Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972

188. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, February 26, 1971.

SUBJECT

• Berlin Status Report

In the course of the two advisers and two Ambassadorial meetings, the Soviets have now completed the presentation of their views on the Western draft agreement of February 5.² In some areas they proposed specific language and in others they merely made general comments.

There has been no great progress on access. The Soviets still maintain that the preferential/unhindered principle applies only to traffic considered “innocent” and in accord with GDR laws. Nevertheless, the Soviets have hinted that there are possibilities of Soviet concessions to come.

On the general issue of Bonn/Berlin ties, the Soviets have proposed including a general statement on the separation of West Berlin and the FRG (non-applicability of the Basic Law) in the body of the Four Power agreement. They may continue to insist on this unless the Western side agrees to drop its insistence on a Four Power access commitment. There has been some real movement on Federal presence since the Soviets seem to have accepted a limitation only to nonperformance of constitutional acts, rather than total elimination of Federal presence. As expected, they insist that committees and fraktionen be included within the limitation. On representation abroad, the Soviets have suggested the outlines of a formula which may allow each side to retain its legal position but possibly offer at least FRG consular protection for Berliners.

There have been lengthy discussions on format and nomenclature (including the near-impossible task of defining the area to which the agreement applies). While retaining the skeleton of the Western draft, the Soviets have attempted to thoroughly weaken its structure by clearly inserting the GDR and avoiding direct Soviet responsibility.

The GDR has continued its parallel efforts through the Bahr/Kohl (access) and now the Stoph/Schuetz (inner-Berlin) channels. Bahr is pressing us hard for the Four to reach an access commitment on a separate and expedited basis so that he can be given a signal thereby to negotiate Berlin access together with the FRG–GDR negotiations which will probably be beginning on a general transport agreement.

Both Brandt and Ehmke have indicated to us that they will be willing to make further concessions on Federal presence (committees and fraktionen), but not until the negotiations have proceeded further.³ But the question of further concessions may have been complicated by a Brandt/Barzel rift heightened by Barzel’s anger at Brandt for not consulting him on the draft agreement. Barzel considers the Western draft unacceptable and representative of the status quo minus—and this draft contained no concession on committees or fraktionen.

We are finding ourselves in an increasingly awkward position of:

• —trying to secure more concessions from the Soviets and rejecting their extreme proposals,
• —without at the same time being able to offer concessions on presence which Brandt feels he will be able to offer later;
• —but on which there is virtually no hope of securing CDU toleration let alone agreement;
• —and at the same time trying to accommodate Bahr’s desire for speedy Four Power agreement at least to signal the start of the Bahr/Kohl negotiations on access;
• —and all in the pressure-cooker atmosphere of the March 14 elections in Berlin where the CDU smells blood and not even charismatic Brandt can rouse the local SPD. (The Stoph letter to Schuetz⁴ was of course intended to help the SPD.) Most predictions still see the SPD losing only some 3–5%, thus retaining the majority traditional in “Red Berlin.”

As a result of the SRG meeting on Berlin two weeks ago, and in accordance with your instruction to Marty Hillenbrand, State is preparing a paper for the President outlining the state of play as well as enclosing a draft NSDM providing further Presidential guidance for the negotiations.⁵

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 691, Country Files, Europe, Germany (Berlin), Vol. III. Secret. Urgent; sent for information. Kissinger initialed the memorandum; an attached form indicates that it was “noted by HAK” on March 4. The memorandum is based on an unsigned status report, attached but not printed, on the negotiations as of February 26.
2. The advisers had met three times since February 5, when the Western draft agreement was tabled. The Mission in Berlin reported the same day on the meetings of February 12, 16, and 23 in telegrams 301; 315, 316, and 317; and 362, 363, and 364, respectively. (All ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 28 GER B). The Ambassadors had met only once since February 8 when they first discussed the Western draft agreement. (See Document 176) The Mission in Berlin reported the highlights of the February 18 meeting the same day in telegram 328 and the details the next day in telegrams 335 and 336. (All in National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 38–6)
3. In a conversation with Rush on February 23, Brandt presented some “preliminary thoughts” on Federal presence, including the suggestion that he might accept a proposal that parliamentary committee meetings in Berlin must deal directly with the city’s affairs. (Telegram 2185 from Bonn, February 24; ibid., POL 28 GER B) Ehmke addressed the issue in similar terms during a luncheon meeting with Rush on February 19. (Telegram 2087 from Bonn, February 22; ibid.)
4. Dated February 24. For text of the letter, see Texte zur Deutschlandpolitik, Vol. 8, pp. 80–81.
5. See Document 216.