Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972

11. Editorial Note

On February 17, 1969, President Nixon received Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin at the White House for an initial review of international affairs, including the Middle East, Strategic Arms Limitation, Vietnam, and Berlin. In a briefing memorandum 2 days earlier, Assistant to the President Kissinger suggested that the President adopt a “polite, but aloof” approach to the Ambassador, making clear that “we believe progress depends on specific settlements, not personal diplomacy.” Kissinger specifically recommended that Nixon convey that “a Berlin crisis could throw a shadow over our relations.” An attached set of talking points, with passages underlined by the President (italicized below), addressed the “Berlin crisis” as follows:

• “1. Any crisis there now would be artificial; we see no justification for it and have no interest in confrontation.
• “2. We do have a vital interest in the integrity and viability of the city.
• “3. We know of no infringement on Soviet interests by any actions in the Western sectors of the city on the part of any of our allies.
• “4. You are going to Berlin to affirm our interests and our responsibilities.
• “5. (OPTIONAL If CONVERSATION WARRANTS) A crisis now would place a heavy burden on our relations.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 340, Subject Files, USSR Memcons, Dobrynin/President 2/17/69)

Before Dobrynin arrived, Kissinger also personally briefed Nixon on “the situation in Berlin and the need to cover our view with the Soviets.” (Memorandum from Haig to Kissinger, February 17; ibid., Box 2, President’s Daily Briefs, February 15–18, 1969)

According to the President’s Daily Diary, Nixon met Dobrynin briefly in the Fish Room before moving to the Oval Office at 11:51 a.m.; Kissinger and Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary Toon then joined the discussion at 12:02 p.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files) The memorandum of conversation records the following exchange on Berlin:

“The President said that he wished to make clear that it was not his view that agreement on one issue must be conditioned by settlement of other issues. The President wished to express his conviction, however, that progress in one area is bound to have an influence on progress in all other areas. The current situation in Berlin is a case in point. If the Berlin situation should deteriorate, Senate approval of the Non-Proliferation Treaty would be much more difficult. The President wished to make clear that he favored early ratification of the treaty and he is optimistic that the Senate will act favorably in the near future. We should bear in mind, however, that just as the situation in Czechoslovakia had influenced the outlook for the treaty last fall, so would the situation in Berlin now have an important bearing on the Senate’s attitude. Ambassador Dobrynin had mentioned the desirability of making progress on some issues, even if settlement of other issues should not be feasible. The Non-Proliferation Treaty is just such an issue. If we can move ahead on this it would be helpful in our efforts on other issues. The only cloud on the horizon is Berlin and the President hoped that the Soviets would make every effort to avoid trouble there.

“Dobrynin said that the situation in Berlin did not stem from any action taken by the Soviets. The President would recall that a meeting was scheduled in Berlin last fall and the Secretary of State had discussed the problem with the Ambassador, urging him to persuade his government to avoid any action in connection with this meeting which might possibly result in unpleasantness in and around Berlin. The Ambassador said he would not wish his remarks to be recorded but he felt the President should know that his Government had used its influence to insure that the situation remained calm. There was no confrontation then, and Ambassador Dobrynin saw no need for a confrontation between us in the present situation.

“The President hoped that there would be no trouble in Berlin and he welcomed Ambassador Dobrynin’s assurances on this point. The Soviets should understand that we are solidly behind the integrity of West Berlin, and we will do whatever is necessary to protect it. He had noted in the press references to the ‘provocative nature’ of his visit to Berlin. The President wished to assure Ambassador Dobrynin that these stories were totally without foundation and that his visit to Berlin was a perfectly normal action for any United States President to take in connection with a visit to Europe.” (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL US–USSR)

During the meeting, Dobrynin gave Nixon a personal message from the Soviet leadership. After declaring a commitment to “pursue the policy of peace,” the message addressed six “big international problems,” including issues relating to Germany and European security:

“We are strongly convinced that the following premise has a first-rate importance for the character and prospects of the relations between the USSR and the USA: that is, whether both our countries are ready to proceed in their practical policies from the respect for the foundations of the post-war structure in Europe, formed as a result of the Second World War and the post-war development, and for the basic provisions, formulated by the Allied powers in the well-known Potsdam Agreements. There is no other way to peace in Europe but to take the reality into consideration and to prompt the others to do the same. It’s impossible to regard the attempts to undermine the post-war structure in Europe otherwise than an encroachment on the vital interests of our country, or its friends and allies—the socialist countries.

“At one time, and in particular in 1959–1963, when the Soviet and U.S. Governments were discussing the complex of German affairs, we were not far apart in understanding of that with regard to some important problems.

