Office of the Historian

43. Letter From the Ambassador to Germany (Rush) to the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Hillenbrand)1

Bonn, November 17, 1969.

Dear Marty:

A number of things have happened here as regards the relationship between the FRG and American governments since the Brandt Government took office which I would like the Department to be aware of and which we will want to watch carefully. Some of these developments are more important than others, and I am not sure how to assess them, but they may add up to a pattern.

The first development was Brandt’s statement in his Government Declaration on October 212 that he wished to be an active ally to the U.S., but a more independent one; he had already made the same point in a press backgrounder for American correspondents (our telegrams 13826,3 [Page 120] para 7, 141684 and 17174).5 The second is the fact that both Brandt and Scheel received Ambassador Tsarapkin before receiving the British and French Ambassadors here. As you know from my report to you (our tel 14207)6 Brandt received me before Tsarapkin. Scheel attempted to do so, but cancelled his appointment with me when he was busy in the Bundestag. The next two days I had to be out of town, so Scheel went ahead with his Tsarapkin appointment before seeing me.

Brandt and Scheel held a reception for the Diplomatic Corps on November 6. In the Federal Bulletin of November 11, as you will see from the enclosure,7 Tsarapkin is featured. The Bulletin does not mention that Brandt and Scheel received the British and French Ambassadors and myself. I must add in fairness that the same page of the Bulletin plays up constructively the President’s Vietnam speech.8

The second instance concerns German negotiations with the Soviets on renunciation of the use of force. As you know, the Foreign Office has told us on instructions from Brandt that he wished to coordinate closely the timing of our next Allied reply to the Soviets on the Berlin Soundings with the German reply to the Soviets on renunciation of force. In the Bonn Group meetings, as late as November 12 (our 14871)9 and November 14, Van Well was discussing details of this coordination with us. But despite this close consultation, Brandt and Scheel suddenly decided, without informing us in any way, to give their reply to the Soviets on November 15.10 We still haven’t been shown the German reply, although we probably will be getting it today. In fairness, it should be pointed out that in the past the Germans have been careful not to consult with us fully on their bilateral exchanges with the Soviets on the renunciation of force, although they always did give us texts in advance.

The third case involves East German policy. As I believe we agree, the Brandt Government’s statements of FRG policy towards East Germany contain a number of important innovations, including a formula [Page 121] which implies acceptance of the existence of East Germany as a state and renunciation of the policy of automatic break in relations with Third Countries which recognize East Germany. These shifts in policy, which are summarized in our telegrams 1437211 and 14712,12 have a direct bearing on Allied rights concerning Berlin as a whole and on our position in Berlin. Although there was opportunity to do so between Brandt’s election as Chancellor on October 21 and the presentation of the policy statement in October 27, there was in fact no consultation between the Germans and us on these questions. At the same time, there is some indication that Bahr did consult on this question with the East Germans and perhaps with the Soviets.13

Finally, there continue to be a number of reports of a planned early Brandt–Scheel visit to Moscow. These reports are not confirmed, but their persistence is such as to make one wonder if there isn’t considerable substance to them.

Cumulatively, there emerges from these points a possible interpretation of what Brandt had in mind when he said that the Federal Republic would be a more independent ally of the U.S. It might be a pattern of deliberate emphasis on Eastern policy while downplaying the Western relationship. The evidence is quite incomplete and it is at odds with Brandt’s deliberate efforts to downplay foreign policy in favor of being a “Chancellor of internal reform” and his other efforts to stress that his foreign policy will be firmly rooted in Germany’s ties with the U.S., NATO, and Western Europe. I need not point out that if the pattern is confirmed, it could have adverse consequences for the relationship of trust between our two governments which is so essential.

We here may be overly sensitive to our reaction to these developments. We are also at present being extremely careful not to give the impression that we are alarmed or are complaining. Our emerging relationship with the new government must be carefully nurtured. It would be very unfortunate if word got around that the United States was deeply concerned or was trying to block the Eastern Policy of the new government. I feel it right, however, to draw these items to your attention as something we will all have to watch closely, with the [Page 122] request that you consider before we meet in December whether any action at the present stage is advisable.

Most sincerely,

Kenneth Rush 14
  1. Source: Department of State, EUR Files: Lot 74 D 430, Department of State—Hillenbrand. Secret; Official–Informal. Drafted by Dean and Fessenden. A copy was sent to Sutterlin.↩
  2. The reference is in error; Brandt, who was elected on October 21, delivered his government declaration on October 28; see footnote 4, Document 39.↩
  3. Dated October 21. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 15 GER W)↩
  4. Dated October 28. (Ibid.)↩
  5. Reference should be to telegram 14174 from Bonn, October 28. (Ibid., POL 15–1 GER W)↩
  6. Document 39. For memoranda of conversation between Brandt and Tsarapkin on October 28 and Scheel and Tsarapkin on October 30, see Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1969, Vol. 2, pp. 1169–1170, 1190–1194.↩
  7. Not attached.↩
  8. Reference is to Nixon’s “Silent Majority” speech of November 3 on the war in Vietnam. For text, see Public Papers: Nixon, 1969, pp. 901–909.↩
  9. Dated November 13. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 28 GER B)↩
  10. For text of the German reply, see Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1969, Vol. 2, pp. 1289–1290.↩
  11. Dated November 1. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 32–4 GER)↩
  12. Document 41.↩
  13. In a November 6 memorandum to Kissinger, David McManis of the White House Situation Room summarized a report regarding an October 26 meeting in Bonn between Bahr and Hermann von Berg, the unofficial East German emissary. According to the report, Bahr showed Berg the sections of the draft government declaration relating to inner-German relations; Berg was satisfied with the language, declining to offer any revisions. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 13, President’s Daily Briefs, 01–09 Nov 69)↩
  14. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.↩