Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972

192. Message From the German State Secretary for Foreign, Defense, and German Policy (Bahr) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Bonn, March 10, 1971.

1) At the request of the three Ambassadors, I refrained from discussing the model of a general transit treaty with the exception of Berlin traffic during the meeting with Kohl on March 8.² Kohl was shocked. After a two and one-half hour break he received permission to explain GDR ideas orally.

2) Accordingly, the GDR withdrew its proposals for ratification and a termination clause and is now prepared to handle Berlin traffic in an annex.

3) With this position, the GDR has fully adapted itself to the concept of a Berlin settlement as discussed by the four powers.³ It is a great loss of prestige to give up ratification of the first treaty between both states. Kohl therefore asked that we not exploit this as an admission, as if that would constitute proof of an inner-German relationship.

4) In my view, the danger is less than ever that the quadripartite negotiations might be undermined by talks at the German level. On the other hand, I have reason to believe that the three Ambassadors have this concern and have adapted their negotiating tactics for a very long period of time. We face difficult decisions about the appropriate position we should now adopt toward the GDR, which we want to discuss on Friday evening.⁴ In this process, the unity of the three Western governments must remain of the utmost importance.

5) I would be interested in your assessment of the situation and your thoughts on further action.⁵

Warm regards

Egon

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 60, Country Files, Europe, Egon Bahr, Berlin File [3 of 3]. Top Secret; Eyes Only. The message, translated here from the original German by the editor, was sent through the special Navy channel in Frankfurt; a handwritten note indicates that it was received in Washington at 2059Z. In a March 11 memorandum to Kissinger, Sonnenfeldt assessed the message: “Bahr presumably is upset that the Allies intervened and obstructed his negotiations (though the resulting stonewall may have aided Bahr in obtaining these GDR concessions). He seems to acknowledge that there may have been some danger that his negotiations would undercut our negotiations. Now he sees this danger contained, but is concerned, apparently that we are taking too long term a view and (apparently) not really moving fast enough to agree on the mandate that would permit him to negotiate. Since the Bonn Group of Ambassadors is deeply involved in this tactical play, I do not see how you can intervene in it, or allow Bahr to use you to circumvent this Group. At the same time, if Bahr or the Bonn Government have specific proposals on tactics or on the substance of the four power negotiations, now is the time for them to come forward.” (Ibid.)
2. See Documents 193 and 196. See also Bahr, Zu meiner Zeit, pp. 358–359.
3. In the memorandum to Kissinger cited in footnote 1 above, Sonnenfeldt wrote: “These are, indeed, shifts in form which may indicate that the GDR will be flexible in further talks. But the fact remains that the general line of development is toward an inner-German agreement that will make it exceedingly difficult to obtain Soviet acceptance of our substantive positions on access and our proposals for a four power mandate.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Country Files, Europe, Box 60, Egon Bahr, Berlin File [3 of 3])
4. March 12.
5. In a special channel message to Bahr on March 12, Kissinger assessed the situation as follows: “From these reports it does seem that there has been a certain forward movement on Kohl’s part. This could well be significant although at the moment it appears to be on less essential matters and on form. I do not rule out the possibility that the movement that may be occurring may be due to some extent to talks in my channel. If this is the case, the Soviets may be waiting to see what they can get bilaterally with you before accepting the Four Power umbrella. Therefore, I think we should wait for Dobrynin’s answer on the unilateral guarantee proposal.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 60, Country Files, Europe, Egon Bahr, Berlin File [3 of 3]) On the same day, Kissinger also sent a special channel message to Rush containing the text of “my latest exchange with Bahr.” (Ibid., Box 59, Ambassador Rush, Berlin, Vol. 1 [2 of 2])