20. Memorandum From Helmut
Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the
President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1
Washington, March 25, 1970.
SUBJECT
-
NSSM–83,2 European
Security—May NATO Ministerial
Meeting
Though the Review Group on this study is, unfortunately, several weeks
away, I thought you might want to familiarize yourself with this
[Page 49]
study. The attached package
includes an analytical summary (Tab A), the study and its summary (Tab
B), a box score done by State of the various Western ideas that have
been floating around (Tab C), plus a copy of an earlier memo on German
views which are becoming of special importance (Tab D).3
As a basic examination of policy options, the paper itself suffers from
several defects. It does not present an in-depth discussion of the broad
concepts of European Security and how they might be achieved. Nor does
it take up the German and Berlin issues. It also does not go into the
problems of conducting a strategy review, on the one hand, and
conducting an active (or passive) European Security policy, on the
other.
Thus, the study is largely a tactical-procedural paper. Nevertheless, the tactical issues have become quite important. This
study is probably the only way to get an NSC framework for and some Presidential control over
the decisions that will be made in NATO in May on a European conference and a proposal on
balanced force reductions. You will recall that Brosio mentioned to you how important
it was for the other Allies to know the US position well before May.4
As it now stands, the schedule does not permit an NSC before early May. Thus, some
policy will again be made by cables. Since Secretary Rogers will be personally involved in
the Rome meeting, an NSC meeting would
be the proper vehicle to involve the President. If it slips beyond the
first week in May, I see no way to intervene in the dialogue between
Brussels and the Department, which by then will be fairly frantic in any
case.
One alternative might be to squeeze in a Review Group meeting and send an
agreed memo to the President concentrating on the question of a
conference and balanced force reductions, with some expanded
argumentation and background.
[Page 50]
Whatever you decide, it seems to me that these will be the issues to lift
out of the paper and present to the NSC
or the President:
- 1.
-
Do we still want to try to impose certain preconditions to
any multilateral conference:
- —if so, on what issues should we insist on
progress: Berlin, Bonn’s negotiations?
- —is there any action on our part called
for?
- 2.
- Is it in our interest to allow balanced force reductions to
become the central negotiating issue, assuming the Soviets can
be brought around?
- —if not, how do we defuse it without causing a great
conflict with the Allies?
- —if we do want to move forward,
is it for psychological reasons (i.e., to provide
excuses not to make unilateral cuts) or for serious
purposes; the difference would matter in developing a
negotiating stance.
We will be in a somewhat better position after the military analysis of
balanced force reduction models by the Military Committee is finished on
April 20. But it seems likely that we will face a State-Defense split
with State wanting to move ahead for political reasons and Defense
rejecting any BFR proposals that might
be negotiable. This is another, and perhaps the most important reason
for putting the issues under Presidential aegis.
Recommendations:5
- 1.
- That you consider speeding up RG
consideration of this paper.
- 2.
- That you consider requesting State to forward promptly a
supplementary paper on the issues to be resolved before the May
NATO Ministerial meeting.6
Tab A7
NSSM 83—CURRENT ISSUES OF EUROPEAN
SECURITY
(Analytical Summary)
Introduction
- —There are as yet few hard indications the Soviets would agree
to proposals acceptably settling the central issues of European
Security.
- —We and our Allies do not want to ratify the present bisection
of the continent or permanent Soviet hegemony in Eastern
Europe.
- —Relations today are at an uncertain half way point.
- —Negotiations for the near future are likely to center on
discreet, and well-defined subjects that are essentially
peripheral to the basic political and security problems of
Europe.
Comment:
By setting the stage in this manner, the paper, as will be seen, is
reduced to essentially tactical-procedural issues. There is an
opportunity if not a real need, to discuss at some length differing
concepts of European Security. The study states we have no interest
in ratifying the “bisection” of Europe. If so, then it would be
worth exploring the supporting arguments, including the German view
that the only road to rapprochement between East and West Europe is
through acknowledgement of the “realities.” After such exploration,
conclusions could be drawn.
The statement that negotiations are likely to center on discreet and
well defined peripheral subjects has no
supporting foundation. Is it because we do not want to take up more
central issues (if so, why not), or because they are being dealt
with by the Germans, or because the Soviets are resisting an
expansion of an agenda, or, finally, because the objective situation
makes any other approach unfeasible?
These are the real issues of any European Security paper.
I. The Setting
- A.
- Antecedents to Today’s Negotiating Situation.
- B.
-
Current Soviet/Eastern European Approaches to European
Security.
Comment: These are standard and
present no great problems. At the same time they are so
superficial as to be of no value.