“The Soviet Union regards with particular watchfulness certain aspects of the development of the F.R.G. and its policy not only because the past German invasion cost us many millions of human lives. President Nixon also understands very well that revanchism begins not when the frontier marks start falling down. That’s the finale, the way to which is leading through the attempts to gain an access to the nuclear weapons, through the rehabilitation of the past, through the provocations similar to those which the F.R.G. commits from time to time with regard to West Berlin.

“It became almost a rule that the F.R.G. stirs up outbursts of tensions around West Berlin, which didn’t and doesn’t belong to it, involving the Soviet Union, the USA and other countries into complications. It’s hardly in anyone’s interests to give the F.R.G. such a possibility. Anyhow the Soviet Union can’t let the F.R.G. make such provocations.

“We would like the President to have complete clearness and confidence that the Soviet Union has no goals in Europe other than the establishment of the solid foundations of security in this part of the world, of the relations of détente between the states of East and West.” (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 340, Subject Files, USSR Memcons Dobrynin/President 2/17/69)

At Kissinger’s request, Toon, who did not see the message but drafted the memorandum of conversation, offered his analysis of the meeting with Dobrynin. Toon argued that the Soviets were clearly intrigued at the prospect of negotiations, but were “uneasy as to the real meaning of linkage between arms control talks and political issues,” perhaps suspecting that Nixon might, as Eisenhower had done, “condition progress in arms control on the German issue.”

“On Berlin, I think the President’s remarks were useful in that they conveyed to Dobrynin our concern lest tough action by the East Germans result in a nasty situation and a confrontation with us. I am not sure, however, that Dobrynin understands clearly that a blow-up in Berlin would seriously affect the outcome of NPT as well as our own decision to proceed with missile talks. Perhaps we should follow this up with a further meeting in the Department, probably toward the end of the President’s tour when we may have a clear understanding as to the action contemplated by the other side. My own view is that there will not be serious problems around Berlin until the President departs that city but that we can probably expect unpleasantness immediately after his departure.” (Memorandum from Toon to Kissinger, undated; ibid., President’s Trip Files, Box 489, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1969 [Part 2])

In a memorandum forwarding this analysis to the President on February 18, Kissinger noted that the Soviet message itself was “extraordinarily forthcoming,” presenting their position “strictly in terms of national interests and mutually perceived threats, without even the usual ritual obeisance to Marxist-Leninist jargon.” “The gist of the paper,” he concluded, “is that the Soviets are prepared to move forward on a whole range of topics: Middle East, Central Europe, Vietnam, Arms control (strategic arms talks), cultural exchange. In other words, we have the ‘linkage.’ Our problem is how to play it.” After summarizing two “schools of thought” on Soviet policy, Kissinger suggested the following game plan: “My own view is that we should seek to utilize this Soviet interest, stemming as I think it does from anxiety, to induce them to come to grips with the real sources of tension, notably in the Middle East, but also in Vietnam. This approach also would require continued firmness on our part in Berlin.” (Ibid.)

For complete text of memorandum excerpted above, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XII, Document 17. For the participants’ respective accounts of the meeting, see Nixon, RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon, pages 369–370; Kissinger, White House Years, pages 28, 140–145; and Dobrynin, In Confidence, pages 198–199.

In a telephone conversation with Kissinger at 2:45 p.m. on February 22, Dobrynin “more or less” dictated the following message from the Soviet leadership:

“These days some officials in Bonn have been putting forward an idea in conversations with representatives of the Soviet Embassy there that if the United States expressed to Mr. Kiesinger’s government an opinion that it would be desirable to refrain from having called the Federal Assembly in West Berlin, then this advice would be gladly followed. It is of course difficult for us to judge with what aim in view and how seriously such ideas are being expressed to us by West German officials. If in Bonn they are really in favor of a solution which would eliminate the presentation, then as it was stated on a number of occasions, the Soviet side would positively evaluate a corresponding step on the part of the Federal Republic of Germany. This would allow [us] to avoid unnecessary complications and cut short a tendency towards mounting of tension.”

Dobrynin further commented that “in Moscow, they share fully the opinion of President Nixon that West Berlin should not throw a shadow on the American relations.” (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 402, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File) According to his later account, Kissinger “rejected the proposition” of U.S. intervention on the Bundesversammlung meeting. “[W]e would make no such request of Kiesinger,” he recalled. “I warned Dobrynin sternly against unilateral acts; to underline my warning, the President, on my recommendation, ordered a step-up in US military traffic over the access routes to Berlin.” (White House Years, page 406)