Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972

64. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, March 10, 1970.

SUBJECT

• Reply Letter to Brandt on Berlin

Secretary Rogers has sent a memo to you concerning the letter from Chancellor Brandt on the Berlin talks (which I reported to you in my memo of March 3).² The Brandt letter and the Secretary’s suggested reply are attached to the Secretary’s memo (Tab B).³

The Germans have been pressing their desire to have the Four Power talks on Berlin begin before the Brandt–Stoph meeting which may be scheduled as early as March 16th. They are interested in the symbolic effect of such a Four Power meeting as an affirmation of continuing Four Power responsibility for Berlin and Germany as a whole. The FRG is also concerned that undue delay in commencing the Quadripartite talks would allow the Soviets to believe—and exploit— disunity in the Western camp. The British have suggested there could be a distinction between the first and subsequent sessions of the Four Power talks, the first procedural, and the second substantive. Thus, they argue, there is no need to delay the first meeting until the Western position is agreed, though agreement would be required before the second meeting could be held.

Secretary Rogers prefers to have the Western position settled even before the first Four Power meeting. However, he is concerned with the pressure from our Allies, and has suggested a compromise course. He recommends that in your reply letter to Brandt, you propose that we now set a date with the Soviets for the end of March in the hope that the Western side will then be ready. If Western agreement is not reached by then, the first session could be devoted to procedural matters.

Attached at Tab A is a letter to Brandt which is the same as the one recommended by the Secretary (slightly altered for style by Jim Keogh). Some aspects of this tactical course concern me. To avoid delay in the second session, we would be put under pressure to reach a hasty and perhaps ill-considered position, or to enter that session also without an agreed position at all. Evidence of Western discord at that point would be more damaging than it would be prior to the commencement of the talks. Moreover, commitment now to a specific date seems somewhat premature since the date for the Brandt–Stoph meeting has not yet been set and the Western side has not yet begun the consultations toward developing the Western position.

Recommendation:

Since the drawbacks are concerned only with tactics, I do not believe it worth arguing about. I therefore recommend that you sign the letter to Brandt at Tab A.⁴

Tab A

Washington, March 12, 1970.

Letter From President Nixon to German Chancellor Brandt

Dear Mr. Chancellor:

I much appreciated your letter of February 25 and the information you provided on the talks which your representatives have carried on in Warsaw and Moscow. Your government has kept us well posted as these important discussions have progressed.

As you state, it is of the utmost importance that the Three Western Powers together with the Federal Republic have a unified standpoint as we begin quadripartite talks with the Soviets on Berlin. While we cannot predict in advance the outcome of these talks, we can be sure that they will touch on sensitive matters and that the Soviet Union will probe to see if there are differences which it can exploit among the Three Western Powers and the Federal Republic, whose interests will be so directly involved.

Your concern that the first meeting with the Soviets take place at an early date is understandable. We are just studying the German position paper on the talks which State Secretary Bahr gave to Ambassador Rush and to his British and French colleagues on February 26⁵ and will be sending instructions to our Embassy in Bonn very shortly so that work can go forward in the Bonn Group on the development of an agreed Western negotiating position. We are prepared to augment the Bonn Group with representatives sent directly from governments if this should prove desirable in the interest of expedition.

Working together in this way on an urgent basis, we should be able to develop a sound position in relatively short time, particularly since so much preparatory work has already taken place. The Western side could take good tactical advantage of having the chair at the first Berlin meeting if our substantive position has been completely formulated and approved.

Under the circumstances, I would propose that we reach agreement together with the British and French to propose to the Soviet side this week through the Western protocol officers in Berlin that the first session of the Four Power Ambassadorial talks take place on March 26. This would afford us some two weeks still to work on the Western position. At the same time the early approach to the Soviet side, followed presumably by public announcement of the date of the opening session, should counter any false impression which otherwise might arise of disagreement among the four Western powers. Moreover, announcement of the date of the first Berlin meeting with the Soviets prior to your forthcoming meeting with Herr Stoph should reemphasize in an appropriate and timely way the continuing responsibilities which the Soviet Union shares with the Three Western Powers for Berlin and Germany as a whole.

If by March 26 there should happen still to be some substantive points to be worked out in the Western position, the first meeting with the Soviets could be devoted largely to procedural matters. I hope, though, that this will not be the case.

Sincerely,

Richard Nixon

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 753, Presidential Correspondence File, Germany, Chancellor Brandt (1969–Apr 70). Secret. Sent for action. No drafting information appears on the memorandum. Sonnenfeldt forwarded a draft to Kissinger on March 6 suggesting that the President delete any specific reference in the letter to a starting date. Kissinger, however, overruled the suggestion with the handwritten comment: “This is not something on which I care to argue with Rogers. It is pure tactics.” (Memorandum from Sonnenfeldt to Kissinger, March 6; ibid.)
2. Document 62.
3. The draft reply is dated March 5; attached but not printed. Also in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 38–6.
4. The President initialed his approval of this recommendation. According to a handwritten note on the memorandum, Sonnenfeldt released the text of the letter to the Executive Secretariat on March 12. The Department forwarded the text to the Embassy with instructions for immediate delivery. (Telegram 36786 to Bonn, March 12; ibid., POL 28 GER B) The Embassy subsequently reported: “DCM [Fessenden] delivered the President’s letter to Chancellor Brandt through Minister Ehmke early March 13. Within an hour of the delivery of the President’s message, Van Well of FRG FonOff contacted us to say that the Chancellor, who was still in the Bundestag, had charged him to inform the USG that the Chancellor was extremely pleased with the President’s letter and very positively impressed by its content.” (Telegram 2782 from Bonn, March 13; ibid.)
5. See Document 59.