- C.
- Current Western Approaches to European Security.
- 1.
-
US Goals.
- —A stable and peaceful situation effectively
guaranteeing the independence and sovereignty of all European states, based on a
military equilibrium sufficient to ensure that this
settlement is on terms satisfactory to the US and its Allies;
- —strengthened prosperous Western Europe;
- —resolution of the German question;
- —peaceful and constructive relations with the
USSR and Eastern
Europe;
- —diminution of Soviet control in Eastern Europe
and gradual liberalization of regimes.
Comment: If our prime goal is
stability, then some of the other goals are obviously in
conflict: guaranteeing the “sovereignty” of all European
[Page 52]
states is not
necessarily compatible with stability, nor is a resolution
of the German question. Diminution of Soviet control in
Eastern Europe and peaceful constructive relations with the
USSR would be quite a
trick.
In short these goals (taken from the Summary paper used at
the NSC meeting with
Wilson) are too
vague to be of any particular meaning for this study.
- 2.
-
Tripartite and FRG Approaches to the Problems of Germany
and Berlin.
“The German question and the status of
Berlin lies at the heart of European security.”
Comment: This is the last you will
read of Germany-Berlin issues. They are not discussed any further in the paper. “This German
policy (of Brandt’s) contains few risks for the
West and even the achievement of limited successes
would be in our own interest. The danger of substantial
weakening of FRG ties with
the West as it seeks to improve its relations with the East
seems remote.”
Comment: These statements are open to
serious challenge. If, as the study acknowledges,
German-Berlin issues are at the heart of European security,
then one would assume that a discussion of possible options
would be warranted—especially if limited success is in our
interest. If the Western position is to insist on progress
on concrete issues, there should be a discussion of what
constitutes such progress: would a Soviet-German agreement
qualify? the settlement of the Oder-Neisse?8 If so, should we
have a position other than watchful waiting?
The risks in Brandt’s
policies are well known to you. Yet State adamantly refuses
to acknowledge any. You will recall that when we prepared a
paper on European issues, they criticized it for being
“anti-German.”9 Yet the same points are being made
forcefully by the French. In any case, relations between the
two Germanys are changing, and this should be a major
consideration in any discussion of European security.
- 3.
-
Other Western and Neutral
Initiatives.
- 4.
-
NATO
Initiative.
[Page 53]
Comment: A factual recitation. This
would be the place for more elaboration of European
attitudes, which are frequently cited as one of the
motivating forces behind Allied interest in a conference of
some kind.
II. The Issues
This section summarizes the advantages and disadvantages of the
specific Options as related to issues to be considered at the May
1970 NATO Ministerial Meeting.
Comment: In other words, only the tactical or
procedural issues are covered. While these should be sorted out for
the President before the Ministerial Meeting there should also be
organizing concepts for discussion.
A. Basic US
Approaches to Resolution of East-West Issues
Options:
- 1.
-
Negotiate settlement directly with the USSR, not in consultation
with our Allies.
Comment: It is difficult to treat
this one seriously as written. If reformulated as an
emphasis on US-Soviet
stability, it might deserve more serious
consideration.
- 2.
-
Conserve the present balance and territorial division,
not seeking a resolution, eventually agreeing to a new
Locarno type treaty.10
—Conceding the status quo reduces friction, but would
nourish a tendency toward neutralism, encourage Warsaw
Pact adventurism, and reduce our security by reducing
our influence in Europe.
Comment: One faintly suspects
that the authors of the study do not like this Option
very much. Yet, it touches on a major subject: should
the status quo be accepted and formalized in some treaty
or understanding, or otherwise institutionalized. There
are some in Europe who believe that this is now the only
realistic approach. Moreover, the Locarno idea should
probably not be dismissed so airily.
Moreover, in the Berlin negotiations it would seem that
we are considering “conserving” the status quo; indeed,
the Germans are prepared to trade an acknowledgement of
their ties to West Berlin for virtual recognition of the
incorporation of East Berlin into the GDR. Similarly, for an
improvement in humanitarian concerns, we presumably
[Page 54]
will not
challenge the political status quo. This is not
necessarily wrong, but it points up that the Option
cannot be readily thrown out, especially with specious
arguments about increasing Warsaw Pact “adventurism.”
One would suspect that the Warsaw Pact would be well
satisfied and would hardly become more aggressive in the
military sense.
- 3.
-
Adopt a leading role in resolving issues
looking toward a comprehensive plan (similar to the
Herter Plan of 1959)11 with
appropriate consultations in NATO and among the four powers.
