Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–3, Documents on Global Issues, 1973–1976

199. Memorandum From the Acting Secretary of State (Robinson) to President Ford¹ ²

Washington, September 21, 1976

Subject

• Report to the President of the Cabinet Committee on International Narcotics Control on the International Narcotics Control Program

I have been informed by the Domestic Council you desire to have a report of the activities of the Cabinet Committee on international Narcotics Control (CCINC) to consider concurrently with reports of new Cabinet Committees for Drug Law Enforcement and Drug Prevention, Treatment and Rehabilitation which you have requested by October 1, 1976.

I am pleased to forward herewith the report of the CCINC and look forward to the receipt of any views and guidance concerning the International Narcotics Control Program which you may have for the Committee.

Attachment:
Report Prepared in the Cabinet Committee on International Narcotics Control

Report of the Cabinet Committee on International Narcotics Control on the International Narcotics Control Program

Five years ago, on August 17, 1971, the President created the Cabinet Committee on International Narcotics Control (CCINC). It was charged with developing a strategy to check the illegal flow of narcotics to the United States and to coordinate the efforts undertaken abroad by involved Federal Departments and Agencies to implement that strategy. Success in this effort required obtaining the cooperation of governments of the countries where these drugs are produced and refined as well as those which they transit.

The Secretary of State was appointed Chairman of this Cabinet Committee. Other members included the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Agriculture, the U.S. Representative to the United Nations, and the Director of Central Intelligence.

I. Highlights

What has been achieved during these five years? What is the current situation? What lies before us?

A. What Has Been Achieved?

In 1971, as now, the opium poppy was legally grown in India and Turkey to supply the world’s pharmaceutical industry. Opium was and is produced illegally in Mexico Burma, Thailand, Laos, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. Most of the heroin then smuggled into the U.S. came from Turkish opium which had escaped that Government’s controls. It was processed into heroin principally in France and smuggled into the U.S. a trade which became known as the French Connection.

The first major successes in the international control effort were the Turkish Government’s ban on poppy cultivation, effective after the 1971–72 crop year and the cooperative enforcement actions of the French authorities.

As a consequence, the problem of drug abuse in the U.S. improved. The heroin addiction rate, for example, dropped sharply. However, it took a turn for the worse in 1974. Demand in the U.S. continued and the traffickers had turned to Mexico for heroin to meet it. This upturn in the direction of the indicators of drug abuse continued and President Ford asked the Domestic Council in 1975 to review the overall Federal effort and recommend ways to make the Federal drug abuse corrective programs more effective. The resulting White Paper on Drug Abuse, in addition to calling for increased action to reduce demand and supply within the U.S., underlined once again the importance to this effort of the International Narcotics Control Program because such a large part of the drugs abused in the U.S. originate abroad.

The drug abuse problem will continue to be serious in the U.S. as long as the demand for illicit drugs remains high. We believe that the rate of addiction be reduced if availability is lowered. The Cabinet Committee on International Narcotics Control is targeted on that goal. A long struggle must be anticipated; but a significant degree of success can be attained as we saw when the disruption of the French Connection reduced availability.

As most of the heroin now seized in the U.S. is from Mexico, the Mexican Government’s crop eradication program is first priority. President Ford, Secretary Kissinger and Attorney General Levi have all underlined in their talks with President Echeverria and the Mexican Attorney General the great importance we attach to the Mexican narcotics control efforts. Aided by equipment and technical assistance provided through our International Narcotics Control Program, Mexico is having very important successes in destroying illegal opium poppy fields there. However the best indicator of success will be a major reduction in the quantity of Mexican brown heroin available on the streets in the U.S. We do not have significant evidence of this to date.

The Turkish Government rescinded its ban on opium poppy cultivation in 1974. But, with assistance and technical advice from the United Nations narcotics control organizations which we help fund and support the Government of Turkey has thus far been effectively controlling production, which is now in poppy straw form. While the United Nations and the Turkish authorities were discussing these control efforts, United States officials, including President Ford and Secretary Kissinger made clear our continued concern that they be made effective.

In other parts of the world, our efforts have brought about greatly increased concern over the problem of drug abuse and drug trafficking. This increased awareness of the drug abuse problem has been the fundamental basis for the greatly improved cooperation we now receive from a number of foreign governments important to us this effort.

