Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–3, Documents on Global Issues, 1973–1976

125. Action Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Saunders) to Secretary of State Kissinger¹ ²

Washington, April 22, 1976

Declassification of the “Fact of” Photo-Satellite Reconnaissance

The Department has been asked by CIA informally to review its position on whether or not the “fact of” U.S. photo-satellite reconnaissance programs should remain classified. The present position is to refuse to confirm in any unclassified statement the fact that the U.S. conducts such reconnaissance.

To date, we have refused confirmation in order to avoid putting other nations in a position where they might feel compelled to protest formally such activity in the airspace above their countries. Even though the program has been discussed in the press and is implicitly acknowledged in the SALT arrangements for verification by “national technical means,” lack of official confirmation has permitted other governments to ignore the issue.

Now, however there are increasingly strong arguments for declassifying the “fact of” such reconnaissance in a low-key manner while refusing to discuss details. There is a general argument for putting the USG in a more credible position, but there are also significant instances where we are denied wider use of the satellite product for non-military purposes because of our present stance.

The arguments are set forth in detail below.

Arguments for Continuing Present Policy

The abandonment of the present policy would be an irreversible act which would court a number of uncertainties in terms of possible international repercussions or adverse impact upon security:

1. If declassification is not accomplished in an appropriately low-key manner, other governments might feel impelled to take public, official positions denying the legitimacy of such activities and calling for limitations thereon which the United States could not accept. It is arguable (though not provable) that our policy of non-acknowledgement of “fact of” has furnished—and if perpetuated would continue to furnish—a convenient and sufficient excuse for others to avoid taking more negative positions on such programs. Thus, the declassification of “fact of” courts some risk of increased international political opposition to the conduct of classified as well as unclassified remote sensing programs from space.

2. Declassification of “fact of” would increase pressures to release more details about reconnaissance, especially on the part of the technologically sophisticated elements of the media, who probably would be quick to perceive any change in established USG policy and speculate on its significance. Declassification might jeopardize the tacit understanding between the Executive Branch and the Congress under which the latter has refrained from asking questions on the substance of the reconnaissance programs. Declassification might lead to relaxation of concern within the intelligence community about the need to preserve the confidentiality of details about our reconnaissance programs; this could lead to leaks or disclosures, inadvertent or otherwise, of genuinely sensitive information.

3. If (but only if) declassification of “fact of” took a highly publicized form, it could present us with troublesome problems in the UN. Too much publicity would put pressure on some governments to push for treaties or conventions restricting foreign sensing of their territories without their consent. Other reaction adverse to the U.S. could include: opposition even to U.S. unclassified (NASA’s) earth-sensing programs; a strengthening of moves to restrict the dissemination of data from unclassified remote sensing programs: and increased international support for a restrictive legal definition of outer space, inimical to the interests of the U.S. and other actual or potential “space powers.”

4. As a matter of principle, we should not accept the argument that, because a subject has been discussed in the press, we should no longer resist acknowledging it officially.

Arguments for Declassifying

1. Declassification of “fact of” would permit wider use of satellite imagery or derived information in support of political and military policy. Since the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, photographic evidence has commanded a degree of public credibility unmatched by other sources of intelligence. Recent use has been made of photographic intelligence to influence public and foreign opinion in the case of the Soviet buildup in Somalia. However, the process of flying reconnaissance planes in to re-photograph activity which has been detected on satellite photography has become expensive, and in many cases would be impossible without penetration of foreign airspace. This has led to a precedent-breaking decision by the 40 Committee to permit the release of sanitized satellite imagery of Somalia either without attribution to any imaging source, or possibly described as simply “aerial photography.” The Committee has been satisfied, at least in this case, that the national interest can be served by the release of this selected satellite photography without revealing the critical capabilities of the system.

The practice of using satellite photography in support of political or military policy has obvious advantages. Continued nonattribution of this photography based on classification of the “fact of” potentially raises a diplomatic issue of special concern to the Department. If either photography or intelligence presumably based on photography concerning a nation’s interior areas is released, the assumption must be either that it was satellite photography or that the nation’s airspace was violated by U.S. aircraft. There is an argument for open attribution to satellite photography in any case where aircraft violation of sovereign airspace would otherwise be presumed.

