Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972

318. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

San Clemente, August 25, 1971.

Henry:

I talked to Rush and conveyed to him the satisfaction which you and the President hold for the draft agreement and the gratitude of both of you for his outstanding efforts. He called me from his hotel room and will call back again at 11:30 [PDT] with the hope of talking to you.² I alerted him to the possibility of a trip to San Clemente tomorrow morning, which he said he could easily do, with the view toward returning tomorrow afternoon for a departure to Europe.

Ted Eliot called back and stated that there would be no difficulties with a trip by Rush to San Clemente but noted that the Secretary was scheduled to meet again with Rush at 3:00 p.m. Washington time this afternoon³ and that he was still going over the substantive points of the agreement. He noted that the Secretary’s principal concern was that we did not buy a pig in a poke which would subsequently generate much criticism against the President. He said in the final analysis the present treatment of the agreement should be dictated by the substantive issues which may not be as satisfactory as we would like.

In this regard Sonnenfeldt told me this morning that the German opposition has decided to take the position that whatever is unsatisfactory in the agreement is the result of Brandt’s pressure and not U.S. naivety.⁴ This further confirms the wisdom of moving to highlight the achievement.

I note that the Secretary has a call in to you now and I am sure he is going to make the point that we should not hype Rush’s achievements until he, the Secretary, is convinced that they are in fact that.

AH

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 685, Country Files, Europe, Germany (Bonn), Vol. IX. Confidential. Kissinger initialed the memorandum, indicating that he had seen it.
2. See Document 320.
3. Rogers met again with Rush, Hillenbrand, Sutterlin, and Brower at 3:30 p.m. (Appointment Book; Personal Papers of William P. Rogers) No other record of the meeting has been found.
4. In a meeting with an Embassy officer on August 22, Barzel explained that the CDU would “claim that the Brandt government, because of its desire to move on to ratification of the FRG-Soviet treaty, had exercised undue pressure on the Allies on these individual points, particularly the Soviet consulate general. He would claim that Allied concessions under the pressure of the FRG government made it clear that full and exclusive payment for the Berlin agreement was not to be found in the FRG-Soviet treaty, but rather that the Allies had been obliged, in order to achieve an agreement which was otherwise quite useful, to make further concessions of their own. Therefore, the CDU would not stand under any moral obligation to vote for the Moscow Treaty merely because a successful Berlin agreement had been concluded. The CDU would not in any case vote for the Moscow Treaty and the position he had just outlined would justify its posture.” (Telegram 1723 from Berlin, August 24; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 28 GER B)