- —Would strengthen NATO as an instrument of cooperation, put
pressures on the USSR to make progress to reduce East-West
tension.
- —Allies would view as premature, and negotiations
on plan acceptable to the US would not succeed.
- 4.
-
Continue pragmatic efforts along
present lines to make bilateral and multilateral
progress on concrete issues where and when
possible.
- —Dealing individually and flexibly with issues
allows them to be used to probe Soviet intentions,
advance our interests in Eastern Europe, take
advantage of openings for genuine if perhaps
unspectacular progress without necessarily linking
negotiation or involving euphoria.
- —Thus far this approach has had limited appeal to
European public opinion.
Comment: Obviously this is the
Option preferred by the study, and its description and
the supposed advantages are clearly slanted. The main
fault is that it has no real meaning; translated from
NATO
communiqué-style language, this Option means to do very
little and leave it largely to the Germans, as things
now stand.
B. Basic Approaches to a European Security
Conference
We would favor a carefully prepared ESC which deals with meaningful issues;
benefits would depend on price Soviets willing to pay to convene a
conference and on the outcome in terms of real gains in resolving
issues.
Comment: This too is baffling, since we are
not proposing to consider major “problems of security” nor do we
seem very clear what the price is that the Soviets are expected to
pay.
Options:
- 1.
- Continue present policy, retaining ESC as long term objective.
- 2.
- Accept view that some progress in East-West negotiations
and inscription of one or more “concrete” security issues on
the agenda represents a sufficient precondition for
convening a meeting.
- 3.
- Agree to an early conference to discuss issues not central
to European security.
- 4.
- Indicate to our Allies that we do not object to early
ESC, but will not participate ourselves.
Comment: Support for Option 1 among the
Allies is waning, and their approach is now Option 2. No one is
supporting Option 3 though it has some attractive advantages in
terms of adding something from East Europeans. After insisting on
our participation as a major condition, it would be difficult for us
to back off now though this could combine with Option 3, i.e., a
conference on trade, exchanges, etc., limited to Europeans.
The problem is that there is not much analysis to support a choice,
but merely whether to move ahead, stand still, or pedal
backward.
C. Basic Approach to Negotiating Modalities other
than a European Security Conference
Options:
- 1.
- Standing Commission on East-West Relations (SCEWR) the
UK plan;12 composed of NATO, Warsaw Pact reps, and
neutrals:
- —would receive public support, provide private
forum for continuing discussion;
- —GDR participation
creates difficulties; not enough progress on issues
to give meaningful work to such a commission.
- 2.
- Encourage greater use of Group of Ten;
- —nobody really cares about this Group.
- 3.
-
Continue present ad hoc utilization of various
appropriate forums;
- —avoids an ESC
and its risks;
- —does not provide adequate psychological
counter to the “public appeal” of the Warsaw Pact
proposal; gives impression NATO is dragging its
feet.
Comment: It does not seem that
these are three separate Options; one could adopt No. 3,
and encompass the other two. The issue here is whether
we want to move toward some institutionalization, as the
British propose, or stay loose.
[Page 56]
D. Issues for Possible East-West Negotiations
The following have been identified by the Allies.
- 1.
-
Mutual East-West Force Reductions Balanced
in Scope and Timing Decision on the future direction of
MBFR should await
the outcome of the NATO
studies currently underway.
Two generalizations are possible:
- —BFR would be
preferable to unilateral cuts;
- —advantages and disadvantages would vary with the
terms of an agreement:
- a.
- Asymmetrical reductions, larger cuts for
Warsaw Pact would be advantageous in ensuring
security, but probably not negotiable.
- b.
- Large, equal percentage cuts (30 percent)
could reduce confrontation, but NATO area probably could
not be defended with forces remaining.
- c.
- Small cuts could make the military
disadvantages less severe and allow some savings
in costs, but would be difficult to verify and
there would still be some military
disadvantages.
Outline of Possible NATO Proposals
Illustrative basic elements:
- —geographic area involved would be West Germany
and Benelux,
GDR, Poland, and
Czechoslovakia;
- —all indigenous and stationed (foreign) forces
involved;
- —conventional, nuclear and dual capable forces
involved;
- —air reductions proportionately less than
ground;
- —agreed limitations as a first step, but
conditional on a reduction agreement;
- —vertification needs to be adequate to detect
breaches.
Background Note: The NATO Working Group has
developed one symmetrical model and four asymmetrical
models, which have now been submitted to the Military
Committee; the MC will issue
a report to the Senior Polads on April 20, they, in turn, will provide
political comments, and prepare recommendations for the
Ministers to consider in late May in Rome.