B. What is the Current Situation?

Drying up the Mexican heroin source will require a continuation of the strenuous efforts the Mexican Government is now making. A new Mexican administration will be inaugurated in December, three months after the resumption of intensified poppy eradication efforts this fall. President-elect Lopez Fortino has stated that his administration will continue and even seek to increase its predecessor’s efforts. However, the transition phase between presidential administrations could result in a slow-down which, even if brief, could allow a significant amount of opium to be harvested since substantial acreage reaches maturity in the late fall.

If success is achieved in Mexico, the continuing high level of demand for heroin in the U.S. will lead the traffickers to turn to other sources, as they did when the French Connection was broken. These sources exist, unfortunately, and others may be created.

Recently new possibilities have opened for us to grapple with the flow of cocaine to the United States and we are developing important new programs to this end in Bolivia, Peru, and Colombia. The White Paper on Drug Abuse of September 1975 stated that when resources constraints force a choice, the choice should be made in favor of the higher priority drugs, such as heroin, which inherently pose a greater risk to the individual and to society. The paper was referring to studies then available showing that the social costs of cocaine abuse were significantly less than those of other stimulants, opiates and depressants. However, the White Paper did not state that all of our efforts should be devoted only to the opiates, barbiturates and amphetamines which appear to have currently higher social costs. Attention, the White Paper said, must be given to all drugs to keep them from expanding into major problems. Cocaine, all agree, is a harmful drug but its use has less social cost than heroin at the present time. However, the percentage of our international program directed against cocaine, even with the new programs now projected for Bolivia and Peru—some $5 to 7 million per year over five years from an annual budget that has averaged in the upper thirty millions —is well below the percentage directed against heroin. Therefore, we believe the programs envisaged for Bolivia, Peru and Colombia regarding cocaine are entirely consistent with the White Paper.

Moreover, coca production is narrowly limited geographically—mainly Bolivia and Peru—and we are therefore being offered an unusual opportunity to subject it to control at a time when production of coca in those countries is being greatly expanded.

Much of the cocaine smuggled into the United States is refined in Colombia from coca paste produced from coca plants grown in Peru and Bolivia. We have recently been receiving reports of dramatically expanded coca production in Peru and Bolivia together with estimates that it could easily be further expanded.

Further, opium production by Peruvian and Ecuadorian farmers has started on the eastern slopes of the Andes where soil and climate are suitable and control is very difficult, although no significant amounts are produced at the present time. The possibility of profits from expanded cocaine traffic financing a successor to Mexican heroin production is of substantial concern.

In September 1975, President Lopez of Colombia and President Ford discussed the increasing cocaine Problem. President Ford directed that we expand our assistance to Colombian efforts to interdict the growing cocaine traffic.

June 1976, President Banzer of Bolivia and Secretary Kissinger met and laid the groundwork for an expanded action program regarding coca. Subsequently, Peru, the other major producer of the plant, has offered to work with us as well. We will seek to develop a program to bring coca production in those countries under control by combining alternative income for coca growers with the adoption of a parallel crop control and enforcement effort. The difficulties posed by this program are much easier to envisage than solutions to the problems. Not only must we identify sources of income viable in these remote areas, but means of marketing the products. Moreover, long entrenched life styles must be changed. Perhaps as long as three to five years may be required to determine the feasibility of and prepare to launch a large scale crop substitution program in the major coca producing regions. But the price of failure is infinitely greater than the funds involved.

We sought and obtained President Ford’s approval of such a program for Bolivia. And we specifically mentioned the issue of program priorities, the difficulties to be faced and the probability that a similar effort would be made in Peru.

