35. Memorandum of Conversation1 2
SUBJECT:
- Secretary’s Conversation with Mexican DOS Delegation
PARTICIPANTS:
- MEXICO
-
- Secretary’s Office of For. Rel
- S.E. Sr. Manuel Tello, Ambassador, Director & Chief
- S.E. Sr. Antonio Gonzalez de Leon, Ambassador, Director & Chief, Secretary’s Office of For. Rel
- US
-
- The Secretary
- H.E. Mr. T. Vincent Learson, Chairman US Delegation
- Mr. Bernard H. Oxman, Deputy Chairman of US Delegation
- Honorable Paul N. McCloskey, Jr. United States House of Representatives
- Mr. Carlyle E. Maw, Under Secretary of State
- Mr. Leigh S. Ratiner, Deputy Representative, US Delegation (NOTETAKER)
The Secretary: I’ve come here to take the temperature of the Conference and plan to come back in a few weeks. Whenever people say we are having trouble at this Conference, for some reason they always mention Mexico.
Ambassador Tello: Not just Mexico, Mr. Secretary, there are other developing countries. In the case of Mexico, which has acted unilaterally to protect its economic zone, we need a Law of the Sea treaty right away. Committee II and Committee III are very far advanced, but we do not want just any kind of LOS treaty, it must be a good one.
The Secretary: Yes, I know II and III have advanced.
Ambassador Tello: There have been no real negotiations so far on the remaining issues.
[Page 2]The Secretary: Is the United States Delegation right when they tell me our two positions are very far apart?
Ambassador Tello: No. We are willing to negotiate. There are two areas we have to look at closely. One is Part IV on Dispute Settlements and the other, and the main problem, is Part I. There is a big difference between the industrialized countries and Mexico together with other developing countries.
The Secretary: Are you having fun stirring up the developing countries? You know you won’t be a developing country for much longer.
Ambassador Tello: We hope we will.
The Secretary: But being an industrialized country puts you in a much more exclusive club than being in the Group of 77 with a 112 other countries. You know there is very little time left for the Law of the Sea. Unilateral actions have already occurred and can create massive future complications. If the same system spreads to the deep seabed, it will be like colonial days. Of course, the United States is quite capable of protecting its own interests, and we wouldn’t suffer in the short run. But in the long run, there could be chaos and nobody would benefit. We are eager to cooperate with Mexico. I spoke with your Foreign Minister in Mexico. I have very warm memories of my visit there. Please convey my best to your Foreign Minister. I thought your biggest concern in Committee I was that you did not see how the Enterprise could ever function—that you saw the parallel system as really being unilateral because if the Enterprise didn’t function, only the companies would get contracts from the Authority. I told your Foreign Minister that I recognized this as a justifiable concern. We would be prepared to work on solving this problem, but if you challenge the whole concept of double access, there would be a deadlock.
Ambassador Tello: I would like to ask Ambassador Gonzalez de Leon, who is our representative in Committee I, to reply.
The Secretary: Fine.
Ambassador Gonzalez de Leon: Developing countries have to be able to be part of the system. Let me say that we have several basic problems. First, the Enterprise must be operative and that includes funding, but also ensuring that it has access.
The Secretary: I think Mexico is going to ask for New Mexico back as soon as we find oil. You want everything.
Ambassador Tello: We must ensure that the Enterprise is functioning within at least 10 to 15 years. It has to get going.
[Page 3]The Secretary: This is a reasonable position.
Ambassador Gonzalez de Leon: Let me tell you our two basic positions. The Authority should have some say in resource policy. To be very frank and to use a word I know you don’t like, the Authority must have power to impose production controls and to get into commodity agreements. We are copper producers and we want protection for our copper.
The Secretary: You don’t find the production limit satisfactory?
Ambassador Gonzalez de Leon: Yes. It only provides for a 20-year limit. We need it forever. The main problem for copper producing countries will be after 20 years when production from the seabed could ruin the economy of developing countries.
The Secretary: I think Canada has expressed an opposite view. What do you have in mind—a longer limit?
Ambassador Gonzalez de Leon: No, Mr. Secretary. We favor a permanent production control, although it should be reasonable.
The Secretary: How do you answer the argument that in this unique situation we should have a temporary limit and, if there is a problem after 20 years, it could be linked to any results which come about for commodities?
Ambassador Gonzalez de Leon: The Authority has to have weight in any commodity agreements.
Ambassador Learson: But Article 9 already provides for the Authority’s participation in commodity agreements.
Ambassador Gonzalez de Leon: Yes, but under the revised SNT the Authority can only participate to the extent of its own production and the Enterprise may never function.
The Secretary: Well, we owe you some answers on these questions. We will reflect on this.
Ambassador Gonzalez de Leon: Another big point for us is that we favor an elastic Annex I, we could be generous if there were a system to review Part I after a period of time. You see, it is not true that we are blocking Committee I.
The Secretary: I would hate to see what you do when you are blocking.
