Since the establishment of the Cabinet Committee by the President the
primary focus of its activity has been on international terrorism as it
affects Americans abroad and foreign nationals in this country. We have
now had sufficient warnings to cause us to be increasingly concerned
about possible acts of terrorism in the United States with international
ramifications. The Hearst and DC Courthouse incidents are but two
examples of cases with international potential since both involved
suggestions of foreign asylum for the terrorists.
We have taken a generally firm line against terrorists and have advised
other governments to do likewise. It is important that our counsel
abroad be consistent with our actions in domestic cases of terrorism
involving foreign interests.
I commend to your consideration the attached guidelines, which I believe
should be useful at such time as internationally-related incidents or
issues may arise and which should facilitate the high level, including
White House, decision-making which may be required.
We are hopeful that new factors such as progress toward a Middle East
settlement will ease tensions and will render the climate for
international terrorists less favorable. Thus it is important that these
guidelines
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remain under
continuing review. I have accordingly directed Ambassador Lewis Hoffacker, Chairman of the Working
Group, to do so with his colleagues who represent you and to report
periodically on appropriate changes in the light of modified
international and other factors.
Attachment
Guidelines
GUIDELINES FOR DEALING WITH TERRORISM WITH
INTERNATIONAL CONNECTIONS OR IMPLICATIONS
STATED POLICY
Under principles of customary international law, the host government
of a country where an act of terrorism occurs is responsible for
providing protection to foreign nationals within its territory,
including securing their safe release from captors.
The US Government has adopted a policy
not to pay ransom and to discourage other governments, companies,
and individuals from making such payments. (Department of State
airgram, A-2667, April 1, 1974.)
The US Government will not give in to
“international blackmail” by terrorist groups. (President Nixon press conference #34, October
3, 1973.)
The US cannot assume a host
government’s responsibility to negotiate with terrorists abroad, but
US officials naturally will
render all appropriate assistance to that government, particularly
if US citizens are held as hostages.
Reciprocally, in an incident in the US involving foreign nationals the US Government will undertake
negotiations to secure the release of hostages. (Department of State
spokesman, Charles Bray, May 2, 1973.)
In cases within the US, the FBI,
under guidance from the Attorney General, has clear
responsibilities, in collaboration with other law enforcement
agencies. The Department of State exercises responsibilities in any
aspects touching on relations with other governments.
A terrorist should be prosecuted for criminally defined acts of
terrorism within the country of commission or be appropriately
extradited. (See Tokyo and Montreal Conventions - TIAS 6758 and
7570, respectively.)
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OBJECTIVES
- —To continue development of a firm, effective, and consistent
US policy at home and abroad.
To manifest appropriate US
Government leadership, by example and by diplomacy, in
attempting to find collective solutions to this international
problem.
- —To take measures at home against terrorism having
international aspects and to do likewise abroad wherever
international terrorists strike, bearing in mind that “domestic
terrorism” is within the jurisdiction of the country
concerned.
- —To establish effective communication with terrorists whose
hostages are under US protective
responsibilities, avoiding hard and fast positions while seeking
to reduce, or ideally to terminate, danger to hostages.
- —To retain the firm, credible US Government image as a deterrent against
potential terrorists and to encourage a like posture by nations
and organizations of the international community, as well as in
the private sector.
ASSUMPTIONS
- —All governments have an internationally accepted
responsibility for protection of foreign nationals within their
respective borders.
- —The US Government will not
release prisoners in response to terrorists’ demands.
- —The US Government generally
opposes but does not act to prevent foreign governments, private
individuals, or companies from meeting terrorists’ demands,
including payment of ransom.
- —Because of effective FBI
follow through in recovering ransom and kidnappers in this
country, the US Government can
show more flexibility here than abroad in acquiescing to ransom
payments.
- —The US Government recognizes
the merit of elimination of causes of terrorism, including
legitimate grievances which motivate potential
terrorists.
- —The US Government is committed
to pursue legal remedies in dealing with terrorists and
endeavors to influence other governments to do likewise.
- —While political motivations such as the achievement of
self-determination or independence are cited by some individuals
or groups to justify terrorism, such issues should be addressed
in appropriate fora rather than by resort to violence against
innocent bystanders.