C. What Lies Before Us?

Recognizing that we cannot eliminate drug traffic as long as there is a demand for illicit drugs in the United States, we must prepare ourselves for a long term effort to try to reduce the levels of availability. Specifically, we should:

• —continue encouragement and assistance to Mexico so that its eradication and interdiction campaigns will continue until the illicit producers and traffickers are finally discouraged;
• —continue U.S. financial support to the U.N. Fund for Drug Abuse Control;
• —continue encouragement of the Turkish Government and the United Nations to the end that Turkish opium does not again become the raw material for heroin in our streets;
• —seek to make more effective the efforts of Burma, Thailand, Pakistan and Afghanistan to bring their illicit opium under control, recognizing that the traffickers could readily turn to those areas to supply the demand for heroin in this country if and when the Mexican source is greatly curtailed;
• —be alert to the possible development opium and heroin sources;
• —press forward with our cooperative efforts against the illicit trafficking of cocaine in Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia and with our newly developing opportunities to bring coca production towards control in Bolivia and Peru;
• —make continuing efforts to bring all Federal assets to bear to develop improved international narcotics intelligence;
• —generally make greater efforts to persuade foreign governments to increase their narcotics programs both in law enforcement and in treatment and prevention:
• —pursue intensified diplomatic efforts to encourage other victim nations to express in multilateral forums and in bilateral contacts their concern over violations of international treaty obligations.

II. The International Narcotics Control Program

Under the Cabinet Committee, a plan of attack was devised to achieve foreign cooperation. Working with our Embassies, Narcotics Control Action Programs were developed for the principal countries involved in production and trafficking. These plans have been under continuing review. Their major emphasis has been on:

• —law enforcement cooperation and exchange of narcotics intelligence information;
• —the building of local enforcement capabilities, and
• —helping producer countries control legitimate production and reduce illicit cultivation.

Because enforcement efforts seize at most 10 to 15 percent of illicit drugs that move into the U.S. our assistance activities concentrate on getting directly at the source, to the extent we can, to eradicate or control it.

A. Narcotics Control Assistance Funds

Our efforts have been supported by International Narcotics Control Program funds. These are authorized and appropriated in the Foreign Assistance Act and administered directly by the State Department with Cabinet Committee policy and program advice and assistance. Over the past five years, these expenditures have amounted to $I47 million. The request for Fiscal Year 1977 is for $34 million with a return envisaged in 1978 to the previous level of requests of around $38 to $40 million. The breakdown of program funds by countries for Fiscal Years 1975 through 1977 is set forth in the attached table. The principal projects are in Burma and Thailand. Other sizeable amounts have gone to Colombia, Ecuador, Bolivia and Peru.

When our international program began five years ago, we found that most governments tended to regard drug abuse as primarily an American phenomenon. Few had effective drug control laws: fewer had drug law enforcement units. Our diplomatic efforts to change this situation, which have had a considerable measure of success, have often been aided by the work of our demand reduction experts. These people worked with their foreign counter parts to develop recognition of the problem’s existence and dimensions. For this reason and in order to demonstrate our concern for the human as well as the enforcement side of drug abuse control, we have had a small but important demand reduction section in our international program. We expect this component to increase and improve the assessment of international drug abuse problems the extent and quality of treatment and prevention efforts conducted by other governments, and research in this field in other countries. In the future, we expect the National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA) to help us in this regard.

One problem which complicates narcotics control everywhere in the world is the corruption of public officials encouraged by the enormous profitability of this illegal traffic. Wherever we believe such action might be constructive, we have brought evidence of corruption to the attention of the highest authorities.

Mexico—As indicated, the Mexican program currently has the top priority. For Fiscal Year 1976 (which includes an additional Interim Quarter), U.S. Government narcotics control assistance to Mexico amounted to $14.5 million, or 30 percent of the total program. An additional $11 million is programmed for Fiscal Year 1977. The Mexican Government with our assistance—primarily aircraft and technical assistance—is pursuing a vigorous program in poppy crop destruction and in interdiction of illicit trafficking.

The Mexican Government decided in November 1975 to move from manual destruction of poppy plants to spraying them with herbicides by helicopter. Previously soldiers were moved by helicopter into the poppy fields in the high Sierra Madre mountains, to knock the plants down with sticks. Generally speaking, the fields are isolated from the farms and this facilitates aerial spraying. Over 20,000 fields were sprayed with widely used and environmentally safe chemicals earlier this year. A number, perhaps a significant number, of the fields had, unfortunately, been harvested before they were destroyed and we can assume most were replanted soon after destruction. Nevertheless, we believe the Mexican eradication program’s achievement this year will, in due course, significantly reduce Mexican heroin avail ability on the U.S. market. Lasting effectiveness of the eradication campaign, however, will require continuation—at the same levels—of the efforts of the Mexican Government.

