Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972

227. Message From the Ambassador to Germany (Rush) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Bonn, April 25, 1971.

Thanks for your messages.²

(1) Abrasimov’s explanation as to why he did not ask for a private meeting with me is not satisfactory. It is true that I had to leave our luncheon meeting shortly after 4 o’clock in the afternoon, since I, as patron, had to return to Bonn for the Boston Pops concert that evening and to be a host to Senator and Mrs. Edward Kennedy and party. However, I had given considerable advance notice of this to Abrasimov, as well as to the other Ambassadors, and on the morning of our meeting again mentioned it to Abrasimov. Nevertheless, he at no time attempted to arrange a private meeting with me. There, of course, may be some communication problems, but I don’t believe these are the reasons for his action.

(2) We have for some time been considering the approach advanced to you by Bahr of dropping the legal formulae as to status and stressing only the obligations and undertakings of each side. Recently, the State Department has been more vigorous in pushing this approach,³ which has a lot of merit.

The problem with this approach is that any agreement, however reduced to essentials, would have to require that someone take certain action, thus unavoidably posing the question of competence, authority and sovereignty. With regard to access, for example, the Russians insist that the sovereign G.D.R. alone, not the Russians, has sovereignty over the access routes and competence to make an access agreement. As you know, despite our understanding with the Russians that our efforts should be to reach an agreement on practical improvements without affecting the legal position of either party, the recently tabled Russian draft attempts almost in full to assert the Russian position. They have also been very aggressive in maneuvering to have negotiations on access removed from the Four Power talks and carried on by the F.R.G. and the G.D.R. and in having negotiations on inner-city movement similarly taken over by the Senat and the G.D.R.

Despite these difficulties, I think we should attempt steadfastly to concentrate on the problems of practical improvements, and, to the fullest extent possible, defer all questions of political status or legal position. It would be very helpful if you could pursue this approach when you see Dobrynin again. If this approach should eventually be successful, we could, I feel sure, find ways to bypass the issues arising from the conflicting legal positions.

(3) I am pleased that you suggested, and Dobrynin agreed in principle, that I meet henceforth with Falin. Unless you advise otherwise, I will do nothing until Falin approaches me, since psychologically, I think this procedure is important when dealing with the Russians.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 59, Country Files, Europe, Kissinger Office Files, Ambassador Rush, Berlin, Vol. 1. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The message was sent through the special Navy channel in Frankfurt. No date or time of transmission or receipt is on the message; the date is from the text of Kissinger’s reply (see Document 228).
2. For Kissinger’s last two messages, see footnote 5, Document 221 and Document 226.
3. In telegram 59068 to Bonn, April 8, the Department gave the Embassy instructions for handling the Soviet draft: “It should be stated to the Soviets that an agreement will not be possible if its wording prejudices the Western position concerning quadripartite rights and responsibilities, the status of Berlin and the role of the GDR. The Counselors should be given the task of seeking to formulate subjects covered both in the Soviet and Western texts in such a way as to avoid prejudice to the legal position of either side, which, after all, was mutually agreed earlier as the only feasible basis for an understanding. The Western Ambassadors should review in detail the problems entailed in the Soviet text in order to provide clear examples for the Soviet side of the work to be done.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 28 GER B)