159. Memorandum From Helmut
Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the
President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1
Washington, April 28, 1972.
SUBJECT
- State’s Assessment of French EC
Referendum
Attached (Tab A) is a memorandum from State covering an analysis of the
outcome of last Sunday’s referendum2 in France on the
European Community (EC). State points
that:
—because of the high abstention rate (almost 40% of the eligible) only
36% of those eligible voted “yes,”
—32% of those actually voting, voted “no.” The
Communists, who campaigned for “no,” are hailing this result as a
victory for them, since they usually get only 18–24% of the national
vote.
From the results, State concludes that:
—the outcome was clearly disappointing to Pompidou;
—it should not, however, be regarded as a major defeat for him or his
European policy;
—the non-contentious nature of the EC
enlargement issue for most Frenchmen (except Communists) accounted for
voter apathy, and Pompidou was
unable to overcome this apathy;
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—Pompidou’s critics within his
party will be emboldened, as will the Communists and Socialists;
—Pompidou may reshuffle his
cabinet, including Chaban-Delmas;
—Internationally, the consequences may be more serious, with Pompidou’s aspirations as a leader of
Europe having perhaps been dealt a severe blow;
—There is no reason, however, to think that the President will
significantly change his European policy.
Comment: We do not entirely share the emphasis on
this assessment that for Pompidou
the more serious consequences will be international. To the degree that
the President expected to utilize a pro-Europe result to assert his sway
over his party, he has lost a great deal domestically. He will have to
reconsider any plans which he may have had for dumping Chaban-Delmas or Debré or moving elections up to this
summer or autumn. The authority vested in the French presidency under
the Fifth Republic, however, makes its incumbent relatively independent
of the electorate’s views as far as bold departures in international
politics are concerned, if he has the will to make them.
Tab A
French Referendum
By a ratio of two to one, those who voted in Sunday’s referendum in
France signified approval of the EC
enlargement treaty. However, this favorable outcome was considerably
marred by the exceptionally large abstention rate—39.5%—which set a
record in French national voting since World War II, if not before.
Moreover, the polls had given Pompidou reason to expect that upwards of 70% of
those voting would vote “yes.” The actual figure was 68%. The result
was that only 36% of the eligible electorate cast an affirmative
vote—a clear disappointment for Pompidou and his supporters.
Despite all the Monday morning quarter-backing now going on, we
should be careful not to view the results of the referendum as a
major defeat for Pompidou or
his new departures in European policy. Undoubtedly Pompidou has received a setback and
may himself wish that he had not taken the initiative to hold a
referendum (legislative ratification of the EC enlargement treaty would have sufficed). However,
such setbacks are not uncommon for heads of state or government in
complex democratic states.
Victory claims are being made by the French Communist Party, which
campaigned for a “no” vote, and by the Socialists who called for
abstention. Of those voting, 32% voted “no.” Since the Communists
have averaged only 18 to 24% of the vote in recent years, they are
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crowing loudly that
they increased their vote. In fact, part of the “no” vote derived
from rightists and disaffected Gaullists who voted “no” more out of
spite than conviction. This disaffection factor also explains the
39.5% abstention rate which the Socialists can hardly claim major
credit for.
A more general reason for the outcome of the referendum was that the
issue of EC enlargement was not
contentious for the French electorate (except for Communist-led
voters). Even Pompidou’s
extensive personal efforts did not succeed in dramatizing the issue
or in convincing the average voter that he had a duty to give
Pompidou a massive “yes”
for his European policy.
Domestically, the results will give new life to the Communists and
Socialists and to Pompidou’s
critics within the Gaullist movement. Pompidou may take the occasion to reshuffle the
government, including the Prime Minister. Over time the fissures in
Gaullist ranks will probably widen further. The adverse effects for
Pompidou internationally,
at least in the short run, may be more serious. His image as a
commanding European statesman and his aspirations for France and for
himself to play a decisive role in Europe’s future have received a
blow. Some Europeans may react with the old feeling that France and
its Gaullist leader have gotten a comeuppance. There may also be
greater resistance now to recent French efforts within the EC to call the signals and have their
way. However, there is no reason as of now to anticipate that
Pompidou will make any
significant change in the thrust or objectives of his European
policy. We will have to await further developments for an indication
of how he may wish to modify his tactics.