President-elect Lopez Portillo has publicly stated his intention to continue the eradication program. He has also expressed concern, as had President Echeverria, over the plight of the impoverished farmers who have been lured by the traffickers into this illegal but lucrative crop. The opium poppy is not a traditional crop in Mexico. The Echeverria Government had made clear in the past that while it was anxious to help the many poor farmers of the country, it would not compensate any of them for giving up illegal activities recently inspired by the traffickers. We believe this is the correct view and that President-elect Lopez Portillo will adhere to it as did President Echeverria.

With the prospect that the Mexican source of heroin is coming under control, we are more concerned than ever with Burma, Thailand, Pakistan and Afghanistan. We must redouble our efforts to help these countries try to eliminate their illegal opium production.

Burma—Burma produces the largest quantity of illicit opium the world, estimated at 450 tons annually. Most of Burma’s opium is grown in its northern states, infested with bandit gangs and insurgent groups. The Burmese Government, recognizing that almost all of these organizations finance their operations with proceeds from opium sales, wishes to check this traffic. It needed helicopters to support raids on illegal poppy fields and heroin laboratories located in territory not under its full control. With the arrival of six U.S.-supplied helicopters in late summer of 1975 the Burmese authorities began mounting major operations against narcotics refinery sites, drug caravans and trafficking organizations. During the 1975/76 growing season the Burmese Government seized and destroyed 17 major heroin laboratories, intercepted nine large drug caravans and destroyed more than 18,000 acres of opium poppies. These efforts reduced significantly the amount of heroin that would have been available that year for export from Burma. For Fiscal Year 1976, including the transitional quarter we programmed 12 additional helicopters for Burma to augment its capabilities for these operations. Six of these have been delivered and the final six are scheduled for delivery by the end of calendar year 1976. Our narcotics control expenditures in Burma for FY 1976 were $13.3 million. A FY 1977 budget request for $3.6 million is to support a spare parts and maintenance program and to furnish any additional required aircraft.

Despite the successes in Burma to date, it must be recognized that virtually all of the growing areas are at this time outside of full time government control so that important opium production is likely to continue for years to come. This production will remain a potential source for trafficking destined for the United States especially if other sources are diminished. Thus, any significant reduction that can be made by the Burmese Government in what is available for export is of great importance to us.

Thailand—In Thailand the great majority of illicit opium is discovered while it is in transit from Burma to the international markets. Several important steps have been taken in Thailand in various narcotics control areas, particularly during the past year. Thai Customs, aided by a U.S. Customs Advisory Team, has increased narcotics seizures at Bangkok International Airport. Specially trained narcotics sensor dogs also began checking outgoing luggage. In the port area, the newly organized Customs Narcotics Unit made its first drug seizures on ships departing the harbor. DEA advisory and liaison assistance continue. However we are trying to encourage a more successful and determined Thai effort to disrupt the flow of narcotics through Thailand. Our assistance in FY 1976 was $1.7 million; the Congressional request is for $1.3 million in FY 1977.

Pakistan—About 150 tons of illicit opium are produced annually in areas either not under government control or where the local economy has dependence upon opium production. Both the United Nations and our bilateral programs are financing studies and pilot projects seeking alternative sources of income for the traditional growers of opium. These, when identified and coupled with enforcement of crop controls, could persuade the producers to switch to other crops in the settled and so-called merged areas (the former princely states). We are also providing transportation and communications to help the Pakistan Narcotics control Board establish a network of 25 Field Investigation units at strategic points throughout the country of concentrate on the interdiction of illicit opium traffic.

Both the launching of the pilot project for income replacement and the effective establishment of the FIUs are lagging and we have brought our concern to the attention of the Government. If renewed forward movement is not forthcoming soon we should raise the level of our approach.

The problems faced by the Pakistan Government are compounded by the fact that it has virtually no control over the tribally governed areas, where much of the opium is grown, and uncertain control in the merged areas.

Afghanistan – About 150 tons of opium are also illicitly produced in uncontrolled areas of Afghanistan and that Government is likewise seeking a program to provide alternative sources of income to its farmers. In addition, there is a U.N. program supporting police narcotics control efforts. Afghanistan, a non-aligned country, wants all international narcotics assistance channeled through the United Nations.

