Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–3, Documents on Global Issues, 1973–1976

178. Memorandum From the Chief Counsel of the Drug Enforcement Administration (Miller) to the Acting Administrator (Dogin)¹ ²

Washington, July 7, 1975

Subject:

• Opium, poppy straw, and poppy straw concentrate, Papaver bracteatum; The Opium Policy Task Force

To save you the task of reading reams of reports, here is a concise rundown on the subject.

Papaver somniferum is the “opium poppy plant.” Its basic alkaloid is morphine which can be made by incising the pod to produce opium (which is approximately 10% morphine), or by extracting the morphine directly from the pod by a chemical process.

Opium is the coagulated juice of the plant Papaver sonmiferum, produced by incising the pod. Opium contains the classic alkaloid morphine, which is used to manufacture the semi-synthetic drug heroin. Since the incising and collection is done by thousands of farmers, this method is vulnerable to the illicit traffic and difficult to police.

Poppy straw is the harvested pods of the plant Papaver somniferum, without incising. Opium is not produced, but through a chemical process, in a factory, morphine is extracted directly from the pulp. This process is less vulnerable because the farmers are not allowed to collect opium, and the process of extracting morphine from the poppy straw is too complicated for a farmer to become much of a problem.

Concentrate of poppy straw is the residual mass of total alkaloids after the extraction process from puppy straw. This concentrate is further refined by separating the individual alkaloids, e.g., morphine, codeine and [perhaps] small amounts of thebaine.

Papaver bracteatum is the “thebaine-producing plan.” It does not contain morphine, and opium cannot result from incising the pod. In the hands of farmers, it is virtually risk free.

Thebaine is not per se a drug of abuse; however, it is readily convertible to drugs of abuse. Its primary value is that it is readily convertible to codeine—the drug causing all the interest by the drug industry and medical professions. Also, it is convertible to other drugs known as oripavines having a potency of hundreds (thousands) of times that of morphine. Whether or not those substances will be abused is highly speculative.

Historically, the United States has only allowed opium to be imported and we have never allowed cultivation of opium poppies to produce our medical supplies. In 1970, the Controlled Substances Import and Export Act continued the intent to depend on importation of opium only, but provided an emergency clause whereby DEA could allow to be imported finished narcotics or semi-finished or crude raw materials wherever the supply of opium could not fill our needs. During 1971 and 1972, the opium inventories of U.S. companies began to diminish to an uncomfortable level. In 1972, Director Ingersoll of BNDD looked into the matter and concluded in a report to the White House that, although there was no shortage at that time, if demand for opium continued, and the supply continued to decrease, the result was obvious: a shortage would be a real concern in 1974.

The problem was temporarily relieved in 1973, when 238 tons of opium were released from the national strategic materials stockpile. Also, a more permanent solution began to develop in 197 3, and more so in 1974, when poppy straw-producing countries began to increase their yields. So, even though the world production of licit opium was going down, the production of morphine was coming up as the result of increased yields of poppy straw.

But, this did not help the United States, where we were stuck with the law allowing only the importation of opium. Therefore, to take advantage of the changing supply pattern, i.e., both opium and poppy straw, it became necessary for us to exercise the emergency provision in 21 U.S.C. 952 and import something more than opium. This now raises the point of how the decision came about.

There is attached a copy of the statement of Ed Johnson on March 5, 1975 before Senator Bayh’s subcommittee. He sets forth in his statement the origin, charter and function of the Opium Policy Task Force. Its membership includes OMB, State, DEA, GSA, DOA, FDA, and NIDA, represented by people in agencies that I believe have the most knowledge of the subject; i.e., Ed Johnson (OMB), Lou Brooks (GSA), Jean-Paul Smith (NIDA), Quinton Jones (DOA), Jack Cusack and myself (DEA), and Dr. John Jennings (FDA), a virtual’ “Opium Who’s Who.”

During December, 1974, the Task Force recommended to former Administrator Bartels that he authorize the importation of concentration of poppy straw. It is still somewhat a mystery why the Task Force did not also recommend that we open the door to poppy straw as well. Presumably, we did not consider it because we were under the impression that no U.S. manufacturer could process it, so why authorize its importation. On February 14, 1975, the order became final allowing the importation of concentrate of poppy straw.

We soon learned how fast U.S. industry could adapt to a changing situation. Whereas, for years our companies had been degrading the poppy straw process because of the expense, now the opium was becoming such a high priced commodity, and in view of the fact that cheap concentrate of poppy straw could not be found, suddenly, the ability to handle poppy straw became more attractive. On March 13, 1975, the Task Force discussed the possibility of recommending importation of poppy straw if an American manufacturer developed a process.

During May 1975, S.B. Penick Co. submitted an application to DEA to import poppy straw. At about the same time, representatives of Penick talked to Jack Cusack of DEA and informed him of the company’s interest in processing imported poppy straw. Subsequently, on May 23, 1975, Jack Cusack briefed the Task Force on Penick’s plans, and after a discussion by the group, with the exception of the representative of State (James McGloughlin), the Task Force agreed that the importation of poppy straw would be very helpful in assuring that a shortage of codeine does riot occur, particularly since the companies have not been able to obtain commitments from foreign suppliers for certain, adequate supplies of concentrate of poppy straw.

At a later date, the State representative told Ed Johnson that Ambassador Vance, Senior Advisor for Narcotic Matters, had said he does not object to minimal amounts of poppy straw being imported to assure adequate medical supplies now, but that as a long-range proposition, Ambassador Vance wants to consider the matter further. Both Ed Johnson and I see this as approval, of the proposed action now before you.

In summary, the matter has been cleared around Government. All the concerned agencies have agreed through their representatives on the Opium Policy Task Force. I have checked the minutes of the meetings with Ed Johnson, and he agrees that this memo is in full accord with the views of the agency representatives.

The decision to import poppy straw also involves an economic, and possibly an anti-inflationary factor. Two of the three United States importers of narcotic raw materials, i.e., Mercke & Co. and Mallinckrodt Chemical Works, have been able to contract with suppliers of concentrate of poppy straw at a substantially higher price than anyone cares to pay. No question about it, in regard to opium and concentrate of poppy straw, it is a seller’s market. This will result in higher priced codeine in the United States, unless competition can keep the price down. S.B. Penick believes it can obtain incised poppy straw cheaply from India, and although its yields will be substantially less than the unincised poppy straw being harvested in Turkey, the price of Indian straw will be so cheap as to make Penick’s venture worthwhile. The consequence of not allowing the importation of poppy straw is that there will be no United States competition to the foreign manufacturers of concentrate of poppy straw.

The attached papers will provide you additional background material if you desire it.

1. Proposal to import concentrate of poppy straw.

2. Order authorizing importation of concentrate.

3. Statement of Edward Johnson, March 5, 1975.

4. Statement of John Bartels, March 5, 1975.

5. Memo from Edward Johnson, May 23, 1975.

1. Source: National Archives, RG 170, Acc. # 89–0021, Box 1. No classification marking. Attachment 1, signed by Dogin on July 9, announced the existence of an emergency that warranted authorization of the import of poppy straw. The other attachments were not found. Joseph McLaughlin (misspelled in the text) was a member of the S/NM staff.
2. Miller summarized key issues pertaining to the licit opium supply situation and the work of the Opium Policy Task Force.