Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972

267. Message From the Ambassador to Germany (Rush) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Bonn, July 14, 1971.

1. I have encountered difficulties with regard to the time frame of reaching an agreement with Falin no earlier than July 20 and preferably nearer July 30, but feel that these problems are now in hand without undue damage. The major difficulty, of course, arises from the fact that the Chancellor and Bahr are very anxious to reach final agreement as soon as possible, are fully aware that Falin is willing to cooperate fully to accomplish this, and have a deep fear that the Russians may change their minds and attitude for some reason, such as suspicion that the United States does not want an agreement. As I mentioned earlier, Bahr told me that Falin and Gromyko were deeply suspicious of the reasons as to why in June I did not return a week earlier from the States for meetings as Bahr had erroneously informed them I would.²

The Chancellor and Bahr pushed me very hard to conclude the talks with Falin this week. This, of course, I insisted was unrealistic and your trip was cited as an important reason for delay. As a further reason, I have insisted that the regular activities of the Bonn Group, the advisers’ and Ambassadors’ meetings, etc., must be carried on in order both to avoid suspicion on the part of the British, French, FRG Foreign Ministry, and our State Department, and also in order to reach as full agreement as possible with the three Allies and the FRG through these procedures in order to minimize possible difficulties in carrying everyone concerned along with us in accepting the final draft of agreement as it comes out of our talks with Falin.

Another source of pressure for an early agreement comes from the British, French, and the FRG Foreign Office. They are aware from the meetings of advisers and Ambassadors and from private talks at lunches, dinners, and otherwise with Abrasimov and Kvitsinskiy that the Russians are willing to move rapidly, and are implying so publicly. For example, the Bonn General-Anzeiger reported July 13 that Falin, in a meeting with leading FDP politicians on July 11, had stated that the Berlin talks could be successfully concluded by the end of August (Bonn 8542).³ Accordingly, our colleagues are anxious to have as many meetings as needed to achieve final agreement as soon as possible. Here, too, however, after long discussions they have reluctantly accepted that at least as of now the course to be followed is to have only one advisers’ meeting and one Ambassadorial meeting a week. In so far as seemed expedient, I have, of course, also delayed action at the advisers’ and Ambassadors’ meetings. At the same time, I must be very careful to appear to be cooperative and forthcoming while meeting your timetable.

Prior to receiving the messages from General Haig,⁴ I had agreed, in order to make the delaying tactics less obvious and more palatable, to have two meetings with Bahr and Falin this week, the results of which are outlined below. I have also discussed in full with Bahr and Falin the fact that orderly procedures must be carried out and that we should not expect to reach final agreement in our talks before the end of this month. They very reluctantly seem to have accepted this, as well as the fact that I have postponed any further meeting until July 22nd because of the fact that I have engagements in Berlin following our Ambassadors’ talk there on the 16th. However, the pressures on all fronts will continue and may increase and it may be that Bahr or Dobrynin will get in touch with you directly to see if you can have me move more speedily. I will, of course, do everything possible to prevent its reaching this point and don’t believe it will do so since they know how thoroughly I coordinate everything with you.

2. The time frame as I would envision it is somewhat as follows, assuming that the Russians continue in their present mood of wanting an agreement and that we are able to settle the issues remaining:

By July 31, Bahr, Falin and I will have a final draft of agreement to be sent by me to you and to be taken by Falin to Moscow. He has said that he will need a few days for final clearance in Moscow and with the GDR.

During the week of August 7, the intensive Ambassadorial sessions would take place, at which the final agreement as recommended by the Ambassadors would emerge in, I hope, exactly the form agreed to in our Falin–Bahr talks.

This should mean that sometime between August 15 and August 30 the agreement would be signed and the issues as to implementation turned over to the FRG and GDR.

Bahr thinks that around two months may be needed to complete his agreement with Kohl, although longer may be required. So that following the signature to that agreement the final quadripartite protocol would be signed between November first and the end of the year.

The Germans insist that unless the final quadripartite protocol is signed by the end of the year at the latest, it would not be possible to ratify the German-Soviet treaty prior to the parliamentary recess of 1972. This would bring the ratification into the beginning, for practical purposes, of the election campaign of 1972 and would mean that the ratification could not take place prior to the 1973 elections. Frank told Falin this in strong terms recently. (See Bonn 7835 and 8234)⁵

3. The Chancellor considers the new formulation with regard to Federal presence advanced by Falin and outlined in my message of July 7⁶ to be a major step forward and generally acceptable. In our discussion with Falin on July 12, however, we pointed out to him that as soon as the wording becomes public there would be major pressure on the Chancellor and the Allies to state with precision just what is and is not permitted under the rather general language. Accordingly, at the time of signing the agreement it will be essential to have an official protocol statement broadly outlining this. The substance of this statement could, in turn, be transmitted by the Allies to the Federal Republic with a copy to the Soviets as guidelines for FRG presence in West Berlin. Falin reaffirmed that the purpose of the broadened language is to permit the holding of committee and Fraktionen meetings in general but that these should not be on subjects having nothing to do with Berlin and should not consist of so-called Bundes weeks, where many committees meet at the same time. We are drafting a protocol statement and letter along the lines of what the FRG has decided are acceptable and will discuss the texts with Falin.

We also raised objection to the statement that the Western sectors of Berlin will also act in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1. We pointed out to Falin that this was unnecessary and difficult to explain to the public since the Senat and other official bodies of the Western sectors, unlike the FRG, act overall under the administration of the Three Powers in assisting to govern Berlin and any such statement would create an unfavorable comparison with East Berlin and arouse political resistance. Without my troubling you with details of a long discussion, Falin at last agreed, subject to Gromyko approval, that the provision might be deleted and that instead we would insert in the protocol statement and letter wording to the effect that in the administration of the Western sectors of Berlin the provisions of paragraph 1 of Annex II will, of course, be respected.

4. At the advisers’ meeting yesterday, instructions were to work on the final quadripartite protocol which, as you know, is a very sticky subject with the French. We went over the draft with Kvitsinskiy today and reached tentative agreement on it. A copy of this final tentative draft is attached.⁷ In it the Russians have substantially abandoned their earlier position and have met our major demands, namely,

(A) Taking note of the German agreements with regard to traffic and listing these agreements in protocol;

(B) Providing that the German agreement and the Four Power agreement and protocol enter into force simultaneously and remain in force together;

(C) Providing for consultation with regard to both the German agreements and the Four Power agreements and protocol to insure the observance of the commitments undertaken and to bring the situation into conformity with them. This should satisfy even the French.

5. Germany has been following your trip with intense interest and no one more than I. I should certainly like to hear about it and hope that it lived up to your highest expectations. I have some concept of how many important balls you are keeping in the air, and if I can be of any further help over here, please call upon me.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 59, Country Files, Europe, Ambassador Rush, Berlin, Vol. 2. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The message was sent through the special Navy channel in Frankfurt. No time of transmission is on the message; a handwritten note indicates that it was received in Washington on July 15 at 0020Z.
2. See Document 261.
3. Dated July 13. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 28 GER B)
4. See footnote 3, Document 265, and footnote 3, Document 266.
5. Dated June 27 and July 6, respectively. (Both National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 28 GER B)
6. Document 266.
7. Attached but not printed.