Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972

373. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Moscow, September 13, 1972, 11:10 a.m.–3:50 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU
• Andrei A. Gromyko, Soviet Foreign Minister
• Anatoli Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador to the United States
• A.M. Aleksandrov, Assistant to the General Secretary
• Viktor M. Sukhodrev, Interpreter
• Soviet Notetaker
• Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
• Winston Lord, NSC Staff Member
• Jonathan T. Howe, NSC Staff Member
• John D. Negroponte, NSC Staff Member

SUBJECTS

• Vietnam; Middle East; Germany; Far East

[Omitted here is a discussion on Vietnam and the Middle East.]

Mr. Brezhnev: What else. Perhaps German affairs.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, the General Secretary mentioned German affairs yesterday, and then perhaps I can make some comments regarding the Far East.

Mr. Brezhnev: We have all along sought to promote a settlement between the two German states to the best of our ability. You and we helped Brandt on the ratification but that is past. There are still further outstanding issues. One of the most important is the admission of the two Germanies to the UN, then negotiations between the two Germanies. That is their own business, but we have an interest. My latest information is that there has been some progress. There is also the question of quadrilateral rights of the allies arising from the postwar agreement. This arises because of the UN issue. We have drafted a formula here relating to the rights of the four powers. [Brezhnev reads a text which he then hands to Dr. Kissinger. Text at Tab A.]²

“The Governments of the Soviet Union, Great Britain, the United States and France note the existence of the necessary prerequisites for the admission of the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany to the United Nations and state in this connection that the admission of the GDR and the FRG to the UN does not affect the question of the rights and responsibility of the four powers under the wartime and postwar agreements and decisions.”

When do you think we can practically expect a settlement of the question of the admission of two Germanies to the United Nations?

Dr. Kissinger: I talked to Bahr and Brandt in Munich.³ As you know, in principle we are not opposed to the admission of two German states. We believe that if a satisfactory formula can be found for the four power responsibilities, and I frankly want to examine this, then I propose the following process. My understanding from Bahr is that he expects to conclude the agreement with the GDR by November 1.

We’ll certainly encourage this from our side and if you could encourage your German allies it would be helpful. After the agreement is signed, we are prepared at this UN session, to support observer status for both Germanies at the UN and, after it is ratified, we are prepared to support membership.

It looks all right to me, but there are always details. But I am sure we can settle it.

Mr. Brezhnev: We are encouraging our allies.

Dr. Kissinger: I have that impression. We can be in touch.

Mr. Gromyko: We do, however, still have some serious disagreements. To a great extent it will depend on the attitude of the West Germans.

Dr. Kissinger: You are, of course, informed of the latest meeting.

Mr. Brezhnev: You mean the one of two days ago?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes. I had the impression from Bahr that he was optimistic that it could be settled by November 1 and I strongly urged him in this direction. Speaking confidentially, I urged him that those issues related to Berlin that he simply say that they should be handled in accord with the Berlin Agreement so we do not have to get into new legal arguments. But this is between us. This was my advice to him.⁴

Mr. Alexandrov: In order not to go through this once more.

Dr. Kissinger: In order not to negotiate again.

Mr. Brezhnev: That is the right thing to do.

Mr. Dobrynin: Otherwise it’s a waste of time.

Dr. Kissinger: But what I told Bahr, my remarks to Bahr, should be treated especially confidentially and not repeated to him. It’s my idea.

Mr. Brezhnev: Don’t worry.

Dr. Kissinger: I was also urged by opposition leaders to use my influence in the opposite direction.⁵

Mr. Gromyko: Are you going to do it?

Dr. Kissinger: No, I am going to do it in the direction I indicated to you. We will use our influence to settle by November 1 and then support observer status afterwards, before ratification.

Mr. Gromyko: Although in all fairness we should say that the GDR is already entitled to ask for observer status. We must be clear on this issue. The Federal Republic already has observer status.

Dr. Kissinger: I understand your point but it is a complex issue which will create enormous debate, and we are only talking really only about a period of six weeks.

Mr. Brezhnev: But perhaps that step—observer status—now could have some positive role for subsequent events. I ask you to put that to President Nixon in my name.