The illicit opium from both Pakistan and Afghanistan finds its way mainly to the Iranian illegal market. Iran, with a higher percentage of its population addicted to the opiates even than the United States, produces and controls its own opium crop for distribution to registered addicts. However, many additional addicts are supplied by the illegal opium smuggled from Pakistan and Afghanistan and it would, therefore, be appropriate for Iran to expand its contributions to the United Nations programs to bring opium poppy production in those neighboring countries under control. The possibility of such an arrangement is being explored but without success to date.

The Coca Belt—In the countries involved with cocaine—Bolivia Peru, Colombia and Ecuador—the U.S. has been providing assistance to improve interdiction programs, the major share being for the expanded assistance program of interdiction in Colombia.

Recent initiatives to consider income replacement programs in Bolivia as a result of Secretary Kissinger’s talks with President Banzer will involve considerably larger assistance sums. Coca leaves have been chewed by the Indian inhabitants of the high Andes for as long as man can recall. In addition to this traditional use there is also a small legal demand in the United States and elsewhere for coca flavoring. What is of concern to us is the surplus of current growth over these traditional and legal uses, increasing amounts of which are transformed into cocaine and smuggled into the U.S.

We are discussing with the Bolivian Government Program that will:

• —expedite and expand our existing research and pilot efforts to determine the feasibility of alternative sources of income for the traditional coca growers;
• —develop a mechanism to enforce control over coca growing because traffickers can always outbid legal buyers (new growers should, we believe, be stopped now and traditional growers should be subjected to control when alternative sources of income become available); and
• —strengthen Bolivian enforcement capabilities against the traffickers.

President Ford has approved potential funding over five years with up to $45 million of AID concessional loan funds for agricultural assistance to poor farmers in the coca growing areas of Bolivia and up to $8 million in additional narcotics control funds to strengthen enforcement. U.S. loan funds will be utilized provided viable programs can be developed and the Government moves forward with enforcement and control measures. We plan also to encourage Bolivia to seek additional assistance for this effort from the International financial institutions.

As has been stated, we also have a request from Peru for a similar program to consider income substitution for coca growers and for increased enforcement efforts.

Training—Our training program for foreign law enforcement officials is an important part of our control effort. With expenditures of some $5 to $6 million per year, our training program has helped develop a cadre of professional narcotics enforcement officials in many key countries of production, processing, and trafficking importance. Since the beginning of the program, the Drug Enforcement Administration and the U.S. Customs Service, using international narcotics control funds, have trained a combined total of almost 12,000 foreign enforcement officials. Many of them are now providing narcotics training to their fellow officers, thereby multiplying the impact of our training. All of our training is now geared to institution building so that these foreign governments can increasingly assume the training job themselves.

U.N. Fund for Drug Abuse Control – The major item in our international narcotics control budget is the U.S. contribution to the United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control (UNFDAC). The Fund was established five and a half years ago, largely in response to U.S. initiative, to receive voluntary contributions to enable the U.N. and the specialized agencies to assist governments seeking to curb drug abuse. This structure supports the international treaty narcotics control system and also administers an assistance program similar to ours. We have thus far been the Fund’s largest financial supporter, providing some three-quarters of the total contributions received by it. In order to encourage greater money raising efforts by the Fund, we have brought the Congressional criticism of the disproportionate U.S. financial support of UNFDAC to the attention of the Fund’s management.

Certainly the most significant contribution made by UNFDAC was what it achieved in Turkey following that Government’s decision to lift its poppy ban. The Government of Turkey accepted the recommendation UNFDAC experts to adopt the method of harvesting known as “poppy straw,” which greatly facilitates control. Important financial and equipment assistance was also given Turkey by the U.N. All evidence available to us indicates that the Turkish control system was effective for both the 1974/75 and 1975/76 crop years.

The Turkish Government is building a poppy straw processing plant with a capacity to process 20,000 tons of poppy straw. Turkey’s first year’s production was 5,800 tons of straw and this year’s is estimated at 14,000 tons. The Government may be burdening itself with either an economically unviable plant or with the need to license more and more poppy fields—thus making its effective controls more difficult. The U.N. had recommended a phased approach.