2. Classification of “fact of” unnecessarily impedes U.S. employment of high-resolution imagery technology in support of foreign aid and disaster relief programs. The utility of high-resolution imagery and imagery-derived information was recognized nearly eight years ago in a report that identified a wide range of economic and developmental uses. In this and follow-on studies, scientists demonstrated the utility of high-resolution satellite photography to civil engineering, land-use surveys, forest inventories, hydrology studies, crop yield predictions, disaster assessments, population censuses, and geologic analyses, including mineral resource identifications. To date, however, efforts by AID to put satellite imagery to use in support of developmental assistance programs have foundered, to an important degree, on the requirement to treat “act of” as Secret and NOFORN. A project to use imagery from a mapping camera, the technology of which is more sensitive than the unclassified SKYLAB, could not proceed simply because this camera was mounted on a reconnaissance satellite and the “fact of” the reconnaissance satellite had to be protected.

At least four important, technically feasible AID projects that require intelligence-quality imagery are in limbo. Domestic utilization in similar projects has conclusively verified the utility of high-resolution photography for non-intelligence-related programs. It is our view that classification of the “fact of” has seriously restricted AID from employing a national asset for humanitarian purposes.

3. “Fact of” is a notorious non-secret. The U.S. satellite photo-reconnaissance program, in addition to being given wide unofficial publicity in the press, has been acknowledged by—among others—President Johnson in an informal press briefing.

Continued refusal to acknowledge that the U.S. carries out photographic reconnaissance by satellite tends to undermine the credibility of U.S. officials charged with the responsibility of defending U.S. space policies in international forums. In dealing with the press and the public, U.S. officials are in the position of either flouting the classification or of being unreasonably reticent. In addition, the task of winning Congressional support for legislation to strengthen the DCI’s “authority to protect sources and methods” may well be complicated unnecessarily if the DCI is burdened with the need to include a notorious non-secret among the myriad of truly vital secrets that he must protect. In addition to being a de facto non-secret, the “fact of” probably could not qualify as “secret’ within the meaning of Executive Order 11652.

4. Neither the Soviets nor the Chinese would be likely to make determined public protests; the former would not wish to draw attention to their own very substantial reconnaissance program; the latter because they are now working hard toward creating such capabilities for themselves. Among other countries, there is nearly universal support for the SAL Agreements, acceptance of the essentiality to those agreements of “national technical means of verification,” and recognition that those “means” are in major part satellite reconnaissance programs.

Options

1. In a low-key and unobtrusive “manner, declassify the fact of U.S. photographic satellite reconnaissance. Pros and cons stated above.

2. If you prefer to proceed more cautiously some of the objectives to be served by declassification could be accomplished if (1) “fact of” were downgraded to CONFIDENTIAL, (2) the NOFORN stricture were relaxed to facilitate sharing of imagery-derived information with friendly countries, including AID use of imagery or derived information for developmental assistance.

Bureau Views

PM, IO, L and S/P—the other Bureaus most concerned with the issue—as well as Joe Sisco, share INR’s view that the arguments favoring declassification of “fact of” outweigh the arguments for continuing to treat it as SECRET, provided that declassification is accomplished in a low-key manner and provided that State is consulted on the specific procedures to implement declassification.

Recommendations:

1. That you authorize me to inform the DCI that the State Department favors in principle declassification of the fact of photo-satellite reconnaissance. Declassification would be revealed in a low-key manner subject to our future concurrence (Option 1).

Approve ___________
Disapprove ___________

Alternatively,

2. That you authorize me to advise the DCI that we believe that the “fact of” should be downgraded to “confidential” and restrictions on foreign dissemination be eased to permit sharing of satellite-imagery-derived information with friendly governments for developmental purposes.

Approve _____________
Disapprove _____________

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, P770109–0570. Secret; Noforn. Drafted by Saunders and Deputy Director of the Office of Resources Policy William P. Deary; and cleared by Sisco. A covering note of the same date indicates that the memorandum was not submitted to Kissinger, but that Sisco approved declassification (option 1). Attached but not published is a Draft Memo from Bill McAfee to Frank Wisner.
2. The memorandum noted the arguments for and against declassification of the “fact of” photo-satellite reconnaissance.