Dr. Kissinger: If it were done now, before the signing of the general treaty, there would be an enormous crisis in Germany. Moreover Brandt doesn’t want it. It would complicate our relations with him. It would reduce our influence in the treaty negotiations. I will, of course, mention everything you say to the President, and your views are always taken seriously. But, I believe it is more practical not to mention observer status now and raise it immediately after signature and then I can assure you it will go through quickly.

Mr. Brezhnev: I just want President Nixon to hear this is my name as I said it.

Dr. Kissinger: I will convey what you said to the President.

Mr. Brezhnev: I would see this as an important step in our relations.

Dr. Kissinger: I will raise it with him.

Mr. Brezhnev: We will have to come to it sometime.

Dr. Kissinger: I will raise it, but I think it will be settled anyway before the end of the General Assembly. But I will mention it to the President.

Mr. Gromyko: It also would certainly produce a very favorable impression in the GDR. We cannot conduct negotiations only on the strings of tension. This would be a great positive effect.

Mr. Brezhnev: I am sure this would prompt the GDR to take a more amenable stand and to make more concessions. It would show that an objective approach was being taken to the whole situation.

Dr. Kissinger: I will report fully to the President. I will discuss the matter and I will let your Ambassador know our reaction, that is if we ever see him again in Washington.

Mr. Brezhnev: That depends on how you act to prepare all these questions for agreement. If not, I will send him to the Crimea and keep him there.

Dr. Kissinger: He will be badly missed. I do not know if you saw the photograph of him in Hollywood, the one in which he was holding a rock over my head in his usual negotiating method.⁶

Mr. Brezhnev: I have no knowledge of this so far.

Dr. Kissinger: It was his usual method—a big rock over my head.

Mr. Gromyko: There is a famous sculpture in clay by the Soviet sculptor Chadre which shows a Soviet worker bending to pick up a rock and the title is “Weapon of the Proletariat.”

Mr. Brezhnev: Did Brandt ask you to convey anything to us?

Dr. Kissinger: There was no special request but he did confirm his desire to come to an agreement by November 1. But his basic attitude towards relations with the East, as you know, is extremely positive.

Mr. Brezhnev: What is his assessment of his prospects for the elections?

Dr. Kissinger: All leaders to whom I spoke were confident they would win the elections. My assessment is that if he completes the treaty before November 1 and there is no crisis which we don’t expect, then I think his chances are reasonably good. Whatever the result, it will be very close, and therefore, the management of the government will be very difficult no matter who wins the election. He has been hurt by the events at the Olympics, not in a negative sense of losing votes, but because he thought the good sentiment created by the Olympics and himself being photographed there and so forth would add to his votes. He has lost that possibility. The Olympics hurt him, Schiller’s resignation hurt, and the scandal of the two secretaries paid by the German magazine hurt him. It will be a very close election. If the Christian Democrats win, it should be by a narrow margin and the possibilities of radical changes in policy will be very limited. We will use our influence in the direction of the continuation of the present course.

We, in any event, will not attempt to influence the outcome of the elections. We will do nothing to encourage Brandt’s opponents and we are thinking of doing a few things that will show our close association with the policies of Brandt.

Mr. Brezhnev: That is extremely important indeed, because I think given the desire President Nixon can do a great deal to help Brandt.

Dr. Kissinger: Everything here is confidential. These are very sensitive comments when we talk about the domestic situation of other countries, but the General Secretary has correctly understood our attitude, and indeed we have asked Brandt to suggest some symbolic steps which we could take to help him.

Mr. Brezhnev: In all confidence, too, I had occasion to observe over the past two years the policies and actions of Brandt. He is a wise politician and it is wise to go on dealing with him. He is better than the others. Because Brandt should, of course, be regarded as a politician whose general line is leading towards the general reduction of tensions in Europe. Both you and we are interested in seeing that happen. That should be the principal criterion, especially since the alternative is someone else in office who will want to return to the past situation. We shall pay attention to Brandt and if you and we are of like opinion, we should find a way of helping Brandt.

Dr. Kissinger: There’s no need to discuss this now because the elections are two months away. We’ll pursue the course discussed with the General Secretary. If for some reason the opponents should win, we will use our influence with them not to change policy, but if that happens we will be in touch before then anyway. There is no need to discuss this now, and I don’t expect this.⁷

[Omitted here is a discussion on the Far East.]