Ambassador Gonzalez de Leon: Mr. Secretary, I must be very frank. In Committee I, the procedures used at the last session were arbitrary and very unfortunate. We felt we were being dragged along.
[Page 4]The Secretary: But I am told that you participated in the negotiations last session.
Ambassador Gonzalez de Leon: It’s true, but we had to leave the negotiations when we realized that just a few countries were dragging us into a bad situation. These were not good procedures.
The Secretary: I’ve never seen Mexicans being dragged anywhere. I interrupted you before. What did you mean by elastic provisions in Annex I?
Ambassador Gonzalez de Leon: Well, on the one side, countries like the United States prefer a laissez faire system. Others believe the Authority must have total control. What we need for a compromise is a mixed economy. If you want a convention, the Authority must have the power to regulate both production and commercialization. We can go along with an easy way of starting up the system, but the conditions of exploitation have to be revised after a period of time. We don’t think the ultimate regime should be extremely favorable for industrialized countries.
The Secretary: Well, if I understand you, there are two possible approaches. The first would be to specify in the treaty what changes there would be after the first generation of mining. The second approach would be to have a review conference after 20 or 30 years.
Ambassador Tello: Well, we don’t have to review the whole convention, only the Annex to Part I.
The Secretary: Please don’t conclude that I am agreeing to anything. But I want to be sure I understand you. You will have no trouble with liberal access if there were a review procedure?
Ambassador Gonzalez de Leon: Yes.
Ambassador Tello: Yes
The Secretary: So you would have a review of access after 25 or 30 years? Of course, the conditions that applied before then would continue even after the review.
Ambassador Gonzalez de Leon: No, sir. The Authority should have the power to revise the conditions of contracts at that time. We understand that your interests need to be protected—that you need security of tenure—but this has to be limited.
[Page 5]The Secretary: Just to be sure I understand what you are saying, the Authority would have to revise existing production contracts?
Ambassador Gonzalez de Leon: Yes.
The Secretary: So, you want to expropriate?
Mr. Oxman: This would be unilateral action by the Authority.
Ambassador Gonzalez de Leon: I would not call the action of the Authority in which all States have been members unilateral. Security of tenure is too much to give for more than one generation of mining.
The Secretary: Do you realize that the more power you try to give the Authority, the more rigid we will have to be on the question of voting in the Council? Suppose we have an effective veto?
Ambassador Gonzalez de Leon: We would oppose that.
The Secretary: Well, we are not negotiating here. I just wanted to get your views. Let me see if I can review your main points. You want the Enterprise to be effective; and you want control over production and this review conference; and if you can’t get all of this?
Ambassador Gonzalez de Leon: If we can’t have all of this, we’d rather have no convention on the deep seabed. We are not prepared to legitimize the existing situation where you can do as you please.
The Secretary: Suppose the present system were made to work so that the Enterprise were given real resources and suppose other things could be worked out in the CIEC talks, how would you react to that?
Ambassador Gonzalez de Leon: Well, there is one other thing. We also want an anti-monopoly provision in the treaty. This is of great interest to us and to most of the Group of 77. Of course, we won’t start the ball rolling, but you must remember we don’t like the access provisions that are now in the revised SNT.
The Secretary: Do you realize our position? You are asking us to subsidize our competition, agree to production controls and share our profits. This puts us in an impossible situation, Congress will not ratify.
Ambassador Gonzalez de Leon: Well, we won’t insist on the anti-dominant provision.
[Page 6]The Secretary: Is that because you expect others to insist upon it so that you don’t have to?
Ambassador Gonzalez de Leon: Yes, I suppose that is true. There is another point I should mention on the banking system. We don’t think developing countries should have access to the banked mine sites. This will lend itself to flags of convenience.
The Secretary: Yes, I understand that problem. We can give some consideration to flags of convenience—to that problem. It is a fair request. Well, we will think about these things. The viability of the Enterprise, the review idea, and on flags of convenience, the Enterprise should be for all developing countries, and the banking system should not be a subterfuge for the industrialized countries. I don’t know what our answer will be or whether we can do anything for you on these points, but we can look at it in Washington in the next few weeks before I come back.
Ambassador Tello: If you are able to agree to the idea of a review conference, that might help start real negotiations in Committee I.
The Secretary: I haven’t reviewed this question personally. I’ve just heard of it. We will consider the implications of this.
Ambassador Gonzalez de Leon: Good.
The Secretary: You know I am troubled by something. I haven’t been reading everything, but whenever people talk to me, they say there is an unusual tone of bitterness toward us coming from the Mexican Delegation.
Ambassador Gonzalez de Leon: Mr. Secretary.
The Secretary: You know my personal affection for Mexico. I am very fond of Mexico.
Ambassador Gonzalez de Leon: No, sir. There were no attacks by us on the United States, but to be very frank and blunt, Committee I at the last session was being manipulated. We got out of the Group as soon as we realized it. You know the US Delegation should really be more flexible and allow some of these main issues to be reopened. We must reach agreement on these fundamental questions. I know there are risks for you if these issues are reopened, but we must do it anyway.
