Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–3, Documents on Global Issues, 1973–1976

33. Memorandum for the Record¹ ²

Washington, August 12, 1976, 6:30 p.m.

Subject:

• Meeting on Law of the Sea
  TIME/PLACE: Thursday, August 12, 1976, 6:30 p.m., Secretary’s Conference Room

PARTICIPANTS:

• The Secretary
• The Deputy Secretary
• Under Secretary Maw
• Mr. Lord
• Ambassador Learson
• Ambassador Brewster
• Ambassador Irving
• Mr. Katz
• Mr. Leigh
• Mr. Veliotes
• Mr. Oxman
• Mr. Blaney
• Mr. Eskin (Notetaker)

The Secretary said that he wanted to get an idea what he should do on his visit to New York on August 13. He indicated he wanted to meet with the U.S. delegation.

Learson said that in terms of the delegation there are two choices: The secretary could meet with the key members of the delegation—about 7—or with a large group which would include the senior representatives of other agencies—about 17.

The Secretary said he wanted to meet with the smaller group. He asked who the seven were and whether they were all from the Department of State.

The Secretary said that he did not want to give a press conference on the eve of the Republican National Convention: he would be asked mostly political questions and about the Greek-Turkish dispute in the Aegean and very little about the Law of the Sea. A backgrounder by Lord and Oxman would be okay.

Mr. Lord indicated that he questioned the usefulness of even a backgrounder.

The Secretary said he wants photographers at every meeting, and a schedule of his meetings issued.

Mr. Lord agreed to see to this.

The Secretary said that on the basis of what he had read, he concluded that the U.S. was not in great shape in the negotiations. He said that we had put forth proposals which benefit only the U.S. He asked what the other countries were going to get out of the development of the deep seabed resources.

Mr. Katz said that the developing countries will get an international regime which they want. Ambassador Learson said that the developing countries will get revenue sharing.

Mr. Lord said they will get the 200 mile economic zone.

The Secretary said they already have the 200-mile economic zone: we had insured them of that through our own unilateral legislation. He said that now every country can have an economic zone except Bolivia.

Mr. Lord said that the LOS Treaty would legitimize the 200- mile economic zone.

The Secretary said that he thought we would have a hard time negotiating the Treaty.

Ambassador Learson said we can get all of our objectives except those in the deep seabed negotiations.

The Secretary asked what we wanted from the bilateral meetings. Why were the particular countries selected?

Ambassador Learson said that, for example, Kenya was a leader In the African Group. Frank Njenga turned the Conference around last session on the question of scheduling a second LOS Conference in 1976.

The Secretary asked whether Njenga knew what he was talking about, remarking that [1 line not declassified]. He asked what we wanted from Kenya.

Ambassador Learson said we would want to encourage Kenya to be moderate.

The Secretary said that everyone thinks they are moderate. He stated that the only way he could hope to impress the Kenyan would be to make him believe that he, the Secretary, knew what he was talking about. The Secretary asked about the question of Financing of the Enterprise.

Ambassador Learson said that there was an agreement between State and Treasury on this issue.

The Secretary noted that he was a veteran in these matters and said that all we have from Simon is an agreement to engage in a financial agreement. There is no agreement on what the arrangements would look like.

Under Secretary Maw said that Simon would agree.

The Secretary asked Assistant Secretary Katz whether he thought we had an agreement with Treasury.

Mr. Katz said that Treasury agreed on the need for some arrangements.

The Secretary said that Treasury would agree in principle but kill you in implementation. The Secretary said that we needed an agreement which Treasury would agree to in writing. The fact that Simon says he will go along will not help us in a final showdown. The Secretary asked that a scheme of financing be worked out in which we could go forward at the proper time. Otherwise, he said, Treasury will kill you. We would be characterized before Congress as “sell-out” artists. Unless you get a written agreement, Treasury will say they do not like the scheme. The Secretary said that before the Conference is three weeks old we would have to make a proposal. He said his philosophy is to move as rapidly as possible: he would not want to sit around doing nothing for three weeks. The Secretary said he wanted to be able to set forth the U.S. position early in the Conference and then see what the reaction was to our position. For his visit on August 13, he would listen in a constructive way. On the 24-25, we would start moving.

Mr. Lord asked whether the Secretary would indicate general willingness to move if the other side showed willingness to move in return.

The Secretary indicated that was correct. He said that the Delegation did not want him to sell anything in New York but instead wanted him to sell the package in Washington. The Secretary said that only little boys tried salami tactics in negotiations, giving away a little at a time. He said that gives the impression of total weakness: it teaches the other side that we can be forced to make concessions. He said that we should tell the other negotiators “this is as far as we can go”. Give them 80% of the final position and negotiate around the margins.

