158. Memorandum of Conversation1
PARTICIPANTS
- Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
- Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Council Operations
Mr. Joseph Luns, Secretary General, NATO
[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]
Mr. Luns: [Omitted here are unrelated comments.] Our MBFR experiences in Vienna are indicative of the general problem. Now there is a general attempt to down-play the role of the NAC in MBFR, while emphasizing the role of the ad hoc group in Vienna. The Belgians have warned us that if they cannot have a plenary meeting of the ad hoc group in Vienna to state their position, they are likely to pull out altogether.
Something is going on that we are not all aware of. Ministers agreed last year to link CSCE and MBFR. Now we have a date on CSCE, but nothing on MBFR. There is some concern that this represents a bargain you may have made in Moscow.
Dr. Kissinger: What bargain?
Mr. Luns: An agreement with the Soviets on the beginning date for MBFR. The impression is that the U.S. is prepared to drop insisting that MBFR begin this fall, while agreeing to go ahead with the CSCE. I would hope that any decision in this regard could await Ministerial discussion at Copenhagen.
Dr. Kissinger: I have made no deals with the Soviets on MBFR.
[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]
Mr. Luns: [Omitted here are unrelated comments.] I was concerned recently to see a newspaper report which mentioned the 16 percent figure for MBFR force reductions. This led some in NATO, I know, once again to be concerned about a U.S.–USSR MBFR deal.
Dr. Kissinger: I can tell you flatly that there has been no discussion on the substance of MBFR with the Soviets. I have never talked to them about the subject, except in terms of a starting date. Dobrynin has sought on several occasions to get me to give him some indication [Page 484] of the size reduction we are thinking about. I have never given him any figure; I have refused any discussion about a figure. If there had been any discussion with the Soviets about the size of reductions, it would have been in my channel. I can state flatly that no figures have been exchanged with the Soviets.
I can tell you, however, that while I am agnostic about the issue, I am inclined to think that the option containing the 16 percent reduction is the best of the three.
[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]
- Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 335, Department of State, Eagleburger, Lawrence S., Memoranda of Conversation, Vol. 1. Secret; Sensitive.↩