72. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Hillenbrand) to Secretary of State Rogers1
The leader of the CDU Parliamentary Group in the Bundestag, Rainer Barzel, has expressed in strong terms to Ambassador Rush his party’s growing concern over Brandt’s Eastern Policy.2
In sum, Barzel contends that Brandt’s Moscow negotiator, Bahr, has worked out a potential agreement with the Soviet Union which [Page 194] would amount to acceptance of the present status quo in Europe on Soviet terms and would result in increased Soviet influence in Europe “from Helsinki to Rome.”
The long existing balance between the US and the USSR in Europe, according to Barzel, would thus be undermined particularly since the new relationship with Moscow would come at a time when, “as Europeans know,” the US is engaged in an internal controversy over its troop commitment in Europe which would apparently bring reductions.
Barzel noted that Washington, London, and Paris have all expressed support for Brandt’s policy. Even if this tripartite endorsement continued, the CDU would pursue its opposition to the government’s plans for an understanding with Moscow. The CDU would not be party to a policy of appeasement and if necessary it could and would bring down the SPD/FDP coalition, Barzel concluded.
Unquestionably Brandt has pushed ahead with his Eastern policy more rapidly than most expected. His basic concept, heavily influenced by his close adviser, Egon Bahr (who has long been distrusted in the CDU), is that by accepting the realities of the current situation in Germany the Federal Republic can in the long run bring about a diminution of the East-West barrier that divides the country. In the process, Brandt believes the Federal Republic can achieve a position of greater influence and independence both in Eastern and Western Europe.
Few in Germany, even in the CDU, quarrel with these objectives. This is a major reason why the CDU until now has not taken strong issue with the government’s Eastern policy. As the talks in Moscow have progressed, however, the question arises in increasingly real terms as to whether and to what extent acceptance of “realities” means acceptance of Soviet demands, and the granting of West German concessions.
This controversy has been inevitable from the formation of the Brandt Government. Brandt clearly was and remains determined to take a new approach to the German question. His government does not wish to be restricted or deterred in its dynamic pursuit of this policy by a requirement for nonpartisan agreement. It therefore has rejected CDU overtures for cooperation in a bipartisan approach.
As this domestic controversy grows, each side is seeking to enlist the support of the US Government. Brandt needs it to defend himself against CDU attacks that his policy is costing the Federal Republic the basis of its security. The CDU needs American support since without it its accusations against the government will be unconvincing to a large segment of the German population.
Under the circumstances the US will need to keep in mind (a) what our objectives and interests are which could be affected by Brandt’s policy in the East and (b) what course domestic developments are likely to take in the FRG. [Page 195] It seems to me that our first objective is to ensure the continued association of the FRG with NATO and the US. The question is can we better assure this by objecting to or supporting Brandt’s Eastern policy.
I believe that over the long run we are bound to lose if the German Government concludes that its loyalty to the West is preventing progress in eliminating the division between East and West Germany. We need always to show by our actions that a defense partnership with us does not inhibit efforts by Bonn to ameliorate the conditions of life for the German people. There has been nothing to suggest that the present German Government dismisses the importance for its security of the Alliance or of partnership with the United States.
We must also consider whether the “concessions” offered by the FRG to the East conflict with US interests.
These concessions could include enhancement and possible recognition—in some form—of the GDR; acceptance, under an appropriate legal formula, of the present borders of Germany including the border between the FRG and the GDR; UN membership for the GDR (together with the FRG), presumably to be followed by GDR membership in other relevant international organizations; FRG ratification of the NPT; and possible FRG encouragement of a conference on European security.
None of these in themselves would seem to be contrary to fundamental US interests. A new relationship with the GDR based on its sovereignty as a state, however, could raise questions concerning Four Power responsibility for Germany as a whole and might, under certain circumstances, prejudice the tripartite position in Berlin.
Therefore we shall need to watch this area closely and insist, perhaps even more strongly than we have thus far, that the German Government consult with us in advance before making proposals to the East.
As far as domestic developments in the FRG are concerned we are inclined to doubt that Barzel could make good on his threat to bring down the present government. From all indications Brandt has the support of the great majority in West Germany for his Eastern initiatives.
The CDU can inhibit the policy insofar as agreements reached with the East would require a constitutional change or approval in the Upper House of Parliament. A CDU Chancellor, while not outside the realm of possibility, seems unlikely in the next three years. If the FDP (the minor coalition partner) should disintegrate, it would most probably be for reasons other than Eastern policy. In summary, we believe we should: a) continue to support the concept of Brandt’s Eastern policy; b) examine on a continuing basis its details from the point of view of US interests, applying the brakes now and again if necessary; c) proceed on the assumption that the SPD government is the Government with which we have presently to deal despite CDU threats.
- Source: Department of State, Bonn Post Files: Lot 72 F 81, POL–FRG/US Relations. Secret. Drafted by Sutterlin. Fessenden wrote on the memorandum: “Important statement of EUR’s position, which you may have seen in Wash. Russ.”↩
- For a detailed report on Barzel’s concerns, see Document 69. In an intelligence brief to the Secretary on March 26, Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research Ray Cline judged that Barzel’s approach to Rush was motivated by political considerations, i.e., “to try, on the eve of Brandt’s visit to Washington, to keep US support for the FRG’s current Ostpolitik to a minimum.” “Polls have shown that Brandt’s Eastern policy—in particular his successful efforts to begin a dialogue with East Germany—is extremely popular,” Cline noted. “Barzel may well calculate that unqualified endorsement of Brandt’s policy in Washington, following similar endorsements from Paris and London, would further encourage this trend among the West German electorate and greatly strengthen the SPD in the vital Landtag elections this summer and this fall.” Cline also concluded that Barzel was clearly bluffing in his threat to topple the Brandt government, doubting that the opposition had “the means to do it.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 917, VIP Visits, Chancellor Brandt Visit, April 10–11, 1970 [2 of 3])↩