The U.N. Fund’s achievements in Turkey could not have been accomplished on a bilateral basis, by the United States or any other country. Apart from other activities of the Fund, it proved its worth to U.S. national interests with this single effort. This is not to say, however, that the Fund is without fault. There is a need for increased effectiveness in a number of its programs and for a better program of evaluation. Its management must, moreover, greatly increase the effectiveness of its fund raising campaign in areas other than the United States if it is to remain a viable international organization.

B. Strengthening of International Treaties

We have also worked for more effective worldwide drug controls through the strengthening of international treaties. But, while we have successfully promoted a tightening of controls on the naturally produced narcotics, we have thus far failed to ourselves ratify a treaty extending international controls to amphetamines, barbiturates and other psychotropic substances.

The 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs —

This treaty, currently in force, limits the production, manufacture and use of natural narcotics substances to that required for medical and scientific purposes. One hundred and six countries, including the U.S. are now parties to the Single Convention.

The Amending Protocol to the Single Convention —

This Protocol strengthens the authority of the International Narcotics Control Board—the control organ of the Single Convention —and tightens Provisions concerning opium production controls. By July 1975, a total of forty countries, including the United States, had ratified or acceded to this Protocol and it came into force for them on August 8, 1975. Unfortunately, with the exception of Thailand, none of the important opium-producing countries has yet become a party to the Protocol. An important part of our diplomatic goal continues to be to urge its more widespread acceptance.

The Convention on Psychotropic Substances of 1971—

We were among the initiators of this effort to arrange international control of the psychotropic or “mind-altering” substances such as LSD, mescaline, amphetamines, barbiturates and tranquilizers.

The Psychotropic Convention was sent to the U.S. Senate on June 29, 1971, for advice and consent to ratification. But Congressional approval of the enabling domestic legislation is still awaited. This delay has been an international embarrassment to us and has reduced the moral force of our arguments for cooperation from other countries. Among the victims of illicit traffic in psychotropic substances are the less developed countries where narcotic plants such as the opium poppy are most widely cultivated, the very countries we continuously press to take more effective action to keep their products off our streets.

Ratification by forty countries occurred on May 18, 1976, and the Convention came into force for those countries on August 16. U.S. ratification would demonstrate our good faith in support of drug controls and, more importantly, encourage the extension of the treaty to numerous other countries. Unlike the United States, a number of producer countries do not have effective export controls on psychotropic substances, a situation that results in their illicit flow into other countries, importantly including our own. Some of the major producers of psychotropics have not as yet acceded to the Convention. Ratification by the United States would help spur these countries to do likewise.

The President has repeatedly called for passage of the domestic enabling legislation, most recently in his narcotics message to the Congress of April 27, 1976. The Department of State and other Cabinet Committee agencies have sought to identify and resolve the problems the House has had with the proposed enabling legislation. However, we have not yet been successful because the objections of a few members appear to be based simply on an aversion to the establishment of international controls in this field.

C. Narcotics Control Personnel Abroad

Our Ambassadors abroad have been charged with the responsibility for obtaining higher level commitment from host governments and maximum cooperative action toward effective narcotics control. A Foreign Service officer at virtually each foreign post has been designated as Narcotics Control Coordinator to assist the Ambassador in coordinating the functions of all U.S. officials working on drug control matters. These include 287 persons of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) now assigned to our Embassies and Consulates, an increase from 91 in 1971. Operating under the policy guidelines of the CCINC and the direction of the Ambassadors under whom they serve, DEA agents are the principal liaison contact for the U.S. Government with foreign agencies concerned with enforcement of drug laws. Their principal duties are liaison in enforcement and in the development and exchange of narcotics intelligence. Their presence and activities abroad have a legal basis in Article 35 of the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs which provided for liaison and cooperation between national narcotics enforcement authorities. DEA agents also work with Embassy and AID officers who are endeavoring to encourage a strengthening of drug control laws, an increase in enforcement capabilities and improvement in the effectiveness of narcotic crop eradication or control programs.

