45. Editorial Note
On December 2, 1969, Secretary of State Rogers arrived in Europe for a week of consultations, including the semi-annual session of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels as well as meetings with German officials in Bonn. At the end of the second day of ministerial meetings, Rogers attended the traditional quadripartite dinner on matters relating to Germany and Berlin. In his opening remarks Foreign Minister Scheel insisted that, contrary to press reports, Germany would fully consult with the Allies as it embarked on a new policy to negotiate with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. “There will be no stage or phase of its Eastern policy,” he declared, “in which there would not be the closest consultation and harmonization of views. Any other approach would be rash adventurism.” Rogers assured Scheel of American support for Ostpolitik: “There had been Washington press reports about U.S. worries on this topic.” He [Rogers] had discussed the matter in detail with the President before coming to Brussels. He could confirm that these press reports were baseless. “The USG wished to assure the FRG that it welcomed efforts to reduce tensions through the bilateral discussions initiated by the Germans.” (Telegram 5568 from USNATO, December 4; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 38–6) After the session, the Ministers issued a joint declaration on East-West relations, stating that “concrete progress” on Berlin and Germany would affect “the prospects for negotiations looking toward improved relations and cooperation in Europe,” implying a clear connection between German plans for the former and Soviet proposals for the latter. (Documents on Germany, 1944–1985, pages 1052–1055)
On December 6 Rogers discussed the prospects for Ostpolitik and Berlin in separate conversations with Scheel and Brandt in Bonn. Scheel emphasized the importance of Westpolitik, in particular, the intensification of “close cooperation” between Germany and the United States. After briefly reviewing the postwar history, Scheel maintained that “no element of German public opinion” currently opposed the policy of affiliation with the United States and the Western allies. In this regard, the German Government fully understood that it could pursue an Eastern policy only by maintaining and, if possible, strengthening its Western policy. Rogers strongly agreed with these remarks, noting that “the spirit motivating FRG policies was closely similar to that underlying our own policies not only as regards the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, but also as concerns China and the Far East.” Rogers further stated that the United States Government was “pleased” not only with the policies but also with the personalities of the German Government. (Telegram 15626 from Bonn, December 6; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, ORG 7 S)
[Page 126]In his subsequent meeting with the Chancellor, the Secretary reiterated that press reports of German-American disagreement were “completely false.” The United States, he asserted, “applauded the German initiatives in Eastern Europe.” Brandt stressed the importance of Allied understanding for Ostpolitik: “He and his colleagues were not adventurers or stupid. Whatever they did, it would be based on maintenance of a strong position within the Western Alliance and Western Europe. He had emphasized that in his recent policy statement, Germany belongs to the West, but that was no reason why it should not attempt to improve its relations with Eastern Europe.” Rogers said that the Nixon administration had never doubted German intentions. “After all, we were in a sense pursuing a parallel policy in attempting bilaterally to settle certain questions with the Soviets,” he explained. “We were not going to make any agreements which were stupid or would adversely affect our allies.” (Telegram 204279 to Bonn, December 9; ibid., Conference Files, Box 503, CF 415, NATO Dec. 69, Memcons & Statements, Vol. 1) For a German record of the meeting, see Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik, 1969–1970, Nr. 26, pp. 75-76. During the visit, Rogers also gave Brandt a letter of “warm personal greetings” from President Nixon. The text of the letter is ibid., Central Files 1967–69, ORG 7 S.
On December 10 Rogers briefed the National Security Council on his trip to Europe. The minutes of the meeting record the discussion on Germany as follows:
“Rogers: After the Brussels sessions I went to Bonn and met with all the top people there. The Chancellor is clearly following a policy of opening lines with Poland and Hungary and the Soviet Union but will consult with us fully. Fundamental policy is based on NATO. He thinks the Soviets may make some concessions to get a European Security Conference, conceivably on Berlin and trade. He feels loan discussion with Poland may be useful.
“He thinks in dealings with East Germany there may be some movement in trade, but he does not have too much hope for a real East-West détente. Brandt has little hope for what Ulbricht can or will do.
“I have no impression of an anti-NATO movement in the government thinking, but rather hard-heading looking to the future.
“The key men around Brandt include: (1) Duckwitz. He is closer to Brandt than Scheel, (2) Ehmke, a brilliant man in the chancery, and (3) Bahr, a reptilian. I wouldn’t trust him as far as I could throw him.
“Brandt seems to be thinking far down the road and wants to solidify his position with the young people and the opposition.”
After consideration of France and other European matters, the participants continued their discussion of Germany and Ostpolitik:
[Page 127]“Nixon: Was there any consensus on German moves towards Moscow?
“Rogers: Pompidou did seem to have some questions on this.
“Nixon: What about the forthcoming Soviet-West German discussions and talks?
“Rogers: Brandt seems to believe that the Soviets are very eager, and feels that he can take advantage of the situation.
“Nixon: What about the people around him and he himself? Are they tough enough, or are they too anxious?
“Rogers: No, they are tough. Maybe Scheel is not as strong as the others, but then neither is he that strong a figure in the government.
“Laird: But I still have the feeling several of the leaders there are awfully optimistic. They seem to think that the Soviets are changing more than I can see in the winds.
“Nixon: Well, it sounds as if you did a good job on the communiqué. But the winds of détente are certainly strong.
“Rogers: Brandt doesn’t really expect too much, I believe.
“Nixon: What about consultation? Is he prepared to consult with us about what he is doing?
“Rogers: Absolutely. I should add that Ambassador Rush is doing a good job and has gained the confidence of the Germans quickly.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–109, NSC Meeting Minutes, Originals)
On December 15 Kissinger also forwarded to the President the official report of the Secretary of State on his European trip. Rogers noted that he had dispelled rumors of American suspicions on Ostpolitik at the quadripartite meeting, and that Brandt had promised not only to consult but also to avoid “adventurism.” (Ibid., Box 281, Agency Files, Dept of State, Vol. V) In his covering memorandum, Kissinger recommended that the President approve a brief reply acknowledging Rogers’ report and citing an upcoming NSC meeting on European policy. According to his handwritten note, Nixon instead called Rogers on December 29 to discuss the issue; he then instructed Kissinger to “set up NSC meeting as planned to cover NATO generally—with particular emphasis on Germany—Italy—France—(in that order) also a look at Greece.” (Ibid.)