Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–3, Documents on Global Issues, 1973–1976

118. Action Memorandum From the Chairman of the Working Group of the Standing Committee on Space Policy (Sloss) to the Chairman of the Standing Committee on Space Policy (Sisco)¹ ²

Washington, November 21, 1975

Space Policy Committee - Some Observations

In this memorandum I want to make some observations about the SPC meeting earlier this week for two purposes. First, to correct some misconceptions that may have arisen at the meeting. Second, as a basis for further discussion with you about the future work of the Committee which I hope we could have next week.

The Issue of the Organization and Management of Space Programs

It was easy to see that this is a very sensitive issue both with NASA and DOD. Mr. Fletcher jumped on it at once when asked to comment on my status report. NASA is concerned that such a study would lead to recommendations that would put them out of the earth resources business. They have reason to believe that this is OMB’s goal. DOD is concerned that combining the classified and unclassified programs might jeopardize the “fragile” acceptance of intelligence programs. NRO also is concerned about their future in light of the pending reorganization of the intelligence community. As Dave Elliott pointed out, it seems most unlikely that there could be a total amalgamation of the two programs. However, this is the extreme case. It may make sense to combine certain functions such as the launching of space vehicles or the exploitation of imagery. Furthermore, as we move into the era of the Space Shuttle we will have a vehicle that can launch and service both civil and intelligence payloads. As the OMB representative pointed out the President has shown an interest in the organizational relationship between the two programs, and for this reason alone I believe that it must ultimately become an issue for consideration in our study.

However, I also think there are good reasons for deferring this issue to a later phase of our study. First, it will be very sensitive and contentious with two of the principal agencies involved in the study, and thus its inclusion in the initial study could become an obstacle to addressing other issues. Second, it is likely that the next few months will see major changes in the organization of the intelligence community. This could include changes in the management of the satellite intelligence programs. Until we can see more clearly what will happen in the overall reorganization of the intelligence community it may be well to defer dealing with the management and organization of earth-sensing programs.

The Data Required In Civil Programs

Dr. Fletcher suggested that there were really no serious issues between DOD and NASA with respect to the resolution required in civil earth-sensing programs because NASA did not require resolution so high that it would pose a threat to intelligence programs. This not quite the whole story. NASA is now in the enviable position both of establishing civil requirements and developing the systems to meet these requirements. They are aware that if they go to very high resolution they will have problems with DOD and CIA, and thus many (but not all) in NASA are prepared to restrict resolution. But many of the civil users we have talked with (e.g. in Interior, Agriculture, EPA and the Corps of Engineers) very much want higher resolution, and frankly resent the fact that NASA sets requirements. A newly established Committee chaired by Interior is charged with consolidating requirements of the civil users for classified imagery of the U.S. However, they have no authority to state requirements for unclassified imagery, and thus there is no mechanism within the U.S. Government that considers the overall requirements of civil users for both the LANDSAT and intelligence type of data. When we talk to NASA they argue that their multi-spectral data even if lower in resolution than the intelligence data, is far more useful for civil purposes. When we talk to the few people in the civil agencies that have been cleared to deal with the high resolution data they seem sold on the need for higher resolution than permitted by current policy. Finally, even if all were to agree on a resolution threshold there are now other types of sensors that pose policy problems such as we have with GEOS-3. Thus it seems clear to me that the technical needs of civil users and the resultant impact of the needs on U.S. security and the open character of NASA programs are issues that we need to address in the study.

Classification

The civil users also point out that the data from the intelligence satellites is of limited utility so long as it has to be handled in special classification compartments. This is why I think we also have to look at what can be done to reduce the classification of intelligence data and what can be done to facilitate declassifying entirely data derived from classified sources as the map makers now are doing. It is interesting that many military users as well as civil users are now urging that the intelligence data be handled at the secret level in order to facilitate its use by field commanders. There are pressures here within the military that may well redound to the benefit of the civil users. Also it should be kept in mind that if we can find ways of making useful data more widely available we may also be able to find more users willing to pay for the data, thereby reducing the financial burden of these programs on the DOD.

Fragility of Intelligence Programs

I thought the exchange between Jim Plummer and Dave Elliott on this subject was instructive. Plummer, as the operator of the program must be conservative about any threat to them. But I do believe that DOD often exaggerates the likelihood of physical interference and the fragility of these systems to political pressures. As you pointed out, in the last analysis the U.S. will simply not permit pressures from other nations to interfere with programs that are important to our security. On the other hand, the State Department should be particularly concerned not to arrive at a position where we face a confrontation in the U.N. or elsewhere on such an issue if it can be avoided.

There is a rather strong difference of view within the government as to the seriousness of international pressures to limit the activities of earth-sensing satellites. NASA officials tend to hold the view expressed by Dr. Fletcher that the more active we are in demonstrating the utility of the systems the more the opposition to space sensing will melt away. Many of our experts in State believe that the opposition, particularly from some of the LDC’s is more substantial. As Amrom Katz pointed out, the future trends are at least uncertain. DOD is inclined to believe the worst, and therefore wants to continue the present policies which strictly limit the distribution of classified data and the technical capabilities of the unclassified systems on the grounds that showing people high resolution imagery will create greater opposition to space sensing and could adversely affect intelligence programs. These restrictive policies, of course, limit the value of the programs to civil users.

As to Congressional pressures, while I have not studied Congressional attitudes on these programs in detail, it is my impression that despite all the furor on the Hill this past year over our intelligence activities these programs have been relatively immune to open criticism, although not at all immune to budget cuts.

While it is not a part of this study, I am convinced that the emergence of the new system capabilities will revolutionize the processing and use of current intelligence. This is likely to present new problems and new opportunities for the State Department. While a few people in INR have begun to address these problems, I am not satisfied that enough attention is being given to them by the top levels of the Department who are likely to be the major claimants on and users of the new capabilities.

Next Steps in the Study

I am assuming that the Committee accepts my proposal to prepare a background paper and the outline of an issues paper from the data we now have which the Committee can again address in a few weeks time. This will not be an easy task as I anticipate continuing differences within the Working Group on the scope and pace of the study. However, I intend to press ahead as rapidly as we can, identifying major differences as they arise rather than trying to resolve them in the Working Group.

While we intend to proceed along these lines in any event, I would find it useful if Mr. Gathright and I could meet with you after you have read this memorandum in order to get your own ideas on how we proceed. Also, I mentioned we have been arranging a series of briefings as background for the Committee work, and I would like to know whether you would like to participate in same of these, and if so, which ones.

Recommendation:

That you meet with Mr. Gathright and me next week to discuss the work of the SPC and the subjects touched on above.

Approve [Sisco approved]
Disapprove __________
Suggested Date 12/16

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, P860117–1558. Secret; Noforn. Drafted by Sloss; cleared by Gathright. Sisco initialed his approval for a meeting on December 16, but a note written in an unknown hand indicates “meeting cancelled at the last minute.”
2. Sloss summarized and analyzed a meeting among members of the Standing Committee on Space Policy.