Mr. Oxman said that the Council proposal that we are considering is not conceivably acceptable to the Conference and the Secretary will be criticized for it. The Secretary said that the approach is that we begin with a weighted voting system and then back off to a collegiate system. In any case, voting is secondary issue until we have the substance. The Secretary said that we would have to have an NSC meeting on this, and that we would have to move as quickly as possible.

Mr. Katz said that, without the substance, it was not possible to make sense out of the voting system.

The Secretary said that if you start with a voting issue it would be necessary to make concessions on voting. It would be best not to deal with the voting issue until the substance is settled.

Ambassador Learson said that voting would not come up first—the first issue would probably be the access question—but that it might come up as the second issue.

The Secretary agreed to invite Senator Pell and Congressman McCloskey to lunch on Friday, August 13.

Ambassador Learson said that he would like to include the FRG among the bilateral talks.

The Secretary said that he could not operate like a dentist during his day in New York with foreign delegates scheduled to meet with him every few minutes.

Under Secretary Maw suggested that the West Germans might be satisfied with a picture-taking arrangement with the Secretary.

The Secretary said that this would not be enough. If there were no substantive talks the Germans would be irritated. There could be no 20-minute meeting. He observed that there is no law that prevented him from taking a 10-minute break. He said that the question of sticking in the Germans should be kept open.

He asked that at a late time someone explain to him the composition of the Group of Five, the Brazil Group, etc.

He said that he would not be a mouthpiece during his visit to New York— he would not be Queen of England for a day. He said the Delegation must convince him on substance or he would not use the talking points. He said that he would not use talking points that he did not understand. Otherwise, he said, he would do it his own way. [The meeting adjourned and resumed again at 2:30.]

The Secretary, examining the talking points paper for the meeting of the Delegation of Kenya, asked what was meant by “urge them to be moderate”. He asked what compromises we are asking Kenya to make.

Mr. Oxman said that we are asking them to support the parallel access system.

Ambassador Learson said that our problem was the Group of 77 was challenging the RSNT on this issue.

The Secretary asked whether it was not correct that we are seeking procedural changes. He asked what the others wanted.

Ambassador Learson said that the Indians were proposing a system which would last for 20 years in which a contract to a country or private party would not be issued until there was assurance that the Enterprise could get underway.

Mr. Katz said that after the 20 years, under the Indian proposal, there would be no access at all.

Ambassador Learson said that this idea was unacceptable.

The Secretary asked what the developing countries answer was when we tell them to go to hell: when we say we will go it alone.

Ambassador Learson noted that the LDC’s have heard this threat before and it has been useful to us.

The Secretary said that the weakness of the U.S. position is that the U.S. gets 50% of the seabed and the rest of the world gets 50%. We can grab all that is worth grabbing.

Mr. Katz said that that was somewhat of an oversimplification because there is no practical limit on the resources that can be exploited: it would take 100 years or more to use them up.

The Secretary said that it appears that we have no one supporting us because the developed countries are even worse off under our proposal than the developing countries. If there is overproduction we have a monopoly.

The Secretary asked what the manganese nodules contained. Mr. Katz said they would be mined for nickel.

The Secretary asked how we knew what was on the deep seabeds and how we could be sure there was no chrome, for example. He asked why God had decided to give chrome only to South. Rhodesia.

Deputy Secretary Robinson, referring to the fear of monopoly, said that U.S. companies could enter into a consortium with, for example, the FRG.

Ambassador Learson said that the U.S. would not have a monopoly even in 20 years.

The Secretary asked whether the Soviet Union had any deep seabed mining capability and whether it perceived that we would have a monopoly.

Deputy Secretary Robinson said that the only limit to seabed production would be set by the production of nickel.

Mr. Katz said that nickel was the principal metal of commercial interest in manganese nodules.

The Secretary asked whether there was any oil on the seabed.

Mr. Oxman said that it was not believed that there was any oil on the deep seabed, although the Arabs were concerned about this possibility.

The Secretary said that he wanted to know who was for, who was against, and why are they against; what is the negotiating situation and what we are being asked to concede.

Ambassador Learson said that the developed countries will be with us on the access system.

The Secretary asked about the quota proposal and how it would work.

Under Secretary Maw expressed the view that some kind of quota would be feasible and would come about, based on exports and markets.

Ambassador Learson said that Treasury and State have an agreement.

The Secretary stated that there was no agreement. He said that a different kind of quota (from one that limited production) would limit access to sites and this is a different kind of issue.

