32. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany1

174682. Subject: Quadripartite Negotiations on Berlin.

1.
Since Gromyko conversations with Western Foreign Ministers in New York failed to clarify Soviet position toward Allied sounding on Berlin, we essentially remain where we were when Allied approach was made two months ago. Soviets nevertheless have kept door open to further discussions.
2.
Department considers that next move with Soviets should be effort to gain their agreement to discuss specific problems which the Three Powers consider present or potential sources of tension. List should not be so ambitious (i.e. elimination of Wall) as to suggest purely propaganda exercise but should be broad enough so that successful negotiations would provide tangible benefits for Berlin. We believe Three Powers should at such time also indicate willingness to discuss topics which Sovs might wish to raise thus affording them opportunity to follow up on FRG offer of possible modification of FRG presence in West Berlin. This offer, together with presumed Sov interest in European Security Conference and in achieving more favorable public image in Western Europe, will probably be main bargaining factors available to Western side in any negotiations.
3.
Before deciding on further démarche with Sovs it will be necessary, in Department’s view, to await formation of new German Government. If, as expected, Brandt becomes Chancellor, he will certainly push this initiative and, as he indicated to Secretary, will wish it to be coordinated with FRG/Sov bilateral talks on renunciation of force. Under such circumstances we should, in order to show responsiveness, be prepared to resume consultations expeditiously in the Bonn Group.
4.
In our view such consultations should aim at developing draft of text which could be handed Sovs later in autumn in response to their September 12 oral statement.2 Draft could address itself to specific improvements we would like to discuss with Soviets, such as facilitation of intra-Berlin travel and communications, and more orderly and secure procedure for German access to Berlin. (Subject of German access might be matter for discussion between West and East German representatives, who would then submit their recommendations to Four Powers responsible for Greater Berlin, but this need not be spelled out in note.) Reply could indicate willingness of three Western powers to meet with USSR in order to discuss these matters and others which Soviet side might wish to suggest.
5.
We agree with Brandt that eventual tripartite reply and any subsequent negotiation should be coordinated with FRG’s bilateral contacts with USSR on renunciation of force. We will welcome continuing quadripartite consultation in Bonn. Department sees some disadvantages in Moscow as locus for Four-Power talks on Berlin, mainly because of security problems involved in carrying out the extensive US/UK/France/FRG consultation which would be required. We therefore would not wish to commit ourselves on Brandt’s suggestion that both FRG and tripartite negotiations be held in Moscow. When discussions resume we would prefer merely to point to possible security problem and solicit British and French views.
6.
This guidance is being provided well in advance in the event the Embassy has comments to submit.3
Rogers
  1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 38–6. Secret. Drafted by Sutterlin and Skoug on October 9; cleared by Hillenbrand, Dubs, Nelson, and Eliot; and approved by Rogers. Repeated to London, Moscow, Paris, USNATO, and Berlin. In an October 16 memorandum to Kissinger, Sonnenfeldt complained that the Department failed to clear this telegram with the White House. According to Sonnenfeldt, there was “no hint in the telegram what problems are or where State thinks this whole exercise should come out. I suppose the idea is to make policy as we go, by telegram.” He continued: “I am afraid our Berlin diplomacy has been badly and confusingly handled ever since the President’s Berlin speech.” Sonnenfeldt concluded: “Except for your brief involvement in the drafting of the ‘Berlin probe’ last August, when the French raised it with you, the White House has been unable to exercise any control or even influence on our diplomacy.” In a handwritten note on the memorandum, Kissinger agreed to raise the issue at his weekly meeting with Richardson on October 23. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 689, Country Files, Europe, Germany (Berlin), Vol. I) Two days before the meeting, Sonnenfeldt briefed Kissinger on the current status of the Berlin “sounding.” (Memorandum from Sonnenfeldt to Kissinger, October 21; ibid., Box 337, Subject Files, HAK/Richardson Meeting, May 1969–December 1969) In an October 27 memorandum to Kissinger, Haig described the outcome: “Despite continued efforts by the NSC staff, State adamantly refused to accept White House guidance until the issue was finally resolved between Dr. Kissinger and the Under Secretary of State.” (Ibid., Kissinger Office Files, Box 148, US Domestic Agency Files, State/WH Relationship, Vol. 1)
  2. See Document 24.
  3. No comments from the Embassy have been found. The U.S. representative outlined the Department’s views at a tripartite meeting in Bonn on October 28. (Telegram 14368 from Bonn, November 1; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 38–6)