Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972

134. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, November 4, 1970.

SUBJECT

• Message from Bahr

He has sent you a message (Tab B)² about the “strange happenings” involving the recent GDR approach to the FRG to resume talks. (We had previously briefed this for you and are also touching on it in a separate status report to you on the Berlin negotiations.)³

His points are:

1. After resisting until the last minute the Soviets caused the GDR to make its move;

2. As usual, the GDR bent to the Soviet will but set up unacceptable conditions for the FRG (i.e. to talk separately about Berlin without prior Great Power agreement).

3. The Germans will ensure that there will be no exchange with the GDR without preconditions, i.e. the roof of a four-power aegis so far as Berlin is concerned.

4. The Germans will report about their exchanges with the GDR to the (Western) Bonn group just as quickly as the West is reporting to the Germans about the four power talks on Berlin with the Soviets. (Bahr expresses himself as happy with Western practice in this regard: the Western powers have, in fact, given the Germans complete and immediate readouts of their meetings with Abrasimov).

5. Bahr has notified the GDR that he is ready to talk in Berlin as of November 3 but, as expected, the GDR is playing for time.

6. If you have questions, you should feel free to raise them with Bahr.

It appears that we are well enough informed about the GDR–FRG byplay and that the Germans (and Bahr for the moment) are playing it straight (which cannot be said of Bahr’s continued surreptitious contacts with the Soviets in Berlin about which CIA is reporting, though with little substance).

Attached for your approval is a brief message to Bahr thanking him for his message (Tab A).⁴

Recommendation:

That you approve backchannel transmission of the attached message to Egon Bahr.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 684, Country Files, Europe, Germany, Vol. VII. Secret; Nodis; Sensitive; (Outside System). Sent for action.
2. Dated November 3; attached but not printed. The backchannel message was transmitted to the White House and relayed to Kissinger in San Clemente. Kissinger wrote the following note on another copy of the message: “Hal S. What is this about? Do we acknowledge? HK.” (Ibid., Box 423, Backchannel Messages, 1970, Europe, Mideast, Latin America) For the text of the message in German, see Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1970, Vol. 3, p. 1901.
3. Document 135.
4. After making several changes to the draft text, Kissinger approved the following backchannel message: “Dear Egon: I appreciate having your comments on the GDR’s approach to you and on your own intentions with respect to it. We shall await further developments. I am delighted that the consultative mechanism is working smoothly and appreciate your taking the time to provide your additional observations. Best regards, Henry Kissinger.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 684, Country Files, Europe, Germany, Vol. VII)