Ambassador Learson said that the Soviet proposal is very vague. It could give 2 or 3 sites but not an unlimited number.

The Secretary asked what would control the allocation of sites.

Ambassador Learson said that we had not faced this problem with the Soviets.

The Secretary said he wanted to understand what the Soviets wanted. He asked what would happen if you put the two systems together (the Soviet and the Indian staggered access system): would that mean that we would get the first 2 sites and then have to wait until the seventh site becomes available.

Mr. Oxman said that the Japanese had proposed a different quota system in which quota would be based on consumption rather than production.

The Secretary said that as he saw it under the French-Soviet proposal, the U.S. would be stopped. He said that it seemed there was no support for our position. The developed countries would hold out for a quota system while the developing countries would insist on an Enterprise linked to limiting our access. This would scuttle our position.

Deputy Secretary Robinson noted that Canada also wants limitation on mining production.

The Secretary asked how we could solve this problem.

Mr. Oxman said that the developed countries will support us on the Enterprise question and the LDC’s have not supported the quota system at least until recently when Mexico indicated support.

The Secretary said that we have no position from a negotiating point of view.

Mr. Katz said that the opposition to us was based on different considerations.

The Secretary said that usually it is possible to play off one group against another only if you can give to one group or another. He asked what we had to give.

Mr. Lord said there was not much leeway in either Committee II or III.

Ambassador Learson referred to a high seas characteristic of the economic zone.

Mr. Oxman said that developing countries are frightened by the strong position the US has taken on this issue. Before we could make any concession in this area, we would have to sell a compromise to other agencies.

The Secretary asked how we would go about giving the economic zone a high seas status without calling it that.

Mr. Oxman referred to a recent Canadian proposal under which all the high seas freedoms would be applied to the economic zone.

The Secretary stated that he was not going to go to New York to sell anything. He was going in order to give the countries a feeling they are being listened to. Later, he said, we may make proposals. We will then go as far as we can and not piddle our position away. The Secretary asked what the issues were in Committee III.

Ambassador Learson said the main issue was consent regime for marine scientific research in the economic zone.

The Secretary asked whether we had agreed to this. He asked whether everyone agreed on this issue.

Ambassador Learson noted the Interior Department favored a consent regime.

The Secretary said that the Navy would never agree to a consent regime and therefore we had no choice in this matter. He asked how we would explain this issue to other countries.

Mr. Oxman said it depended on who we were talking to. Some of our allies understand the issues perfectly. He said in any case the issue was not only a military one. We do not consider military research as being covered by the regime for scientific research. Our objective is to protect open scientific research.

The Secretary asked what the problem was in regard to dispute settlement.

Mr. Oxman said that the problem concerned the application of dispute settlement procedures to the economic zone. He indicated the US could be flexible on fisheries.

The Secretary asked what he should ask for from the Japanese.

Mr. Oxman said that the Japanese would want to raise fisheries and possibly quota issues.

The Secretary said that he wanted to do something for the FRG on fisheries before the election. He asked that proposals be prepared by Monday and he said he wanted to tell the FRG the results himself. He asked what we wanted from the FRG and said it looked like he would not make much of an impact on his visit to New York. He said he wanted a list of appointments given out this afternoon.

Mr. Oxman went through the luncheon guest list explaining who was involved.

The Secretary asked what we wanted out of the luncheon.

Ambassador Learson suggested the Secretary ask the Conference leadership their view on outstanding issues.

The Secretary commented that any Conference in which a Bulgarian held an influential position did not inspire confidence. He asked why Egypt was included among the bilaterals.

Mr. Oxman explained the problem of the strait of Tiran and the Egyptian views on this issue.

Under Secretary Maw noted that the Israelis were taking the opposite view and wanted free transit to apply to the Strait of Tiran.

The Secretary commented that he would expect the Israelis to claim the Strait of Tiran to be in its territorial sea as a bargaining position. He asked what the issues would be in the Soviet bilateral.

Mr. Oxman said the quota issue. The Secretary asked about the Mexican talks.

Mr. Oxman said that the Mexicans were attacking the compromise agreements made at the last session of the Conference in March.

The Secretary said that he did not want to be pushed into taking a position at these meetings. He said there would be no resolution of issues. He wanted to get a feel for the Conference; to understand what the others are saying. He wanted to know with whom we are trading.

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, P820118–0520. Secret; Nodis. A note to researchers, this document was found under the date September 13, 1976 in the electronic search system.
2. Kissinger discussed with Department of State officials how best to utilize his August 13–14 appearance at the August–September, 1976 (New York) UNCLOS III session.