Symmetrical model is 30 percent reduction of ground force and
10 percent air force in geographical area noted above.
Four asymmetrical models break down along the following
lines:
- —same area, all NATO reductions are 5, 8, 10 percent,
Warsaw Pact either 15, 30, 40 percent, or 10, 20, 30
with special emphasis on reduction in tanks; air
force cuts of Warsaw Pact only 15 percent;
- —area covered expanded to include Baltic,
Byelorussian and Carpathian military districts of
USSR, NATO cuts the same, but
Pact reductions 10, 20, 30, or 10, 15, 20 with
special emphasis on tanks; air force cuts of 20
percent for Warsaw Pact in former case, or 15
percent in latter.
[Page 57]
In sum, all asymmetrical models call for minimum five percent
NATO reductions against
minimum 10–15 percent Warsaw Pact reductions, plus Pact air
force reduction only, with area
covered varying.
—The central dilemma is that these asymmetrical models are
probably non-negotiable, while symmetrical ones might
jeopardize NATO
security.
In this light these are Options presented in the study:
- 1.
- Kill the MBFR
project by studying it to death.
- 2.
- Attempt to develop a consensus to kill it.
- 3.
- Continue studies, analyses, etc., with objective
of explorations with USSR/Warsaw Pact after May meeting in
order to provide a basis for assessment of
desirability and timeliness of negotiations.
- 4.
- Press forward with study to decide in May on
negotiating proposals.
- 5.
- If NATO study
aborts, consider other approaches to balanced force
reductions (i.e. mutual example, US-Soviet cuts
only).
Comment: As you can see these are
strictly tactical options. No discussion, evaluation of the
concept, our interests, the positions of the Allies, etc.,
relationship to other issues. There are no criteria for
deciding whether to press forward, slow down, kill, etc.
The fact is that we are fairly close to being committed to
make some concrete proposals to the USSR, as a result of conversations with
Dobrynin13 and the past record. The chances
are, however, that the Military Committee will only endorse
those studies which confer major advantage to us. This will
not provide any basis for an exploration of Soviet
intentions.
In any case, as you know, this entire scheme creates
problems. If the Soviets turn around and move toward a
BFR conference or
negotiations, we are probably in major trouble.
- 2.
-
Lesser Disarmament and Confidence Building
Measures
NATO has endorsed several
for discussion: exchange of observers at maneuvers, advance
notification of military movements and maneuvers,
observation posts and joint study of methods of
inspection.
The issue seems to be whether to develop negotiating
proposals together with or separate from balanced force
reductions.
[Page 58]
Options:
- 1.
- Unilaterally frustrate a conclusion of NATO studies.
- 2.
- Keep work in phase with MBFR.
- 3.
- Independently work on BFR, press forward with studies on
confidence building measures.
Comment: It is difficult to know
whether to press forward or backward if there is no
discussion of the merits of any of these issues in some
pattern. The pros and cons are in terms of whether we make
BFR more or less
complicated.
- 3.
-
Joint East-West Declaration of
Principles
(This is not a very live issue at present.)
Options:
- 1.
- Not pursue it further.
- 2.
- Ask Eastern countries to subscribe to our
principles without negotiations.
- 3.
-
Seek Allied agreement to negotiate with East on
joint statement.
- —Not pressing would please most of Allies,
but would “deny West” issues for possible
negotiations.
- —Unilateral
declaration would provide evidence of Allied
willingness to seek East-West accords (sic), but East might respond by
proposing European security conference to discuss
it.
- —Negotiating joint statement would have same
advantage, but negotiations could create false
impression of greater security.
Comment: The critique of
this is self-evident.
- 4.
-
Stimulating Trade and Other
Cooperation
NATO is on record for freer
movement of peoples, goods and ideas. Central issue is how
far to go in pressing trade issues in view of tight controls
over our exports.
- A.
-
US Bilateral
Options:
- 1.
- Maintain present permissive but not
promotional attitude toward trade with the
East.
- 2.
- Stimulate contacts with the East to maximum
extent feasible within bounds of current
legislation.
- 3.
- Attempt to obtain Congressional approval for
further loosening of selective restrictions on
trade.
Comment: All of this would
seem out of place in this paper, which is not the
place to decide major trade policy.
- B.
-
Multilateral Efforts
Option: Stimulate enhanced
East-West trade through ECE and greater use of OECD and GATT.
- 5.
-
Environment
Option: To pursue actively East-West
cooperation in environmental studies through ECE; through proposals put
forward by OECD, and
eventually through NATO
CCMS.
—Would provide opportunities for joint endeavor but could
politicize environmental issue.