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Country Files, Box 74, Europe, USSR, HAK Trip to Moscow Sept. 1972, Memcons (Originals). Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting was held in the Kremlin. Kissinger visited Moscow from September 10 to 13 for “a general review of all aspects of US-Soviet relations.” (Kissinger, White House Years, p. 1271)
2. The text of the note attached but not printed at Tab A is identical to the text quoted in the memorandum. Brackets in the original.
3. Kissinger met Brandt on September 10 at the Chancellor’s villa in Feldafing outside Munich; Bahr and Hillenbrand also attended the meeting “except during the last twenty minutes which were private.” In telegram 1583 from Berlin, September 12, Hillenbrand forwarded the following account of the discussion on UN membership: “Reporting on his recent lightning trip to East Berlin, Egon Bahr said he had undertaken it to head off an East German initiative to seek observer status in the UN. Dr. Kissinger noted that the President had said in Moscow that in this area we would follow the lead of the Federal Republic. Brandt observed that the Soviets tell the Germans this implies that there is no real US objection to UN membership for the GDR. Dr. Kissinger pointed out that for us to have said otherwise would have caused the Soviets to apply even heavier pressure on the FRG.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL GER W–US)
4. In a September 18 memorandum to Kissinger, Helms forwarded a report on Bahr’s account of his meeting with Kissinger: “1. First, Bahr said, he had told Dr. Kissinger that he was having difficulties with the State Department and the U.S. Embassy in Bonn with respect to the Four-Power Declaration, since both were demanding much more than he considered possible or necessary. Bahr had explained his own formula to Dr. Kissinger and had noted that it would appear to be quite adequate. He would be very happy, he had said, if Dr. Kissinger would tell the Soviets that the formula was satisfactory, so that there was an understanding at the highest level. Dr. Kissinger had replied that he had heard Bahr’s explanation, and that Bahr’s proposal for a Four-Power Declaration was indeed satisfactory. He had advised Bahr not to worry about the State Department. Bahr should tell him if he had problems with those people, and ‘we will roll over them.’ Dr. Kissinger had promised to inform the Soviets to this effect. Thus, Bahr told [his interlocutor], he could now say that he had reached an agreement with Dr. Kissinger—over the head of and against the State Department—on a formula which, he knew for certain, was acceptable to the Soviets. 2. Bahr said he had then told Kissinger that he had reached an agreement with the East Germans to the effect that the German Democratic Republic would attain sovereign status as soon as the Basic Treaty had been completed. When Dr. Kissinger had asked whether he might tell this to the Soviets, Bahr had responded that he would be very happy if Dr. Kissinger did. That, Bahr explained, would put the seal on this agreement, because the Soviets could tell the East Germans that the Americans had endorsed it. Very clever, wasn’t it, Bahr asked rhetorically.” (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 60, Country Files, Europe, Egon Bahr, Berlin File [1 of 3])
5. In addition to his meeting with Strauss on September 10 (see Document 372), Kissinger was scheduled to see Barzel in Munich on September 9. (Memorandum from Kennedy to Haig, September 5; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 24, HAK Trip Files, HAK’s Germany, Moscow, London, Paris Trip, Sep 9–15, 1972, Misc. Cables & Documents) No record of the conversation has been found.
6. Dobrynin visited Hollywood during a trip to San Clemente in mid-July for meetings with Nixon and Kissinger. For his published account of the visit, see Dobrynin, In Confidence, pp. 257–260.
7. In a special channel message to Bahr on September 22, Kissinger reported on his discussion of German matters with Brezhnev: “Regarding Germany I had the distinct impression that Brezhnev wants an early agreement between you and the East Germans and is exerting himself in that direction. Brezhnev of course also wants the GDR in the UN as soon as possible, at least as an observer but I think he recognizes and accepts our common point that observer status can come only after your treaty is signed and membership not until ratification. My impression also was that there should be no serious problem about an appropriate four-power declaration regarding four-power rights and responsibilities.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 424, Backchannel Files, Backchannel Messages, Europe, 1972) For the full text of Kissinger’s message, see Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik, 1971–1972, Vol. 1, Nr. 173, p. 609.