The Secretary: The idea of manipulation of Peru and Brazil is very hard to believe. That is quite an accomplishment.
[Page 7]Ambassador Gonzalez de Leon: Well, Mr. Secretary, you have a very able man in Committee I.
The Secretary: Yes, if you can manipulate Peru and Brazil. I think so.
Mr. Ratiner: Thank you, Antonio.
Ambassador Gonzalez de Leon: But it is not very dignified to negotiate in this manner. We now have an atmosphere of distrust from the Spring session. We need a negotiating atmosphere with a different procedure. We can’t have this small group dragging us further.
The Secretary: I can’t imagine you being dragged. I agree there is no sense in insisting on things if people won’t agree. We need to understand each other better. I am happy that you are not challenging the double access system.
Ambassador Gonzalez de Leon: That is right. We can live with the dual access system.
The Secretary: If on some of your points it was possible to negotiate—I’m not promising any answers—what would your attitude be?
Ambassador Gonzalez de Leon: We would be positive. We are not radical. We can be very conciliatory, but the situation is now polarized. Let me say, the United States position is very inflexible.
The Secretary: We have a very tough fellow in Committee I. He is not in the career Foreign Service. Of course, that is important because you can’t get to be in the job I have if you come from the career Foreign Service. The qualifications of that job are to come from somewhere else. Well, let me think about these things. I will see what, if any response, we can make. Giving the Enterprise the capacity to exploit its part of the bank is a reasonable request, but production controls is a major theological point for us. That will never get through Congress.
Congressman McCloskey: That is absolutely right. Congress would resist very strongly. The climate is very bad in Congress for discussions of commodity agreements.
The Secretary: Even the 6% production limit in the text we have already accepted is being opposed in Congress. It is going down very hard. If you tie that to a commodity agreement, Congress will finish it. But long before the production from the seabed can have any impact, these commodity questions will probably be settled one way or another. It will be 10 more years before the seabed is producing minerals. Things are changing. If we agree to some constraints, the rest should be left to any negotiations [Page 8] on commodities. Look at our position in CIEC now as compared with 15 months ago.
Ambassador Gonzalez de Leon: The important thing here is to let the steam out in the Group of 77—to permit a renegotiation in Committee I. If you don’t, you will see that the revised text is only an illusion.
The Secretary: Well, then voting in the Council will become of increasing importance if we go further. Please don’t forget you will be a developed country before this whole system starts working. You may then regret some of the things you are insisting on now.
Ambassador Tello: I hope so, sir.
The Secretary: Well, let’s turn to Committee II. The big issue is the high seas?
Ambassador Tello: There are two main problems in Committee II. The relations between the coastal States and the landlocked. We must reach a common understanding.
The Secretary: (To Ambassador Learson) There is no conflict here for us?
Ambassador Learson: No.
The Secretary: Are you affected by any land-locked country?
Ambassador Tello: No, not really, but we may have some problems with Jamaica. There are extremities in the landlocked group. They are asking for access to the mineral resources. This is not acceptable to us. We can agree to the living resources, but not the mineral resources. We do have differences with the US on the juridical status of the Economic Zone. We have a compromise position. On the one side are the countries who wanted a territorial sea of 200 miles. On the other side were the countries who wanted the 12 mile territorial sea with only preferential rights for fishing in the coastal States.
The Secretary: Why were preferential rights not acceptable?
Ambassador Tello: The coastal States should have all the rights to the resources. The Economic Zone is a new concept. There is the territorial sea, the Continental Shelf and the high seas. The Economic Zone is a fourth zone. The real question is what are the rights of coastal States and what [Page 9] is the right of third States in the zone?
The Secretary: Would you be willing to work on the detailed provisions of everyone’s right in the zone? We are interested in functional things, not words. We don’t care what the title is if we can safeguard our interests. Now, I have another group waiting for me, please tell me in two minutes about the science issue.
Ambassador Tello: We want notification for all research.
The Secretary: We can agree to that, can’t we?
Ambassador Tello: Coastal States should not normally refuse to give their consent.
The Secretary: So this bears on a distinction between resource research and other research. We can live with consent if the automatic consent is clearly defined. But if it is left vague, a coastal State could deny almost anything. What we need to do is to define the two kinds of research. We could take a look at this, but we can’t necessarily accept it. I think I am beginning to understand your position. I want you to understand that our Delegation is very sensitive. So, please deprive them of confrontation.
Ambassador Gonzalez de Leon: That’s just a rumor.
The Secretary: We cannot understand this with Mexico. With Algeria, we understand that it is part of a systematic approach to negotiations to cause us problems. Algeria is a professional opponent of ours, but Mexico is not in that category. So, we should not have that problem. We will be in touch again, but you should avoid new onslaughts. Please give my warm regards to your President and Foreign Minister. I look forward to seeing your candidate in Washington in September. I want to keep this a secret from the Vice President, so I can head the US Delegation.