
more urgent consideration of these issues in preparation for the
1976 meeting. On the other hand, the U.S.S.R., Australia, and New Zealand appear to prefer
that no resource activities occur for the time being.
On the critical question of access to the resources, statements and
informal corridor conversations indicated that each of the twelve
Consultative Parties may come to perceive a national interest in the
kind of open access system sought by the U.S. The other non-claimants (Belgium, Japan, South
Africa and the U.S.S.R.) can be
expected to take a view similar to ours if a regime is negotiated.
Among the claimants, France, New Zealand, Norway and Great Britain
indicated support or implied eventual acceptance of
non-discriminatory access. Australia indicated an understanding that
there is no hydrocarbon potential within her claimed area so that
open access is her only mechanism to acquire resources. While Chile
and Argentina did not speak to the issue, the U.K. territorial claim, which overlaps and conflicts
with the Latin claims, may put sufficient pressure on the Latins to
accept open access. The threat of unilateral action by the U.S. or others, the fear of UN action in the area, and the potential
economic benefits for developing Southern Hemisphere nations, such
as Chile and Argentina, from providing a logistical base for
Antarctic mineral activities may add to the pressure for agreement
on open access.
The particulars of a resource regime were not discussed at the Oslo
meeting. Only France and South Africa were prepared to enter such
discussions, although the U.K.
presented an informal, unofficial working paper intended to focus
discussion.
The question of participation in a resource regime by states other
than the twelve original signatories to the Antarctic Treaty may
become a thorny negotiating problem. It is unlikely that any of the
twelve would welcome negotiating an Antarctic mineral resource
regime with the global community. At the same time, only a few would
assert that all of Antarctica is closed to mineral activities by
others as a matter of international law. Moreover, there is a
general recognition that the twelve cannot appear to be carving up
the minerals of Antarctica among themselves for fear that the global
community would not stand for it. Brazil’s accession to the Treaty
with accompanying efforts to observe the Consultative Meeting caused
some concern
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that the
original signatories were losing their special position, and recent
indications that Sri Lanka may raise the issue at the UN makes the question all the more
troubling.
RECOMMENDED NEXT STEPS
- 1.
- The Department of State should approve the mineral resources
recommendation (VIII-14) when it is tactically advantageous to
do so.
- 2.
- The Antarctic Policy Group, with input from all interested
agencies, should develop terms of reference for the 1976 special
preparatory meeting and seek their adoption through diplomatic
channels after appropriate bilateral preparation. If necessary,
the U.S. might host an informal
meeting in Washington no later than March, 1976, to work out
final terms of reference.
- 3.
- The U.S. should undertake
bilateral consultations with the U.S.S.R. and Japan at an early date. These non
claimants are natural allies of the U.S. on this issue, but were too unprepared at Oslo
to be helpful.
- 4.
- A long-term Action Plan as called for by NSDM 263 should be prepared and
the U.S. position elaborated as
contemplated by the President’s directive of May 20,
1975.
- 5.
- The APG shall give early
consideration to the implementation of the study called for in
Operative paragraph 2 of Recommendation VIII-14 and the
preparation of an environmental impact statement.