- —While the US Government
deplores terrorists’ actions wherever they occur, any official
US policy representations to
other governments on essentially domestic terrorism will be
formulated in such a manner as to avoid interference in internal
affairs, particularly if no US
citizens or interests are involved. At the same time, the US Government reserves the right to
criticize other governments if they show irresponsibility in
transferring international terrorists to the international
community in cases which do not involve probable further
bloodshed. In so doing, the US
Government will act so as not to incur responsibility for
bloodshed in a particular incident.
GUIDELINES
Our response to the terrorist challenge should range from the period
prior to an attack (pre-attack), during an actual act of terrorism
(attack), and following the event (post attack).
I. Pre-Attack
- —Study causes of terrorism. Seek to remove then if they are
within our influence and are based on legitimate grievances.
Through our example, through diplomacy, and through appropriate
other means, attempt to influence other governments
similarly.
- —Give appropriate publicity to our position on terrorism so
that potential terrorists—wherever they may be—will be
forewarned should they be tempted to strike within the US or at our nationals
abroad.
- —Educate the US public
concerning international terrorism, how it affects residents of
this country, and the objectives we seek to achieve in
countering it.
- —Improve our intelligence capability in order to deter and
detect terrorist acts. Share intelligence appropriately with
friendly governments bilaterally and, if feasible,
multilaterally.
- —Improve technical and physical security wherever possible—
e.g., airports, airlines, visas, immigration, customs, ships,
piers, key bridges, highway and railway tunnels and water
supplies to permit effective interception of terrorist acts.
Share techniques and experience appropriately with foreign
governments and inspire similar initiatives abroad.
- —Take all appropriate diplomatic initiatives, preferably
multilateral, to inspire legal safeguards or other deterrents
against terrorists.
II. Attack
US decision-makers may be faced with four fairly common terrorist
demands—ransom, release of prisoners, freedom for terrorists, and
domestic amnesty—in three different situations—in the US, abroad
with US interests or citizens
involved, and abroad without involvement of US citizens or interests.
A. In the US
1. Ransom
—Refuse an official ransom. Given, however, the effectiveness of
FBI retrieval of the vast
majority of
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kidnappers/ransoms, show more flexibility in counsel to other
governments, companies, or individuals faced with ransom demands in
this country.
2. Prisoner Release
—Refuse demands for prisoner release.
3. Free Departure for Terrorists—Such a
demand would go to the Attorney General and the Secretary of State,
who would face the following options with pros and cons.
a. Arguments against facilitating foreign
refuge for terrorists.
- (1)
- Allowing the terrorists to escape gives them the opportunity
to strike again, and we may therefore be exporting our problem
to another country, something we have asked other countries not
to do.
- (2)
- Depending on the circumstances, this action may encourage
other terrorists to believe they can test the government’s will
without serious personal risk.
- (3)
- This would be inconsistent with the assumed need and utility
of eliminating safe havens.
b. Arguments in favor of facilitating
foreign refuge for terrorists.
- (1)
- Innocent life or lives might be spared without payment of
ransom or other difficult concession to blackmail.
- (2)
- Depending on the circumstances, the failure of the terrorists
to obtain their objectives might discourage repetition of such
incidents.
- (3)
- If this alternative is suggested, its rejection could expose
the US Government to at least a
portion of the onus for any ensuing bloodshed.
4. Domestic Amnesty
—Avoid any suggestion that federal or state authorities are prepared
to exercise such clemency lest they give a signal to other
terrorists to try similar tactics. Moreover, granting amnesty to the
terrorists themselves would, in certain instances, be inconsistent
with international agreements we have supported and encouraged other
nations to endorse.
B. Abroad with US
Citizens or Interests Involved—Since cases in this category
fall under foreign jurisdiction, the US Government role is essentially advisory.
1. Ransom
—Advise other governments, companies, and other parties concerned of
the disadvantages of payment of ransom in the long range deterrent
to terrorism.
—As a last resort and if the life of the hostage is clearly at stake,
acquiesce to a non-US Government ransom.
2. Prisoner Release
—Refuse demands for American prisoners release.
—Advise other governments to stand firm against demands for prisoner
release unless it is advantageous to show flexibility in cases of
foreign “political prisoners.”
