280. Memorandum From the President’s Science Adviser (David) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the President’s Assistant (Flanigan)1 2
SUBJECT:
- Post-Apollo Relationships with the Europeans
I have reviewed the memorandum from Secretary Rogers to the President on this subject, dated April 29th, (copy attached) and have several comments to offer.
The cumulative effect of several U.S. actions in the past year in the field of space cooperation has been to cause considerable cooling in U.S.-European relationships in this area. European leaders, however, appear to understand the background for the changing attitude of the U. S. toward the flow of technology and management difficulties and they are pragmatic enough to seek acceptable solutions to this problem without abandoning cooperation. I have recent information that the French are going to propose that their European partners give priority to development of Sortie or RAM modules that would eventually be carried as a payload in the shuttle and that they abandon plans for a potential role as developer of the tug and contributor of subsystems to the shuttle vehicle itself. If this proposal is accepted by the European Space Conference, it will pre-empt somewhat action on the memo to the President from Secretary Rogers.
It is anticipated that a delegation from the European Space Conference will request a meeting with the U.S. following their meeting later this week. We should be prepared to respond to the Europeans at that time with a clearly defined U.S. position. I believe the proposal outlined below will provide a basis for that position.
In my view, the U.S. can accept European participation in the shuttle program, if limited to RAM and Sortie payload modules. The State Department proposal (point 2 of the attached) that the U.S. leave open the question of European development of the tug would only raise false hopes that the U.S. might agree to such development. I am opposed to European development of the tug and [Page 2] I believe this view is shared by most of the interested agencies. The State Department has also proposed that we continue to negotiate with the Europeans on specific shuttle vehicle tasks that had been identified by NASA as appropriate to European participation. I believe we can terminate such negotiations and discussion of the tug and should point out in so doing that our further review of these tasks reveal that they would lead to excessive additional costs and management complications that the U.S. is unwilling to accept.
I will be pleased to discuss this in further detail with you, if you wish.
- Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 393, Subject Files, Space Programs, 1972. No classification marking. Rogers’ memorandum is Document 279.↩
- David commented on points made by Rogers in his April 29 memorandum to the President. He suggested that the U.S. Government could accept the Europeans if their role was limited to RAM and Sortie payload modules; eaving open the possibility of participation in the Space Tug would only create “false hopes.”↩