Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–3, Documents on Global Issues, 1973–1976

174. Telegram 14796 From the Department of State to Multiple Posts¹ ²

Washington, March 26, 1975, 0301Z

Quote
State 014796

Subject:

• DEA Activities Abroad

Reference:

• State 233734; State 241812

For Chief of Mission/Principal Officer

1. As you are aware, the program objectives of the Cabinet Committee on International Narcotics Control involve intensive efforts to interdict the flow of illicit narcotics from and through foreign countries to the United States. In the long run our success in achieving this objective depends heavily on what foreign governments are able and willing to do. They and we have international obligations under Articles 35 and 36 of the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs calling for comprehensive international cooperation and coordination of actions of a preventive and repressive nature against the illicit international traffic in narcotic drugs.

2. Pursuant to Cabinet Committee decision, the Drug Enforcement Administration of the Department of Justice has substantially increased the number of its agent personnel assigned abroad. Historically, the vast majority of host country police agencies and/or governments have set forth informally guidelines and parameters for operations of DEA (and predecessor BNDD and FBN). Working relationships have developed, in a great many places, where DEA is invited by host government to assist as undercover investigators and/or as observers in narcotic raids, seizures and arrests, and carry weapons. Some of the foregoing exposes them to situations having the possibility of incidents involving public relations and political overtones. Furthermore, DEA might wish in some cases to undertake unilaterally certain activities of a drug interdiction nature which will individually require advance con-concurrence by Chief of Mission or Principal Officer. In this situation a number of COMs have sought advice from Washington in establishing guidelines for DEA operations.

3. As is well known, DEA representatives, like all other official United States personnel abroad (excepting certain military commands), are, according to established directives, under the full authority of Chief of Mission. He is expected to assist and guide their activities in such a way as to assure that their specific mission is realized to the maximum extent possible while seeking to avoid unwarranted risks to USG-host country relations and potential impairment of other important US interests in host country. In view of the high national priority of our narcotics control program, the Department supports a vigorous approach to the extent feasible, but each country presents a different situation in this respect and the risks in each must be weighed by the COM against the gains realized in impact on international narcotics traffic aimed at the United States.

4. DEA Special Agents in Charge (SAIC) assigned to your constituent posts report, according to the DEA organizational structure, to regional DEA headquarters located abroad (Paris, Ankara, Caracas, Bangkok, Mexico City, and Manila) rather than to SAICs at the respective Embassies. (In the case of Canadian posts, reporting is direct to nearby DEA offices in the US. A special circumstance also exists in Mexico. DEA interests in Mexican border zone are handled by appropriate DEA offices inside US who work directly with their Mexican counterparts. Those DEA offices within US are responsible for keeping DEA rep in Mexico City and also DEA headquarters fully informed on all their activities in Mexico.)

5. DEA has informed Department that DEA SAICS at constituent posts exchange information copies of reports with and often seek guidance and counsel of DEA country attaches where DEA has more than one office in a country where no DEA regional headquarters is located. (Regional headquarters, in communicating with constituent posts, routinely send info copies to SAIC at concerned Embassy.) In such situations DEA country attache has responsibility to ensure other DEA offices comply with Chief of Mission policy. At the same time, under your direction, Principal Officers at your constituent posts to which DEA agents are assigned should ensure DEA operations in their consular districts are within the guidelines established by Chief of Mission.

6. It is believed that the following checklist will be useful to you in deciding, in consultation with the DEA SAIC assigned to your staff, on the guidelines which you instruct DEA personnel in your host country to observe.

A) Except in special cases, which must individually be approved in advance by the COM or Principal Officer, DEA personnel shall not carry out any activity or operation considered inappropriate by the host government.

B) In some cases local political conditions might make it appropriate to limit DEA activities to a stage short of what the local government might approve or desire.