3. Freedom for Terrorists
—As a last resort and if the life of the hostage is clearly at stake,
acquiesce in “the Bangkok solution” whereby terrorists are given
their freedom and publicity for their cause in return for freedom of
the hostages.
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4. Domestic Amnesty
—Urge fulfillment of the principle of arrest or extradition of an
offender unless, as in the previous section, the life of the hostage
is clearly at stake.
C. Abroad without US Citizens or Interests Involved
1. Ransom, prisoner release, freedom for
terrorists, or domestic amnesty—In all four categories,
US Government counsel to other
governments will necessarily be more muted than in the previous
instance, where US citizens or
interests were directly involved, unless there is the prospect of
transfer of the international terrorist(s) in question to the
international community. In the latter instance, the US Government should advise firmness in
the absence of a probable threat to the hostage’s life and resist,
within the limitation of the law, admitting terrorists wishing to
come to the US.
III. Post-Attack
- —Pursue the terrorist with the collaboration of other
governments.
- —Arrest and prosecute the terrorist or extradite him to an
appropriate jurisdiction.
- —Urge other governments to follow the US pattern of holding convicted terrorists for
service of their sentences in accord with the terms and
conditions generally applicable to common criminals serving
sentences for like crimes. Governments should not consider
release of prisoners in anticipation of a further terrorist
threat.
- —Improve technical, physical, and legal deterrents in the
light of the experience gained in the attack. Exploit the
momentum which sometimes is generated by an attack to induce
other governments to improve counter-measures.
- —Examine the origin of the terrorist action, including the
motivation of the terrorists. If it is within our
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influence and it
embodies a legitimate grievance, seek ways to remove it in order
to eliminate the cause of similar terrorism.
OPERATIONAL ASPECTS
Terrorist incidents abroad involving US interests are normally managed by task forces,
either informally or formally organized, headed by the Chairman of
the Working Group of the Cabinet Committee, who operates
simultaneously as Special Assistant to the Secretary of State as
Coordinator for Combating Terrorism. (Exceptions are sometimes made
on the management of the task force if a US official is kidnapped.)
In either capacity he calls on members of or participants in the
Working Group, or others, to cooperate in meeting the challenge of
an international terrorist attack. This task force action usually
focuses in the Operations Center of the Department of State, but may
also be directed from the office of the Chairman. Procedures for
dealing with kidnapping of a US
official abroad are dealt with in a special SOP (A-S660, July 3,
1973).
The Chairman of the Working Group would take similar initiatives (at
the suggestion of members of the Working Group or otherwise) in
setting up a task force in the Department of State in the event of
any incident within the US with
foreign components or potentiality. Such an organization will
dove-tail with the command post established by the FBI or other agencies having
responsibilities for coping with the incident. Nothing herein
conflicts with or infringes upon standing responsibilities of the
FBI or other agencies in such
situations. The functions of the task force would include:
- 1.
- Maintain closest liaison with the operational command post
run by the FBI or other
agency managing the incident and advise them on foreign
relations aspects which may be involved or foreseen.
- 2.
- Call upon Justice, Transportation, CIA and other agencies with responsibilities in
the incident (probably their Working Group members) to name
representative(s) to work with the task force.
- 3.
- Maintain liaison with the White House (Domestic Council
and NSC) as appropriate,
soliciting guidance as the case develops.
- 4.
- Maintain contact with Foreign Service posts involved and,
through them, with the respective foreign governments.
Maintain similar contact with the embassy (embassies)
concerned in Washington.
- 5.
- Serve as the focal point for making recommendations on the
foreign policy aspects to be passed to the respective
superiors by members of the Working Group, keeping the White
House informed throughout this process.
- 6.
- Take such initiative as appropriate to ensure prompt,
coordinated recommendations to the White House on crucial
decisions.
- 7.
- Because of the extreme importance of using publicity to
the maximum advantage, serve as the authority within the
US Government for
arranging public statements on international aspects of
ongoing incidents.
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CABINET COMMITTEE
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of the Treasury
The
Secretary of Defense
The Attorney General
The Secretary of
Transportation
The United States Ambassador to the United
Nations
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs
The Assistant to
the President for Domestic Affairs
The Director of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation
