114. Memorandum NSC–U/DM–92B From the Chairman of the NSC Under Secretaries Committee (Ingersoll) to President Ford1 2
Subject:
- Space Launching Services for Other Countries
In reviewing US policy on cooperation in space launch assistance and technology (NSDM 187), the Under Secretaries Committee has previously considered and reported on the conditions under which we should assist other countries or international organizations in launching satellites.
To avoid misunderstandings, we need to clarify the extent of the services we would be prepared to provide, particularly in the case of satellites requiring geosynchronous orbits. This matter is reviewed below, and the views and recommendations of the Members of the Committee are presented for your consideration. A more detailed report is enclosed.
Geosynchronous Orbits
Geosynchronous (“stationary”) orbits are those—at an altitude of some 22,300 statute miles above the equator—in which a satellite remains in the same position relative to a point on the earth. Such orbits are needed, for example, for certain types of meteorological and communications satellites.
To achieve geosynchronous orbit, a satellite is first placed in a circular “parking” orbit at a relatively low altitude and then transferred to an orbit [Page 2] having its highest point above the equator at 22,300 statute miles. These steps constitute the basic launching. The final separation of the satellite from the launching vehicle occurs during the transfer phase.
The injection of the satellite into geosynchronous orbit and subsequent adjustments to maintain its position are accomplished by rocket motors aboard the satellite.
The entire procedure requires extensive support from ground-based command and control facilities and tracking stations. Effective coordination is needed among the group responsible for the basic launching, the group responsible for the satellite (usually an industrial firm), and the tracking group.
The question that needs to be resolved is essentially how much responsibility the US Government should accept for the foregoing steps and how much should be borne by the country requesting launch assistance, working directly with the US industrial community.
Present Practice and Alternatives
From the standpoint of other countries, the US offer of launch assistance could be construed as covering the full range of responsibilities involved in placing satellites in geosynchronous orbit. NASA, however, would be confronted with the need to augment its in-house capacity to carry out such additional responsibilities.
To minimize this continuing burden, NASA has maintained a position with respect to both domestic and foreign launch requests of providing the following services: the group of services to carry out the basic launching, most of the tracking effort required for five days after launch, and transmission of data in emergencies for three months after launch. NASA is also prepared in some cases to permit special tracking installations at NASA stations and to provide limited training. Under this approach, the [Page 3] domestic or foreign customer either secures the remaining services needed (including those related to the injection of the satellite into geosynchronous orbit) directly from US industrial firms or provides the services itself. In no case does NASA assume any responsibility, either operational or legal, for the spacecraft itself.
This approach can be viewed by other countries as delivering less than implied by our offer of launch assistance. As a practical matter, other industrialized countries have not encountered major problems. One developing-country, Indonesia, has recently concluded an arrangement under which basic launching services will be supplied by NASA and services for injecting the satellite into geosynchronous orbit will be furnished by the US industrial firm supplying the satellite.
This approach should also be the likely (if not only) solution for other developing countries where the availability of technical-managerial capabilities is minimal (for example, Brazil, Iran, Saudi Arabia). However, there is always the possibility that the USSR might well be prepared to provide assistance, and that others (like France) will be able to do so in the future.
As for developed countries, it is only a question of time before Japan, Canada, and others can provide their own injection services. France and Germany are already doing so.
There are a number of alternatives to NASA’s present approach. Illustratively, it might be possible to develop a complete “package” in which a country could obtain from NASA a US-manufactured satellite in stationary orbit, a set of design criteria for ground control/readout facilities, and a technical assistance package from a US industrial firm, all on a fully reimbursable basis. Such an approach could [Page 4] provide the appearance and fact of greater accommodation, simplicity and negotiating confidence for other countries and should be especially attractive to developing countries interested, for example, in communications satellites. This approach is likely to be offered by France in the future and may be offered by the Soviet Union, now that it has achieved synchronous capability. NASA has not defined in detail the personnel resources implications of such a possibility.
Views and Recommendations
The Under Secretaries Committee believes that the present NASA position of offering, in conjunction with launch services, selected tracking network support and in some cases, limited training, should be continued on a interim basis. This option can be carried out within NASA’s available resources, has a defensible history, and supplies—together with assistance available from US industry—all necessary services.
Since the Japanese have not renewed their request to NASA for additional services and, from all indications are now preparing to arrange with US industry to obtain the required geostationary injection services, the requirement to modify present practice to accommodate the Japanese request is not an issue. Furthermore, adoption of a broader approach in the case of requests from other countries could be viewed by the Japanese as discriminating against them. The Department of State feels that the penalty in relations with the Japanese would outweigh possible benefits to be gained by being more accommodating to requests from other than the Japanese especially in the immediate future.
For the longer term, the Committee believes a distinction should be considered between advanced countries such as Japan, which have substantial technical and managerial expertise, and developing countries which might feel much greater confidence in the complex contracting for geostationary satellites if NASA were to provide a “package” approach from satellite design through insertion and placement in final orbit.
[Page 5]NASA’s present practice should, therefore, be further reviewed to examine whether it will meet the needs of all potential users, Such an examination, which we believe should not be publicized, should take the following aspects fully into account: the reliability of services available from US industry; the possible willingness of developing countries, as in the Indonesia case, to buy US services in two “packages” (one from NASA, the other from an industrial firm); and the alternative of being able to offer a single “package” under which NASA, while drawing as fully as possible on US industry for actual provision of the necessary services, would play a central overall coordinating role.
Taking the foregoing into account, the Under Secretaries Committee recommends your approval of the following approach to providing launch services to other countries and international organizations:
- —NASA will continue to supply, on a reimbursable basis, basic launch services as currently defined but will not provide additional services for injecting satellites into geosynchronous orbit (since the latter services are available directly from industrial firms).
- —Without public announcement, NASA should examine and report on the resource implications of a broader “package” approach.
While agreeing with the proposed interim policy, the Office of Telecommunications Policy notes that it has not been established that a complete “package” should be offered through NASA. The Office of Telecommunications Policy believes an alternative would be for industrial firms to make an integrated offering, with NASA providing a portion of the package dealing with launch, tracking, and communications services required by private firms. It further believes that it is ministration policy that a government agency should not be providing services that US contractors could provide.
[Page 6]As Chairman of the Under Secretaries Committee, I wish to make clear that all Members of the Committee strongly support an active role for private industry. Both the proposed interim policy and the possible alternative of considering a “package” approach would place substantial reliance on procuring services from private industry. Indeed, the purpose of examining the “package” approach would be to ensure that we will maintain a strong competitive position in the future.
Chairman
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, EB/OTA/TD Files: Lot 78 D 237, NSDM 187, 1972–. Limited Official Use. Forwarded on August 8 by Gathright to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the Acting Director of the Office of Telecommunications Policy, and the Executive Director of the Council on International Economic Policy. The attachment has not been found.↩
- The memorandum recommended clarification of U.S. policies for providing space launching services for other countries.↩