C) Each Chief of Mission should as appropriate encourage dialogue between the concerned Ministries and the appropriate police services of the host country in order to assure that host country narcotic law enforcement technical personnel have opportunity to contribute to the host country’s overall stance toward DEA’s presence and operations. When the central government position is favorable, the Chief of Mission should encourage it to give wide dissemination to all administrative subdivisions in order to assure to the extent possible that policy and guidelines are uniform throughout country.

D) Except in special cases, which must individually be approved by the COM or Principal Officer, DEA shall not conduct activities abroad unilaterally.

E) Specific points on which local guidelines should be established by the COM:

I) Carrying of weapons by DEA agents.—When and under what circumstances?

II) Use of technical surveillance equipment by DEA agents.—When and under what circumstances? (Background: In bilateral enforcement situations, DEA often supports host services with technical equipment and skills. DEA utilizes unit known as kel device, a self contained voice transmitter, usually concealed upon an informant, DEA agent or host polill colleague. Unit is used primarily for the protection of the individual and possibly to corroborate conversation with related investigative data and to assist surveillance personnel in seizure and arrest situations. DEA has assured Department that unilateral use of this device as well as telephonic wire intercepts is strictly prohibited. Involvement with wire intercepts (telephonic) must be in strict compliance with host country law and existing policies.) Under no circumstances should technical surveillance equipment be used by consular or other Embassy officers.

III) Presence of DEA agents during an arrest situation abroad. As an aid to your consideration as to when and under what circumstance such presence should be authorized, DEA has provided the following illustrative list of circumstances in which DEA agents have customarily been present in many countries:

• —Where DEA is requested by host authorities to provide an agent to pose as an undercover “buyer” of narcotics believed to be in the illicit traffic aimed at the United States.
• —When DEA personnel are requested by host authorities to participate as observers to a situation (arrest, etc.) which would have US implications or interest.
• —When DEA agents are requested by host authorities to furnish substantial US funds to be displayed, by either police or DEA, to international traffickers, in order to convince them to complete a substantial delivery of narcotics.
• —When DEA provides local police with initial or follow-up information, USG has interest in final outcome of investigations, and local authorities concur.
• —When local police request expertise of DEA agents and/or use of DEA equipment (radios, cameras, etc.).
• —When local police permit DEA agents to observe and evaluate narcotic enforcement situation (i.e., local police undercover operation) where DEA agents may be used to detect and report counter surveillance, etc.

IV) Presence of DEA agents during interrogation of American citizen or other prisoners by local officials. The Department’s general guidance on this point will be contained in a septel.

7. The guidelines are expected to vary considerably between countries depending on such factors as the cooperativeness of the host government, the length of time DEA (BNDD and FBN) agents have been working with local officials, the perception by the host country of their narcotics problem in relation to the goal of suppression of narcotics trafficking, and the degree of that country’s willingness and capability to effectively control traffic without our enforcement assistance.

8. It is requested that each COM in a country in which DEA personnel are stationed review with highest level of DEA in country existing policies, conditions and DEA operating procedures, both at the Embassy and constituent posts, to assure that they are appropriate to current circumstances.

9. While the Department wishes to be of every assistance, the COM is in the best position to judge and continue to monitor the potential gains and risks of his country narcotics program and thus to establish both general and specific guidelines for DEA personnel under his authority. He should be aware, as indicated in State 233134, that narcotics control is regarded by the President as a question of prime importance. He may expect to have Washington backing in the implementation or continuation of a vigorous and well considered program.

10. Addressees of this message include both posts at which DEA personnel are now present and those at which DEA Presence is projected.

11. For Bangkok: Please pass Songkhla.

Kissinger
Unquote.

Kissinger

1. Source: National Archives, Central Foreign Policy Files. Confidential. Drafted in S/NM by Ernst and in DEA by Antonelli; cleared in L/SFP, M, S/S–O, P, SCA, ARA, EA/EP, EUR, and NEA; and approved by Vance. Sent to 77 posts worldwide, with information copies forwarded to USUN in New York and the U.S. Mission in Geneva. Printed from a copy repeated to multiple posts on March 26.
2. The telegram provided guidance to Chiefs of Mission concerning oversight of DEA activities abroad.