Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972

82. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Bonn, April 16, 1970.

PARTICIPANTS

• Franz Josef Strauss, CSO Chairman
• Ambassador Kenneth Rush

Ambassador Rush began the conversation by summarizing the present state of American opinion concerning retention of American forces in Europe. Strauss said he agreed completely with the Ambassador’s views on this point; it was absolutely necessary to retain American forces in NATO at their present level.

Ambassador Rush said that if Strauss was in agreement on this point, he might logically also agree that Germany should take a fairer share of the burden of maintaining NATO forces through increasing its own defense expenditures. This was not only equitable, but politically essential in terms of American opinion. Strauss, who has in the past been an opponent of support payments to the U.S., nodded but made no explicit response.

Strauss said he had high hopes that the present FDP/SPD government would fall prior to the 1973 elections. The political impact of inflation in the economy, combined with the expected failure of Brandt’s Eastern policy, would splinter the FDP, resulting in the fall of the government. Strauss said FDP Chairman Scheel was in a position whose demands on him exceeded his relatively modest capabilities. Scheel was in any case an adaptable and flexible man whose sole object was to keep the party alive. After Scheel and other FDP members observed that the SPD was in serious trouble with the German electorate, the problems of the FDP’s future would loom even larger in their eyes and they would seek ways to assure their own survival.

Strauss said that in general Brandt and his government were so hemmed in by various negative elements in the political and economic environment that they had little choice or leeway. On the one side was their problem with the Free Democrats. On the other was inflation and pressure on the budget. An inflation rate of six percent was quite possible for 1970. Brandt could not raise taxes either as a device of fixed control or as a source of new revenue because the FDP would not agree. There was no money now available or likely to be available in the normal tax income during the course of the midterm finance program ending in 1973 to finance the new social programs Brandt wanted. Brandt could not borrow to meet his budget obligations as this too would be inflationary. By the time the effects of inflation, the FDP’s unwillingness to agree to tax increases, and the inevitable contingencies for which no provision was made had their effect, it would be impossible to finance the new programs.

At the same time, Brandt was under strong leftwing pressures from his own socialist youth movement in the direction of the welfare state and codetermination. Here too the FDP would not go along with leftwing SPD opinion. The resulting inaction and inability of the government to make good on its political goals would weaken its position in public opinion and place increasing pressures in the coalition relation between SPD and FDP.

Concerning relations with the CDU, Strauss said that if the CDU were called on to form the new government in the near future, Barzel would almost certainly be Chancellor. Strauss then explicitly stated that he would back Barzel in this event and that Barzel would win the Chancellorship because of his, Strauss’, backing. Strauss said that in such a government he would be number two and Deputy Chancellor. He said, speaking very openly, that he realized clearly that the liberal element in the CDU would not support him for the Chancellorship and that for him to push for the position as Chancellor candidate could well do irreparable harm to the CDU including the possibility of a split in the party. Strauss said Kiesinger would probably drop out of active politics within the next year or so.

Turning to Brandt, Strauss said that Brandt was a well-intentioned man whose main aim was to go down in history as a great German chancellor. Brandt was impressionable and did what others suggested. In addition to Wehner, Brandt, with few new ideas of his own, was under the intellectual influence of Leo Bauer and Egon Bahr, left-wingers with few intellectual scruples, who influenced Brandt into doing what they wanted.

Concerning Brandt’s Eastern policy, Strauss said that what worried him most was that Brandt’s permissive attitude toward the East would have the effect of leading Germany away from the Western Alliance and would in effect result in another Neville Chamberlain appeasement of totalitarianism, this time in the guise of the Soviets. The government was making more and more concessions to the Russians, giving them whatever they wanted. Strauss believed that as a result, Soviet Union influence over Germany would increase and, with it, the possibility that Germany would be detached from the Western Alliance. Every step Brandt took on Eastern policy was a “coffin nail for economic and political union in Western Europe,” which should now be receiving German priority instead of Eastern policy. Western Europe must be strong, including having its own nuclear military resources. But as of today, of course, the only protection for Europe was the U.S. strategic nuclear deterrent. U.S. forces were in Europe to protect the Alliance; they were not imperialists. They could some day be reduced, but not now. They should stay as long as needed.

The Ambassador asked Strauss why Herbert Wehner had acted in such an extreme way in the April 15 Bundestag debate over Brandt’s report of his April 5–11 trip to the United States. Strauss replied that he believed that Wehner’s conversion away from communism was in fact genuine, but that, as a consequence of the years of rivalry between Wehner and Ulbricht in the Communist Party, Wehner’s main interest in life was an overpowering desire to pay back Ulbricht and to destroy him through FRG success in its policy towards East Germany. In addition to his normal excitability and his worries about the condition of his wife (recently operated on for a brain tumor), Wehner appeared emotionally upset at present concerning the possibility that his Eastern policy would not succeed.

Comment: Strauss was frank and extremely open about his own position in party politics. His unexpected endorsement of Barzel, which he had previously deliberately withheld, and Barzel’s own recent shift toward Strauss’ hard position toward Brandt’s Eastern policy, may well be linked as part of a recently reached political understanding between the two men. Its immediate effect would be to lock the CDU into an opposition position and to nullify efforts by moderates in both CDU and SPD to work back toward a bipartisan approach.²

Note: This information is sensitive and should have special handling.

1. Source: Department of State, EUR/CE Files: Lot 85 D 330, JDean—Memos of Conversation 1970. Secret. Drafted by Dean on April 24. Copies were sent to Rush, Hillenbrand, Sutterlin, Packman, Morris, Bremen, Düsseldorf, Frankfurt, Hamburg, Munich, and Stuttgart. The luncheon meeting was held at the Ambassador’s Residence.
2. On April 23 the Embassy forwarded a brief account of Strauss’ remarks in support of Barzel and commented: “The immediate significance of a political deal of this kind is that it tends to lock the CDU into an opposition position on Eastern policy, nullifying the effects of SPD second thoughts about trying to reengage Barzel in a now partisan approach to this subject.” (Telegram 4548 from Bonn; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 12 GER W)