Office of the Historian

194. Memorandum From the Special Assistant for Federal Drug Management, Office of Management and Budget (Johnson) to the Associate Director for National Security and International Affairs, Office of Management and Budget (Ogilvie) and the Associate Director for Economics and Government, Office of Management and Budget (Kearney)1 2

Washington, May 28, 1976

SUBJECT:

  • INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS DEVELOPMENTS

There have been a number of significant developments in the international narcotics control area of which you should be aware. This memorandum highlights these developments for your information; no action is requested or required.

Major country developments:

1.

Mexico. The intensive phase of the opium poppy eradication campaign in Western Mexico is complete, and the Mexican government reports the destruction of more than 20,000 fields containing almost 13,000 acres of illicit poppies. Eighty-one percent of the fields were destroyed by herbicides sprayed from helicopters, a technique used for the first time this year which probably represents the most important development of the year. In addition, 14 heroin laboratories were seized, over 1600 individuals arrested, 3000 marihuana fields destroyed, and significant quantities of drugs seized.

Mexican officials (and some in our State Department, unfortunately) estimate that this campaign destroyed the equivalent of 5 to 6 metric tons of heroin, perhaps 80 percent of the volume we believe was smuggled into the U.S. from Mexico in 1975 (and 65-70 percent of the total illicit U.S. supply). I believe the claims are grossly overstated*; but even if actual results were only half those reported, this could represent more than a 30 percent reduction in U.S. supplies—a reduction we should be able to monitor in the form of sharply lower street purity and higher prices beginning late this year or early in 1977. If not, we should rethink our strategy.

In short, the eradication program represents a major success. But there are also serious threats to the Mexican program. Recently, the government of Mexico has taken a much harder position in regards to [Page 2] DEA’s operations in Mexico: restricting access along the border; demanding the names of informants; and in general threatening to severely curtail their activities. Also, the president-designate and others have been increasingly referring to the plight of the “poor farmer” who grows opium to survive; I view this as the prelude to either backing away from crop eradication, or requesting regional economic development aid. I will keep you up to date on developments.

2.

Burma. Burma is the world’s largest producer of illicit opium, accounting for some 500 plus metric tons*, 40-50 percent of illicit supplies. Although most is consumed locally or elsewhere in S.E. Asia, an increasing amount of heroin is flowing to Western Europe by way of air from Thailand or Malaysia to Amsterdam. Thus, it represents a logical “next likely threat” if we succeed in cutting into the Mexican supply.

Fortunately, in early 1975 the Burmese government dramatically stepped up their narcotic suppression program—partly in response to a recognition that drug trafficking was financing insurgent groups, and partly because of the spread of drug addiction to the Burmese upper class. The Burmese army has been actively destroying crops (but only an estimated 10-15 percent has been destroyed), attacking the smuggling caravans so effectively that traffickers have been forced to make major changes in methods and routes, and have just destroyed a large refinery for the first time. Despite the resulting disruption to the traffic, however, large volumes of opium and heroin continue to flow into Thailand.

3.
Thailand. Thailand grows illicit opium, but it is far more important as a transit route through which some of the Burmese opium reaches the international market. We have traditionally had a very active program in Thailand, both in providing material support and in stationing a large number of DEA agents in country to gather intelligence and assist Thais in making cases. The entire program is now being reviewed by the Embassy, State in Washington (they are at virtual loggerheads as to which direction to move), DEA, and the CIA. My office will probably have to get involved to ensure that a coherent, coordinated program results.
4.
Netherlands. Over the past year, we have been watching Amsterdam’s emergence as a major distribution point for S.E. Asian heroin with alarm. At least partly in response to loud protests from the UN, Germany, and others, the lower house of the Dutch Parliament recently [Page 3] passed a law significantly strengthening penalties for trafficking in hard drugs, while at the same time essentially decriminalizing possession of marihuana. (I wouldn’t be surprised at a similar attempt to link tough penalties for trafficking with lighter ones for possession in Congress.) Routine approval by the upper house is imminent. Holland has also moved to strengthen its narcotics enforcement agencies. Singapore (heroin transiting), Colombia (cocaine) and Nepal (hashish) have also strengthened drug laws recently.
5.
Turkey. All evidence is that the control measures taken last year to prevent diversion of opium from the new planting were successful -even the most rabid anti-Turkey elements in DEA agree. More acres are being planted this year—we do not as yet know with any confidence how many more—but in the same geographical area with the same controls. My only concern: Turkey is planning to build a huge plant to process poppy straw which is so large that it may be an economic failure, which could lead to renewed pressure to return to hand incision. UN officials are talking to them about this, and since nothing has left the drawing board, I am hopeful that they will scale down (or better yet, scrap) their plan to build a plant.

In the international program management area, there are two pluses and one minus.

1.
Interagency Drug Intelligence Group. Good progress is being made in implementing a major White Paper recommendation regarding the utilization of intelligence: drug intelligence and analytic resources are being pooled under the auspices of DEA. Currently DEA, Customs, INS, Coast Guard, and State are participating in IDIG and are focusing exclusively on Mexican Brown heroin. (The CIA is also providing support in the international arena, but due to the Executive Order, is prohibited from full time participation). Expectations are that a much more efficient use of federal enforcement and interdiction resources will result.
2.
Satellite Reconnaissance of Poppies. A major constraint on our ability to detect and assess major poppy growth (which are exclusively located on foreign soil) has been the lack of an independent monitoring capability. In recent weeks the CIA and DEA have made some impressive progress in imagery analysis of the growing areas and infrared processing to detect the poppy fields in Mexico. Although preliminary) the outlook is very encouraging that the U.S. will have an independent monitoring capability by the fall of this year.
3.
Functioning of the Cabinet Committee for International Narcotics Control (CCINC). The CCINC is not working well. For a period of time after we backed away from virtually running the CCINC from this office (the transition took place between March and October, 1974), the mechanism appeared to be working reasonably well. However, beginning a year ago when I began focusing virtually all attention on the White Paper and DEA began focusing on internal problems, the CCINC decision [Page 4] process has been increasingly dominated by Ambassador Vance, and he in turn has been increasingly responding to overall State Department—rather than narcotic program—concerns. As a result, other agencies feel left out of real decision-making (they are) in regards to the expenditure of the narcotic assistance funds, and in retaliation are handling other interagency problems outside the CCINC. They have also taken to frequently calling me to recommend that “we make it work like it used to.”

I’ve spoken to Sheldon Vance and his deputy about the problem, and Jim Barie tried to force the issue into the open earlier this week. But, I am frankly skeptical that much progress is possible unless we forcefully reinsert ourselves. That is a direction I do not want to go, but the fact that we’re facing nearly the same problem in the treatment area (i.e., the interagency committee system works reasonably well when we play an active leadership role, but dies when we try to turn it over to a “lead agency”) may suggest that EOP leadership is critical.

  1. Source: Ford Library, Parsons Files, Box 21, International Narcotics Control, March–June 1976. Secret.↩
  2. Johnson presented an overview of international drug control developments and related domestic matters.↩
  3. the CIA agrees with me, but State and DEA disagree.↩
  4. rule of thumb: ten tons of opium yield one ton of pure heroin, which in the U.S. is successively cut to a street purity of 5-10%↩