27. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon1
SUBJECT
- Significance of West German Election
Yesterday’s West German election does not appear to have significantly altered the make-up of the Bundestag.2 Neither of the prominent political parties—Kiesinger’s Christian Democratic Party and Brandt’s Social Democratic Party—gained a clear-cut majority in the Bundestag. The Christian Democrats will hold 242 of the 496 seats.3 The Social Democratic Party announced that it will attempt to form a governing coalition with the liberal Free Democratic Party.
The breakdown of yesterday’s election results, with the 1965 figures in parentheses, follows:
| Results | Percent | Seats | |
| Christian Democratic Party | 15,203,457 | 46.1 (47.6) | 242 (245) |
| Social Democratic Party | 14,074,455 | 42.7 (39.3) | 224 (202) |
| Free Democratic Party | 1,904,387 | 5.8 (9.5) | 30 (49) |
| National Democratic Party | 1,422,106 | 4.3 (2.0) | none |
According to these projected results, the CDU would be a few seats short of an absolute majority (249 seats). Consequently a government by coalition must be arranged. Theoretically, all three possibilities—a continuation of the CDU–SPD coalition, a CDU–FDP coalition and an [Page 84] SPD–FDP coalition—are possible. Negotiations between the three parties will now begin in order to reach agreement on a coalition.
During the election campaign, SPD Chairman Brandt expressed a strong preference for a coalition with the FDP. He can be expected to attempt to form such a coalition if for no other reason than to demonstrate to the SPD that he has tried. Such a coalition would have only a narrow majority and a few defections from the FDP would make this combination impossible. Its foreign policy orientation would attempt to be much more flexible toward the East. Given the limits of German maneuverability this may not in practice get very far.
A CDU–FDP coalition would have a broader majority. In fact, a few individual defections from the FDP to the CDU could give that party an absolute majority. Such a coalition would mark a return to the traditional governing pattern in the Federal Republic during the Adenauer period, but in present circumstances it would be far less stable.
A continuation of the CDU–SPD coalition which was generally regarded as the most likely outcome remains a quite feasible possibility despite bitter personality conflicts which were sharpened during the campaign. If this is the outcome, we would expect coalition negotiations to be difficult and protracted.
A development which might present an immediate problem for the United States would be a conflict over the eligibility of the 22 Berlin representatives to vote in the election of the Chancellor. The Three Western Powers have made clear that because of the special status of Berlin, the Allied prohibition of such participation remains in effect. There is a bare possibility that Brandt, tempted by the prospect of becoming Chancellor in an SPD–FDP coalition, might seek to utilize the Berlin votes which would provide him a more solid majority. (The 22 Berlin votes are divided as follows: 13 SPD, 8 CDU and 1 FDP.)
- Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 682, Country Files, Europe, Germany, Vol. III. Confidential. Sent for information. No drafting information appears on the memorandum. According to a handwritten notation, it was returned from the President on October 1.↩
- In telegram 12748 from Bonn, September 29, the Embassy summarized the political consequences of the election as follows: “The most important immediate result of the Sept 28 German Bundestag elections was rejection of political extremes, especially the right-radical NPD. The second major consequence of the election was a move towards the two-party system. The latter might be considered a constructive contribution to German political stability in the long run, but these positive consequences are balanced and may be outweighed by the negative ones. The Free Democratic Party (FDP) has received what may be a mortal wound, but it promises to take a long time dying, with adverse effects on the short-term stability of the German political system.” (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 14 GER W)↩
- On September 28 the President called the West German Chancellor at 5:45 p.m. to offer his congratulations. Nixon had called Kissinger immediately beforehand, presumably to discuss the election returns. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary) No substantive record of either telephone call has been found. According to Julie Nixon Eisenhower, her father placed the call “when David [Eisenhower] told him that he heard that Willy Brandt had been defeated.” “David felt terrible for giving Daddy the wrong information, especially since he [Nixon] just picked up the phone and called—he’s impulsive that way.” (Safire, Before the Fall, pp. 624–625) In a memorandum to Kissinger on September 29, Sonnenfeldt suggested that Ziegler issue the following statement during the afternoon press briefing. “The President’s call to Kiesinger was a personal gesture since he had seen him so recently. Naturally, the question of forming a government is entirely one for the Germans to work out. The President has the highest regard for the leaders of all three German parties, all of whom he has personally met at various times. He looks forward to continued close cooperation with the German government, regardless of party composition.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 682, Country Files, Europe, Germany, Vol. III) For memoir accounts of the incident, see also Kissinger, White House Years, p. 408; Hillenbrand, Fragments of Our Time, p. 279; Bahr, Zu meiner Zeit, pp. 269–270; and Brandt, My Life In Politics, pp. 170–171.↩