Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972

91. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State¹

Bonn, June 25, 1970, 1922Z.

7343. Subj: Bahr Talk with the Ambassador on Eastern Policy. Ref: Bonn 7277.²

1. Bahr told the Ambassador June 24 that the Brandt government intends to go right ahead with its Eastern policy. Bahr believes it important to do so because the Soviets, who abandoned many of their demands during the talks, may not go through with the deal unless something is done soon.

2. Bahr described his negotiating with Gromyko by saying that, as the talks progressed, Gromyko adopted an unyielding position. Then, after several sessions, Bahr noted some slight differences in the way Gromyko formulated points. Bahr took these as signals of change in the Soviet position. Bahr then repeated the point to Gromyko, formulating it however as he wanted it, and asking if this was the Soviet view. Gromyko would then say, “yes of course” seemingly annoyed that there would be any question about it. Bahr also said that his overall experience with Gromyko showed him that the best way to negotiate with the Soviets is to start with a reasonable position and then stick firmly to it. One cannot make real concessions during the negotiations. The Soviets will grab the concessions and seek more. Bahr suggested this approach be used in the Berlin talks.

3. Bahr emphasized that there was in the FRG view the firmest link between their three negotiations and the Berlin talks. He also agreed with the Ambassador’s formulation that the Berlin talks were for the FRG a condition precedent to the three German negotiations, but not vice versa. In other words, the three German negotiations were not a condition precedent for the Three Powers in reaching an agreement on Berlin. A Berlin agreement could stand on its own. Bahr also agreed that in domestic political terms it was essential to the Brandt government that there be agreement on Berlin before ratification of the German agreements with the Soviet Union, Poland, and the GDR. Bahr thought that signing the German agreements but delaying ratification until a satisfactory Berlin agreement was reached need not put undue pressure on the Three Powers to agree to an unsatisfactory Berlin agreement. The way to avoid this, he thought, was to have the FRG make clear to the Russians and perhaps publicly just what its minimum terms were for a Berlin settlement.

4. Bahr said that he realized that the French opposition to direct FRG–GDR dealings on access made the development of an Allied position in the Berlin talks very difficult at the moment. However, he was quite hopeful that the Pompidou visit July 3 would clear up this problem.³

Rush

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 1 EUR E–GER W. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to London, Moscow, Paris, Rome, USNATO, and Berlin. Sonnenfeldt briefly summarized the telegram in a June 30 memorandum to Kissinger (Document 93).
2. Not found. The discussion was held during a luncheon, hosted by Brandt, to honor NATO Secretary General Manlio Brosio. (Department of State, EUR Files: Lot 74 D 430, Rush Appointment Cards, Egon Bahr)
3. Pompidou was in Bonn July 3 and 4 for semiannual consultations. According to Brandt, Pompidou “underlined his ‘moral and political support’ [for Ostpolitik] and stressed the importance of Four-Power rights in Berlin.” (Brandt, People and Politics, pp. 261–262) For German records of the meetings, see Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1970, Vol. 2, pp. 1069–1080, 1089–1097.