104. Letter From German Chancellor Brandt to President Nixon1
“Dear Mr. President:
As a result of the negotiations which Foreign Minister Scheel conducted in Moscow from July 27 to August 7, the text of a treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was initialed. The text of the treaty and of the documents pertaining to it has already reached your government.2
You have been informed, Mr. President, about the course of the often difficult negotiations through the detailed consultations that have taken place between the German delegation and the ambassadors of the Three Powers in Moscow. I can state with satisfaction that, despite all difficulties, it was possible to reach a mutually acceptable settlement on a number of points. I regard the result as wellbalanced. That also [Page 290] applies to the problem that was of special mutual concern to us: the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union has expressly confirmed that the question of the rights of the Four Powers is not affected by the treaty.
I am convinced—and the discussions in Moscow have strengthened me in this conviction—that the result of the negotiations will also have a favorable impact on the further development of the Four-Power negotiations in Berlin. In the Moscow discussions Foreign Minister Scheel made it perfectly clear that we see a close connection between an improvement of the situation in and around Berlin and the implementation of the German-Soviet treaty.
My government realizes that the successful conclusion of the negotiations with the Soviet government can be only a step toward a basic improvement of the situation in Europe. Many difficult tasks still lie before us all. I am confident that the allied nations of the West will strive as before, in close understanding, for further progress in their joint policy of relaxation of tensions. The solidarity of the Western Alliance is a precondition for the success of such a policy. In that connection I attach great importance to very close cooperation with the governments of the Three Powers. Without our Alliance and the trust between us, we could not have attained such a result.
The Soviet Government has invited me to sign the treaty together with the Federal Foreign Minister in Moscow—probably on August 12. The Federal Cabinet has recommended that I accept this invitation.
I should like to take this opportunity also to suggest that a meeting be held in the autumn between the heads of state or government of the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany, at which we would confirm the importance of our special relationship.3
I have also written today to President Pompidou and Prime Minister Heath to the same effect.
Accept, Mr. President, the expression of my high esteem and the feeling of a close bond.
- Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 753, Presidential Correspondence File, Germany, Chancellor Willy Brandt, May–Dec 1970. Confidential. The German Embassy delivered the letter to the White House on August 9. The source text is the Department’s Language Services’ translation, which Eliot forwarded to Kissinger on August 11. The original text in German is ibid.; see Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1970, Vol. 2, pp. 1428–1429.↩
- For text of the treaty and related documentation, including the exchange of notes between Germany and the Western Allies on quadripartite rights and the German letter to the Soviet Government on reunification, see Documents on Germany, 1944–1985, pp. 1100–1105.↩
- In a telephone conversation on August 11, Rogers asked Kissinger if the Germans had told him about the summit proposal. Kissinger: “I had a call from Bahr on Friday [August 7] that said he was back and we would be hearing from Brandt.” Rogers: “I think the fact that they did it publicly without checking with us—it makes it difficult to say no but I can understand why it would hurt the President. It will [help] Brandt in the election.” Kissinger: “Is there an election?” Rogers: “In a couple of districts.” Kissinger: “They never raised it with me.” Rogers: “I wanted to check.” (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 364, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File)↩