Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–1, Documents on Global Issues, 1969–1972

274. Transcript of a Conversation between the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) and the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (Fletcher)¹ ²

Washington, December 1, 1970.

SUBJECT:

• Post-Apollo Space Program

The Department, in consultation with the Executive Secretary of the Space Council, the NSC Staff, OST and NASA, has prepared the enclosed brief report on the relevance of the manner in which FY-72 budget decisions are made concerning the post-Apollo space program to the European approach to their participation in that program. I subscribe to the eonclusion in that Report that, if we are to sustain the impetus in Europe to participate substantially in the post-Apollo program, the content and character of our FY-72 budgetary and program decisions for the space transportation system should provide a clear indication that the US stands committed to continuity and forward movement in its major space efforts.

I have no doubt that the values of foreign participation in the post-Apollo program have already been addressed in the budget proposals now before the President. Although these values are clearly not the primary consideration in our budget and program decisions, I should like to reiterate that they are, nonetheless, quite important.

From a technical point of view we would obtain the benefit of European know-how in areas where they have special technical competence. Under the terms presently contemplated, European participation would reduce United States budget requirements by approximately $1 billion. From a national security viewpoint, there are obvious advantages to having the Europeans as partners in the United States program, as compared to their developing a separate and independent space launching capability which would be wasteful and overwhichwe would have little or no influence. Politically, we have long encouraged the Western Europeans to collaborate on multinational endeavors and this would be a very large one indeed. Success in this venture would help put life into other pending proposals for intra-European cooperation and could be a useful precedent for major scientific and technical projects in the future. Participation in this program would also strengthen the technological capacity of countries who are our NATO allies and thereby enhance the strength of the Alliance.

U. Alexis Johnson

Enclosure

November 30, 1970

PROSPECTS FOR EUROPEAN PARTICIPATION IN THE POST-APOLLO SPACE PROGRAM

In consultation with the Executive Secretary of the National Aeronautics and Space Council and representatives of the NSC Staff, the Office of Science and Technology and NASA we have .assessed the current prospects for substantial European participation in our post-Apollo space program. We find that a key question affecting European decisions as to participation is the extent of then U.S. commitment to the development of a reusable space transportation system and other major elements of the post-Apollo program.

The Europeans are convinced that they cannot afford to pursue a fully independent program to meet their own objectives for the use of space and, at the same time, participate substantially in post-Apollo developments. They have a number of options as to the timing and content of their program, but within a few months should make the fundamental choice whether to arrange their space program so as to permit participation or to pursue an independent course, particularly in the development of their own launch vehicle capability. They cannot be expected to forego independence unless our program offers an assured alternative. Thus, the manner in which we handle our program and budget decisions for fiscal year 1972 will have a major effect on prospects for engaging their participation.

This is obviously not to suggest that the question of European participation should be a pivotal consideration in our budget and program decisions. Rather it is to note that these decisions and the manner in which they are expressed will have an obvious impact on the European approach to participation in the post-Apollo program. If we are to sustain the impetus in Europe to participate substantially in the the post-Apollo program, content and character of our FY-72 budgetary and program decisions for the space transportation system should provide a clear indication that the U.S. stands committed to continuity and forward movement in its major space efforts.

Thus, it is important that, insofar as these decisions reflect U.S. intentions as to the post-Apollo program, our intentions emerge as clearly as possible. Should these decisions becloud our intentions, serious doubt will be raised in Europe whether our professed commitment to ongoing space activities, and to sharing their benefits and burdens, will in fact offer opportunities of rea1 interest to Europe.

Herman Pollack
Director
Bureau of International Scientific
and Technological Affairs

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, SP 10 US. No classification marking. Fletcher and Low met with the President and the President’s Assistant for Domestic Affairs Ehrlichman at the Western White House in San Clemente, California on January 5, from 10:01 to 10:35 a.m. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary) On November 29 Nixon sent Flanigan a memorandum asking: “Is there still no feasible way to get multi-national participation in some of our future space flights?” Nixon stated he knew there were technical problems, but it was “a pet idea of mine and I would like to press it.” The full text of the conversation is in Document I-23, Logsdon (ed.), Exploring the Universe, Vol. II, External Relations.
2. Fletcher reported on his conversation with President Nixon concerning the space shuttle and the foreign policy benefits vs. the cost of international cooperation.