The latest guidelines for DEA operations in foreign countries, dated July 30, 1976, reflected the congressional concern written into the National Security Assistance and Arms Control Act of 1976 that U.S. officers not participate in direct police arrest action abroad. The Congressional action expressed a desire, congruent with the policy direction the Cabinet Committee and DEA have for some time been following, to move DEA abroad away from operational activities and toward a liaison and intelligence collection and exchange role. The Defense Department and Customs, likewise affected by the Act, also have appropriate guidelines.

II. The Job Ahead

The White Paper on Drug Abuse made a number of important recommendations regarding our international narcotics control program. Throughout the past year, the Department of State in conjunction with the other member agencies of the Cabinet Committee on International Narcotics Control has worked to implement them and we shall continue to work in this direction.

Coordination between the CCINC and the new Cabinet Committees on Enforcement and Treatment is developing well due to a degree of interlocking membership and the presence of the Executive Directors of each of the three Cabinet Committees on the Working Group of each Committee.

A major current project is to improve the overseas narcotics intelligence program so as better to utilize the talents of all appropriate U.S. agencies. This would include State, DEA, Customs, CIA, DOD, et al. The object of this program is to increase the quantity and quality of the intelligence gathering and analysis necessary for more effective crop control and eradication, interdiction and prosecution (both foreign and domestic) and to insure better dissemination to all potential users. The resources and manpower devoted to intelligence by the lead enforcement agency —DEA must be augmented to achieve these goals. We should also make further progress in techniques to locate new opium poppy cultivation.

The CCINC agencies will also work for the following:

• —increasingly effective efforts abroad to reduce illicit narcotic supply and demand;
• —our prompt ratification of the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances and the ratification of this Convention and the Amending Protocol by more countries;
• —continued support of the U.N. Fund for Drug Abuse Control, at the same time urging the Fund to conduct a much more aggressive fund raising program and to increase the effectiveness of its program;
• —continued U.S. support and participation in INTERPOL and the Customs Cooperation Council;
• —stepped up action directed against the fiscal resources of narcotics traffickers, including negotiation of mutual assistance agreements for exchange of financial information, Customs-to-Customs agreements and strengthened tax treaties;
• —continued assistance to other governments to strengthen their narcotics control legislation; and
• —coordinated efforts to obtain U.S. jurisdiction over foreign drug traffickers through extradition and expulsion where appropriate and feasible and judicial cooperation programs which encourage foreign prosecution of traffickers abroad. Judicial cooperation entails agreed methods for exchanging evidence consistent with applicable judicial procedures. Foreign cooperation in the prosecution of traffickers relieves docket congestion in U.S. Courts and manifests the spirit of cooperation in the broadest sense.

IV: Objectives Requiring Presidential Support

To supplement the efforts of the CCINC agencies, Presidential support is recommended for three crucial areas in the International Narcotics Control Program:

First, the White House should continue to seek Congressional approval of enabling domestic legislation to pave the way for Senate approval of U.S. ratification of the 1971 Convention on psychotropic substances.

The second area relates to a much needed tightening of U.S. laws dealing with major narcotics offenders.

The White House should continue to spearhead the drive for minimum mandatory sentences and other provisions of the Narcotics Sentencing and Seizure Act now pending before the Congress. While the U.S. Government can point with some satisfaction to its efforts toward improving the effectiveness of international narcotics control, our own efforts to deal with traffickers has acquired a reputation of leniency. Specific complaints have been registered, primarily from Latin American countries, about low bail, release on personal cognizance, lenient sentences, and early parole of traffickers apprehended following close cooperation between U.S. and foreign law enforcement officials. Such treatment clearly inhibits our ability to sustain support from foreign governments in this area.

Thirdly, the subject of narcotics control should be included in the President’s agenda for all high-level bilateral discussions with officials from countries that can be of assistance in furthering our narcotics control objectives. Recommendations for specific action of this nature will be made as appropriate.

While we recognize the difficulties of narcotics control and understand that illicit production and trafficking will probably never be completely eliminated, efforts toward those goals must be continued otherwise drug abuse social costs will become much greater.

1. Source: National Archives, Central Foreign Policy Files, P760151–1263. No classification marking. Drafted on September 20. The attached table has not been found.
2. Robinson forwarded to Ford a report on the activities of the Cabinet Committee on International Narcotics Control.