Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972

181. Telegram From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, February 14, 1971, 2133Z.

WH10125. Subject: Pravda Editorial on German Treaty and Berlin. Pravda has added another piece to the strange puzzle of Soviet statements on Germany. In an apparent attempt to repudiate Soviet-inspired press stories attacking Brandt and hinting at a Soviet rapprochement with the CDU, Pravda editorial launches an attack on the CDU for blocking the Eastern treaties and the Four Power negotiations on Berlin. Kiesinger and Strauss, but not Barzel, are criticized by name. Moreover, without naming Brandt, the editorial concludes that only a party and a “politician” who take into consideration “reality” and draw lessons from the past, can expect to succeed.²

Last week the Soviets tried to play down the speculation caused by the stories given out by Vorontsov in Washington and a Soviet diplomat in Stockholm. The Soviet Embassy in Bonn categorically denied that any interviews had been given at all. And Vorontsov called in the reporter from the Hearst press and argued that he had overwritten the story.³ Then, Tsarapkin in a farewell meeting with Brandt agreed to publish a six week old New Year’s greeting from Kosygin as a gesture to the government (the actual Kosygin text, however, seemed as critical as it was friendly).⁴

Now Pravda seems to close out the incident, since Pravda editorials can be considered definitive. Moreover, Pravda in its treatment of the issues not only defends the treaties as a legitimate compromise, but seems to accept the link between the treaty ratification and the Berlin negotiations, by lumping together criticism of the CDU (and the US) for blocking both. Why, then, did the Soviets begin this weird episode?

One explanation, that is favored by the West Germans is the old one of a split in the Kremlin. Perhaps this is not too far fetched, but it does seem implausible. It would be virtually unprecedented for two Embassies to lend themselves to Kremlin intrigue. Since the official majority line must be Pravda editorial, this would mean that Vorontsov would be acting for some minority group—highly unlikely.

More likely is that the Soviets planned this little demonstration to impress on Brandt and the SPD the extent to which they have mortgaged their policies to the USSR’s good will. By reminding Bonn that the USSR had an alternative of waiting for the CDU, and allowing this to sink in before retracting it in Pravda, the Soviets seem to be saying that they still expect Brandt to deliver the ratification of the treaties.

It is also possible that Pravda is responding to a private appeal that Brandt is reported [less than 1 line not declassified] to have initiated through a letter to well known Soviet journalist on February 4.⁵ In this appeal, written by one of Brandt’s entourage, the West Germans complained that the Soviets themselves were placing obstacles in the road of Ostpolitik. It hinted that Brandt might have to retreat from the treaties and blame their failure on the USSR. Thus, the Soviets might have decided that they could not go too far in pushing Brandt by the threat of turning toward the CDU.

The upshot seems to be that the Soviets still have an interest in these treaties. Pravda goes a long way in defending them. While opening some line of retreat by emphasizing the strength of German opposition, the overall suggestion is that the Soviets will continue to work for their ratification. This means that they will have to consider how to move the Berlin talks off deadcenter. The tone of the Soviet advisor’s comments in the Four Power session on Friday,⁶ also seems to fit in with one last Soviet effort to bring their own Westpolitik to fruition.

The full text of Pravda is not available here and the above speculation is preliminary. When the text is received we may want to send you some further analysis.⁷

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 714, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Vol. XII. Secret.
2. The editorial appeared in Pravda on February 13. For a condensed text, see The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, March 16, 1971, Vol. XXIII, No. 7, pp. 30–31.
3. See Document 174.
4. For text of the letter from Kosygin, which Tsarapkin delivered to Brandt on February 9, see Meissner, ed., Moskau–Bonn, Vol. 2, pp. 1320–1321. In a February 11 memorandum to Nixon, Kissinger assessed the letter as follows: “In a letter to Brandt yesterday, Kosygin praised the [Moscow] treaty but emphasized that its benefits would only come with ratification. In this regard, Kosygin stated, ‘much will depend on the efforts and energy of your government.’ This polite reminder comes against a background of inspired press stories emanating from the Counselor of the Soviet Embassy in Washington [Vorontsov] to the effect that the Soviets had all but decided to abandon the Brandt government and wait for the CDU to return to power. The Soviet source claimed the article had been overwritten, and it was totally denied by the Soviet Embassy in Bonn. These actions will merely highlight the whole affair. The Soviets apparently hope that these implied threats will lead Brandt to advance some concession in the Berlin negotiations in order to fulfill his own commitment that a satisfactory Berlin solution is a precondition to ratifying the treaties. While all of this is part of a war of nerves, nevertheless some in the CDU believe that the Soviets may be seriously thinking about breaking with Brandt on the grounds that only the CDU could implement the Eastern treaties.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 31, President’s Daily Brief, February 1–17, 1971)
5. As reported in a memorandum from Fazio to Kissinger on February 12. (Ibid.)
6. February 12. A detailed account of the advisers’ meeting is in telegram 301 from Berlin, February 12. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 38–6)
7. No further analysis has been found.