130. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security
Affairs (Kissinger)
to President Nixon1
2
Washington, May 28, 1970.
SUBJECT:
- Note to Cuban Government on Hijacking
In the memo at Tab A, Secretary Rogers asks your approval to present a draft memorandum
of understanding on hijacking to the Cuban Government. Last November you
authorized the Secretary to inform the Cuban Government that we would be
prepared to enter into an agreement for the reciprocal return of
hijackers (Tab C). Cuba replied to our initial approach by stating that
it was disposed to work out an agreement. The Secretary is not very
sanguine that an agreement is possible, and views the Cuban reply as
more of an effort to return the ball to our court without committing
Cuba. However, he recommends that we now forward a draft memorandum of
understanding in an effort to pin down an agreement, because we should
pursue the matter so long as there remains any hope of resolving this
vexing problem.
Failure to follow up would give Castro the opportunity to say that the US is unwilling to settle this problem. If
we reply with a concrete proposal we would demonstrate that we have gone
to considerable and serious effort to deter hijacking; if we conclude an
agreement, it would be to our advantage; if Castro backs away, we could charge Castro is insincere.
The text of the memorandum of understanding proposed by the Secretary is
appended at Tab B. It states merely that each government will upon
request return hijackers of planes or ships to the other, except that
each government reserves the right not to return its own nationals or
persons to whom it grants political asylum.
I agree with the Secretary’s arguments and recommend that you approve his
recommendation.
RECOMMENDATION
That you approve the dispatch of the note and proposed memorandum of
understanding on hijacking attached at Tab B.
[The President initialed his approval on June 11.]
[Page 2]
Tab A
Washington, May 15, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
Subject:
- Hijacking Agreement with Cuba
Recommendation:
That you approve the dispatch of the enclosed note to the Government
of Cuba which proposes to that Government the text of a specific
Memorandum of Understanding with respect to hijacking.
Approve _________ Disapprove __________
Background:
On December 8 the Cuban Government replied to our proposal for an
understanding on the return of hijackers in the following terms:
“The Revolutionary Government of Cuba states that it is
disposed to work out an agreement with the Government of the
United States on hijackers of aircraft and other similar
acts referred to in Cuban law 1226, published on September
16, 1969, which shall constitute for Cuba, the legal basis
of the said agreement.”
This general reply does not add much to the Cuban law of September
16, 1969, which in itself contemplates bilateral agreements, but it
does state that the Cuban law is applicable to the United States. No
doubt Castro made this reply
to return the ball to our court without committing Cuba. Both Mexico
and Canada, despite persistent efforts, have been unable to reach
firm agreement with Cuba on the hijacking issue. Considering
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Cuba’s trade and other
relations with these countries, we are not hopeful that the United
States will do better. Moreover, in a major speech on April 22,
Castro cast doubt upon
the sincerity of the motives of the Cuban Government when it
announced its willingness to enter bilateral agreements on
hijacking. That speech states that governments wishing to enter into
hijacking agreements with Cuba must abide by the Cuban law “article
by article without removing a single comma.” The Cuban law includes
provisions relating to illegal emigration from Cuba, which Cuba
could not expect the United States to accept.
Nevertheless, it would serve our interests to offer to enter into a
specific understanding with Cuba on hijacking. One reason is our
public posture. Cuba has now responded to our December 8, 1969 note,
that you had approved, by repeating its apparently forthcoming
position. If we fail to make a significant reply, Castro will have the propaganda
advantage. If we reply with a concrete proposal, we could
demonstrate effectively that we have gone to considerable and
serious effort to deter hijacking. We would be in a position to
expose Castro’s insincerity
on the hijacking question if he fails to pursue an agreement
seriously. More important, however, we should take all reasonable
steps to stop hijacking. So long as there remains any hope of
actually reaching some firm agreement, we should pursue the matter
seriously. If no progress can be made, I would not plan to continue
to forward proposals indefinitely.
If Cuba should suggest that as a means of reaching agreement on
hijacking we cease using Guantanamo as a port of exit for Cubans
seeking to come to the United States, a possibility hinted at in
Castro’s speech, we
should reject the suggestion for we would then be required either to
hold refugees at the base or return them to the Cuban authorities.
Neither option is feasible. If we sought overtly to discourage
Cubans seeking freedom from entering the base, it could be
tantamount to our building a “Berlin Wall.” In rejecting such terms,
we could treat the suggestion as “evidence” that Cuba is not
seriously interested in a hijacking agreement.
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The possibility of concluding a formal agreement with Cuba was
contemplated in my earlier memorandum to you on this subject.
Failure to forward the Memorandum of Understanding would leave us in
a situation in which Castro
could say that he has repeated his offer to reach agreement with the
United States on this sensitive problem, and that we had not
responded.
