Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972

101. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, July 17, 1970.

SUBJECT

• The Berlin Talks

In the light of the visit of German Foreign Minister Scheel on Saturday,² I thought you might wish a report on the status of the Four Power talks in Berlin which began on March 30. Another meeting is scheduled for July 21, after which there is to be a recess for the summer.

During each of the five meetings, the Soviets have made it clear that East Berlin is not a subject of the negotiations, and that the elimination of FRG political presence in West Berlin is the sine qua non for any possible agreement. Though they have admitted that the US, UK and France are supreme in West Berlin, the Soviets have expressed dissatisfaction with our performance since we are tolerating “illegal”FRG activities there. West Berlin, the Soviets assert, must be recognized as having the status of a city-state, an independent political entity. They have insisted that the Three Powers agree on a set of general principles which codify the Soviet viewpoint.

The Allies, on the other hand, have argued that the basis for the talks is the continuing Four Power responsibility for all of Berlin and its access. We have tried to proceed from the specific to the general, by suggesting practical improvements in the situation relating to inner-city communication, access, and representation of Berlin abroad. So far there has been no meeting of the minds.

An essential difficulty which has hobbled the Western side throughout has been the lack of full agreement between the Three Powers and the FRG on the question of Federal presence in Berlin and the Bonn-Berlin ties. The Germans had led us to believe earlier that they would be willing to reduce their presence in West Berlin in exchange for Soviet concessions on the practical measures such as improved access. Now, however, the FRG seems to be taking the position that it is prepared to reduce its presence only in exchange for Soviet acknowledgement of Bonn-Berlin ties—a point which is totally inconsistent with the basic Soviet position.

Another and more essential friction point is the issue of the linkage between the Berlin Talks and the FRG’s negotiations with the East. The Germans have now made success (by their definition) in the Berlin Talks a virtual precondition for the completion of their ongoing negotiations with the Soviets, and (to a lesser extent) the Poles and East Germans. The FRG would argue with some logic that normalization of relations with the East would have little meaning if there was not at the same time a satisfactory settlement of the situation in and around Berlin.

But, this situation puts us in the anomalous position of negotiating with the Soviets in Berlin arrangements which the FRG wants in order to make its own Eastern Policy tenable. This becomes more complex because the arrangements the Germans want for Berlin have proved utterly nonnegotiable with the Soviets. The Germans persist in part because they seem to be convinced that the Soviets want a German settlement because of China and because they want relief for their economic problems. This belief is at best a theory and at worst a sheer delusion.

Nevertheless, we have been maneuvered by this theory delusion into the Berlin talks, and we may well be blamed if the talks are not successful (by the German definition) and the Eastern Policy is brought to a standstill as a result. Indeed, even if the FRG’s negotiations with the East reach an impasse for wholly other reasons, the blame will still probably be placed on us. Alternatively, the Germans might very well untie their efforts with the East from the Berlin issue if their negotiations are successful despite the absence of a new modus vivendi for Berlin.

This does not mean there is no point in talking to the Soviets about Berlin. Given the enormous tactical advantage the Soviets have on the ground in Berlin, we have very little leverage except our insistence that a European Security Conference (strongly desired by the Soviets) makes no sense unless the threats to Berlin have been contained. At a minimum, we can hope that the Soviets will be deterred at least during these talks from creating crises and deteriorations in the Western position in Berlin by their fears of the impact this might have on relations with the West generally and the US in particular.

In the weeks ahead, we shall be reviewing whether these talks should be pursued, and, if not, how the Germans can be given a way to proceed with their Eastern policy, on which Brandt has staked his political life and which NATO has publicly endorsed.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 690, Country Files, Europe, Germany (Berlin), Vol. II. Secret. Sent for information. No drafting information appears on the memorandum. A stamped note indicates that the President saw it on July 22. Sonnenfeldt forwarded this memorandum to Kissinger on July 15. (Memorandum from Sonnenfeldt to Kissinger, July 15; ibid.) At Kissinger’s request (see Document 93), Sonnenfeldt had submitted a status report regarding the Berlin talks on July 10. Kissinger considered the report “excellent” and instructed Sonnenfeldt to turn it into a memorandum for the President. (Memorandum from Sonnenfeldt to Kissinger, July 10; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 690, Country Files, Europe, Germany (Berlin), Vol. II)
2. July 18.