25. Editorial Note
On September 22, 1969, during the 24th Session of the UN General Assembly, Secretary of State Rogers and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko met in New York to discuss several issues, including recent proposals for talks on Berlin. The Department of State reported that, while the “discussions were amiable and non-polemical, they reflected little if any advance over previous Soviet positions on principal topics and issues.” The Department also noted that throughout the meeting [Page 78] Gromyko “spoke in English except during discussion of Berlin when he spoke in Russian and asked that Secretary be interpreted into Russian.” (Telegram 3165 (Secto 26) from USUN, September 23; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL US–USSR) The following is an excerpt on Berlin from the memorandum of conversation:
“Foreign Minister Gromyko said that some time ago the United States Government had proposed an exchange of views with the Soviet Government on ways of improving the situation relating to West Berlin. He also thought the present situation there was not normal as a result of certain steps taken by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany. There was no need at this time to delve deeply into the history of this problem, since this would merely prolong discussion needlessly. In principle he agreed that it would be useful to conduct an exchange of views on this problem between the Governments of the United States and the Soviet Union, but wanted to inquire as to what the U.S. Government had in mind with respect to the results of such an exchange of views. Did the United States intend to have these results reflected in a formal document, as was customary in international practice, or did we merely want to improve the situation de facto on the basis of mutual example; in other words, what did we conceive as possible ways of reflecting the results of the future exchange of views. He suggested that if the Secretary was not ready to reply at the present moment, he might give the problem some thought and return to it at the time of their next meeting on Friday. If this was acceptable, he did want to take this opportunity to suggest Moscow as the place for holding this exchange of opinions.
“The Secretary said that he understood that East Germany and West Germany had already entered into discussions on possible ways of improving relations between them, especially with respect to transportation, communications and similar matters. We would be glad if these discussions resulted in better relations between East Germany and West Germany. As for the questions of Berlin, both East Berlin and West Berlin, the Secretary believed this to be of concern to the Four Powers and thought that any discussions for improving the situation there should include all four.
“Mr. Gromyko emphasized that his remarks were intended to deal with the situation in West Berlin and not with the situation in Germany in general. This did indeed touch upon the interests of the other allies. Some time ago, however, the United States had raised the question of conducting an exchange of views between the Governments of the Soviet Union and the United States; today the Secretary talked about Berlin in terms of the Four Powers. Did this mean that we were withdrawing our suggestion for bilateral discussions? He was simply asking this question in an attempt to understand the Secretary’s thinking on the subject and not in order to raise any objections.
[Page 79]“The Secretary replied that he thought any discussion concerning the future of Berlin would have to include the other two powers. He would be happy to talk about how this could be brought about. In this connection, however, he was not quite sure what Mr. Gromyko had in mind as to the objectives that might be achieved in talks. The Soviet reply had not been entirely clear to us and we wondered what their ideas were.
“Mr. Gromyko said that this was precisely the question he was addressing to the Secretary as representative of the Government which had proposed these discussions. It was he who was asking for clarification. What did the Secretary consider to be the best way of reflecting the results of such an exchange of views? He repeated his earlier suggestion that if the Secretary needed time to consult on this problem, they could return to it at their next meeting. If the Secretary’s thinking was in terms of Four Power talks, he did not object in principle and would consider it useful to discuss ways of putting the machinery for such an exchange in motion. He thought this was something both sides should have a chance to consider and return to it later.
“The Secretary agreed that this was a good suggestion and said he would be willing to discuss it further next Friday.
“Assistant Secretary Hillenbrand remarked that the specific form of any possible agreement, that is, whether it should be a written document or a de facto improvement, would, no doubt, depend upon the course of the discussions and could be considered as we went along.
“Mr. Gromyko said that whether the talks were held on a bilateral or on a Four Power basis, inasmuch as communications to and from West Berlin passed through the territory of the German Democratic Republic, his Government would, of course, have to be in consultation with the Government of the GDR. He was just mentioning this ‘by the way,’ as it were.
“The Secretary agreed to return to this question next Friday.” (Ibid.)
Assistant to the President Kissinger summarized the conversation between Rogers and Gromyko in a memorandum to the President on September 26. Kissinger agreed with the Department’s assessment, i.e., that no “important new ground was broken” during the meeting:
“Gromyko showed some interest in bilateral talks with us. You had hinted at this possibility in your letter to Kosygin last April. The Soviets undoubtedly sense a good deal of Western interest in talking about Berlin, especially in the SPD and FDP in Germany which may form the next government in Bonn. In fact, even if one could make a case that the Soviets might be interested in a modus vivendi, there are no signs that they will be prepared to buck the GDR’s continued interest in keeping the situation unsettled. Negotiations, whether bilateral US-Soviet [Page 80] or four power are therefore likely to encounter a rigid Soviet-GDR position, while we, especially if Brandt becomes Chancellor, would be under pressure from our allies to come up with ‘constructive’ proposals. And in Berlin our negotiating position is weak; the other side holds all the cards. We thus have no interest in pushing Berlin negotiations at this time, although we will undoubtedly come under pressure to do so and may in the end have to go along.” (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 280, Agency Files, Department of State, Vol. III) Rogers and Gromyko met in New York for dinner the evening of September 26 to continue their previous discussion. Although no record of the conversation on Berlin has been found, Deputy Assistant Secretary Swank forwarded the following brief account in a letter to Ambassador Beam on September 30: “On Berlin and the possibility of quadripartite talks, the Secretary sought to elicit some clarification of the opaque Soviet response to the recent tripartite démarche. As in the earlier discussion of Berlin on September 22, Gromyko dealt in generalities rather than specifics and contributed nothing new.” (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL US–USSR) Kissinger also discussed the possibility of talks on Berlin in an afternoon meeting on September 27 with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin. According to the memorandum of conversation, Dobrynin raised the issue: “Dobrynin then remarked that his Minister had asked him to inquire whether in negotiating the Berlin issue we had any preference as to forum. Specifically, did we care whether it was discussed in a four-power or two-power forum? While the Soviet Union was willing to speak in a four-power forum, it was also prepared to have two-power discussions. I told him that four-power discussions seemed to be quite acceptable. If there was any different inclination on the part of the President, I would let him know.” (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1969 [Part 1])
In a telephone conversation with the President after the meeting, Kissinger briefly reported that one of “two stupid questions” Dobrynin raised was “whether we want to have the Berlin talks to be quadripartite or bilateral.” According to the transcript, Nixon did not express an opinion on the matter. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 360, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File)