43. Memorandum of Conversation1 2
SUBJECT:
- Secretary’s Luncheon with Group of Five, September 1
PARTICIPANTS:
- UK
- Ambassador Ivor Richard
- Mr. Evan Luard
- Ambassador Donald Logan
- Mr. John Guinness
- USSR
- Ambassador Semyon Kozyrev
- Ambassador Igor Kolosovsky
- Mr. Alexander Shtanko (interpreter)
- JAPAN
- Ambassador Masato Fujisaki
- Mr. Kunisada Kume
- FRANCE
- Minister Guy de Lacharriere
- Minister Roger Jeannel
- US
- The Secretary
- Ambassador Learson
- Under Secretary Maw
- Mr. Oxman (notetaker)
Mr. Luard: (continuation of conversation over cocktails) Who is running in the Democratic primary in addition to Moynihan and Abzug?
The Secretary: Ramsey Clark, the former Attorney General, O’Dwyer and someone else.
[Page 2]Mr. Luard: Moynihan got a lot of publicity while at the UN.
The Secretary: Every time there was a newspaper article criticizing him, I was accused of instigating it. If I had that kind of influence with the press, I would use it to eliminate criticism of me. Pat’s a good friend of mine. He did a good job in India.
Mr. Luard: Did he have political ambitions all along?
The Secretary: I don’t think he had political ambitions before he got here. It was a combination of the Northern media and a peculiar constellation of events. Two years earlier they would have run him out of town, but the circumstances made him a national figure.
Mr. Luard: The conference has reached a critical stage. There is a serious danger of a total breakdown. There is a need for some move to be made. The IInd and IIIrd Committees are stalled waiting for Committee I. Committee I is moving backwards. Is there anything the group could do to get things moving again? We might suggest to Amerasinghe that he put together 15 people to work with him on this, including we five. In Committee I we might seek heads of agreement on a system of exploitation, the Council, the Assembly, the Enterprise... In II and III there might be more detail: marine scientific research, the status of the economic zone, dispute settlement, etc. There is the important matter of construction standards in the territorial sea. If that group were able to reach agreement, it would have a big impact on others. Do the governments represented here think this would be useful? What would be the subjects?’
The Secretary: Matters are approaching a deadlock. If there is no visible progress soon, trends to unilateralism will multiply. I think in II and III we can settle the status of the economic zone and scientific research. I haven’t really studied the dispute settlement matter which, of course, is very critical. Final agreement might be reached at the next session. In the First Committee, there is no conceptual agreement. There are two questions: procedure and substance. On procedure, it would be highly desirable for someone to pull together a coordinated text. I am an agnostic on whether this should be done by the President alone or the President with a small negotiating group. I would support a group if someone else proposed it. The members here should be part of the group. The group could have 12, 15 or 20—I have no particular views, but if it [Page 3] gets larger, it would simply repeat the problems we have had in the conference. Then there is substance. In Committee we cannot compromise on the dual access system. There is no point in creating the impression of flexibility on the dual access system. The question is where can we be flexible. On the question of whether the Enterprise will be viable: we can contribute to insure that it can go into business concurrently with private enterprise or soon thereafter. There could be a review clause, let’s say 20 or 25 years, with an assurance for enterprises that went into business before the review. On the monopoly clause, I have pointed out to our Russian friend that his standing to raise the issue is limited. We have no proposal, but we are studying the matter—how to insure that others can get into business. On the first two points, we can move now. On the third point (monopoly), we can think about if things are not pushed too far.
Mr. Luard: I think these proposals should go far to get the others to accept the dual access system. It would be a very fair system.
The Secretary: It is the only way for the developing countries. If we go unilateral, which we will have to do without agreement, there is nothing for them in terms of getting into business.
Minister de Lacharriere: US offers are reasonable but I’m not sure the Third World behaves in a reasonable way—they are very dogmatic. They want to transfer the internal concepts of resource investment, total control and joint venture to the deep seabeds. They don’t want to do anything here that can prejudice their options. They think you won’t go ahead because if you do, there will be political costs. You will be condemned by the General Assembly.
The Secretary: The most popular thing in the US today is to be attacked by the General Assembly. I have read these reports of developing countries being told to wait for a new administration. There won’t be a new administration. (laughter) Whether or not Carter will be President, I doubt that on this issue he can be more flexible. For a Democrat, this could make him vulnerable to the kind of attack he can’t afford at the start of a new administration. I don’t think Carter will win, but that’s another matter.
Mr. Luard: Do you have any details on how the Enterprise system would work?
The Secretary: We are talking to some companies to see what they can do on top of that. On this, we will have full support from our companies. If the conference rejects dual access, some time next week we will let those bills go through Congress.
[Page 4]Ambassador Kozyrev: What form will the system of the Enterprise take? In the initial stage, the Enterprise will have to hire people who have the practical experience.
Mr. Luard: The more you stress transfer of technology and training, the better.
The Secretary: Particularly because there is no way you can have a monopoly. If a country has five or six sites in operation, then others will be coming in.
Ambassador Fujisaki: I think it is very important for us to indicate that we would help to get the Enterprise started.
The Secretary: Yes, but I must stress that we don’t care what anyone else does. We will never accept the present opposition in the Group of 77 to the dual access system.
Minister de Lacharriere: We are even more reluctant than you. It is dangerous to rely on treaty clauses to balance the powers of the Assembly and the Council. The developing countries will interpret it to expand the powers of the Assembly. This happened in the UN with your support.
The Secretary: We will not introduce a Uniting for Peace into Seabed Authority.
Minister de Lacharriere: Yes, but the Group of 77 will.
The Secretary: That’s a good point. In any event, we are approaching the limit of what we can do on this negotiation.
Minister de Lacharriere: It would be very valuable to make that explicit now. We would be in favor of your saying that. As long as you say you are keen for an agreement, the Group of 77 is suspicious. You ought to say that you cannot accept. If you can say that you cannot accept the text, then perhaps the 77 can accept it.
Ambassador Kozyrev: The idea that the Enterprise can start almost simultaneously will be attractive. But then they will want to write this into the treaty and they will want to provide that there can be no monopoly by states or by the Authority.
The Secretary: It seems to me that details might be put into some separate instrument.
[Page 5]Ambassador Kozyrev: Then they would really be suspicious.
Minister de Lacharriere: Could there be an explicit commitment on time (for starting up the Enterprise)?
The Secretary: Yes, but we cannot provide that we are willing to head up our own exploitation. On the anti-monopoly, we are studying it. We can look at some ideas if they are in keeping with reality. We cannot give the same assurances on the other issues. We are studying it.
Ambassador Kozyrev: What developing countries would be included in this negotiating group?
Mr. Luard: I would think we would leave this up to the President, and urge him to choose constructive individuals.
Minister de Lacharriere: I would conceive of this as a nonexistent, personal group.
Mr. Luard: Shall we go into the other room for coffee?
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, P820121–0672. Secret; Nodis. A note to researchers, this was found under the date December 8, 1976 in the electronic system.↩
- Kissinger and other members of the U.S. delegation discussed UNCLOS III negotiations with British, Soviet, Japanese and French representatives.↩