2. For this reason NIE 11–4–77 is an
unusual estimate. It presents two general lines of argument without
requiring the NFIB principals to
define their positions. Obviously, within these two general positions
there are differences of emphasis among the individual agencies, but I
believe that to state these would be more likely to hamper the reader’s
basic understanding of this important issue than to assist it.
Attachment
National Intelligence Estimate3
NIE 11–4–77
Washington,
January 12,
1977.
[Omitted here are the Table of Contents and the Foreword.]
SOVIET STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES
KEY JUDGMENTS4
A. This Estimate addresses two closely related questions:
—Do the Soviet leaders now base policy—and the programs and
activities which flow therefrom—on a belief that the USSR will continue to make
substantial gains toward a position of overall dominance in the
world? Do they now expect to achieve such a position in the next ten
years?
—Have they come to believe—or will they soon—that aggressive actions
on their part carry lower risks than earlier, and that these risks
have become low enough to be acceptable to prudent yet ambitious
men?
B. There is in the Intelligence Community agreement on some matters
relevant to these questions and disagreement on others. Among the
areas of agreement:
—The aims of Soviet global policy are far-reaching. The Soviet
leaders’ basic perception of the world still posits a struggle of
two great systems, in which theirs will ultimately prevail. This
outlook is reinforced by both defensive and expansionist impulses
derived from Russia’s history and boosted by the remarkable growth
of Soviet power and prestige since World War II. Neither in its
foreign policy nor its military policy does the USSR aim at long-term equilibrium
between the two systems; instead it seeks a continual enhancement of
its own power and influence.
—In prosecuting the struggle on multiple fronts, the Soviets see
military power as a key instrument which can be used to attain
strategic objectives without war.
—The Soviets have never accepted the concept of mutual assured
destruction, with its connotation that some finite level of force is
suffi
[Page 808]
cient for
deterrence, although they recognize mutual deterrence as a present
reality that will be very difficult to alter. Moreover, trying to
forge ahead of the US and at the
same time fearful of falling behind it, they are little disposed to
adjust their military programs unilaterally so as to foster
strategic stability, or to moderate them lest they provoke US program reactions.
—The Soviets aim at advantage in their military forces. They continue
to press forward with a broad and vigorous program for improving
their military capabilities to support their political
objectives.
—The striking thing about these programs is not that they have
accelerated in the last few years but that they have grown at a more
or less steady pace for two decades. We expect this growth to
continue. Neither the creation of an acknowledged deterrent nor the
achievement of acknowledged strategic parity has caused the effort
to falter. Soviet military doctrine calls for capabilities to fight,
survive, and win a nuclear war.
—At the same time, the Soviets worry that they may fall behind in the
qualitative military competition, and this further reinforces the
priority of their research and development effort.
—In the struggle, they are conscious of weaknesses on their own side,
particularly those arising from economic and technological
deficiencies and conflict with China. They are working to overcome
these weaknesses, but they do not presently expect to remove them in
the next decade.
—On the other hand, beyond their obvious military strength, they
credit themselves with other important assets: disciplined
policy-making, social cohesion, and perseverance.
C. Among our major disagreements:
—Some judge that the Soviets are persuaded that the US and the West, despite periodic
rebounds, are in a long-term decline that will be reflected in a
flagging of political resolve, military efforts, and economic
growth. Others think the Soviets hope for this but do not count on
it, and indeed may think that US and
Western military effort is again on the rise.
—Some believe that, in improving their military forces, the Soviets
pursue the acquisition of a war-winning capability as a realistic
objective. Others believe that the Soviets have no realistic
expectation of attaining such a capability.
These disagreements lead to conclusions that, while not diametrically
opposed, present significant differences of emphasis.
D. One line of argument holds that, in the Soviet view, the global
correlation of forces has in the 1970s shifted in the USSR’s favor and that this trend is
likely to continue. The US and its
Allies have entered upon a new stage in the “general crisis of
capitalism” that will prove irreversible even if there are periodic
recoveries. The problems of the Soviet economy and the dispute with
China are serious but, on the plane of international competition,
not debilitating. In this situation, the Soviets aim to achieve the
degree of military superiority over the West needed to permit them
to wage, survive as a national entity, and win a
[Page 809]
conventional or nuclear war. The
Soviets see their improvements in survivability and in counterforce
capabilities, air defense and ABM
development, and broad hardening and civil defense programs in
particular, and their improvements in conventional forces in
general, as all contributing to this objective. While it is
uncertain when the Soviets expect to gain such a decisive strategic
superiority, they view this objective as practical and attainable in
a programmed fashion. They expect to move closer to this goal over
the next ten years. This trend, they believe, will increasingly
enable them to deter US initiatives
and to inhibit US opposition to
Soviet initiatives, thereby advancing the Soviet objective of
gaining a position of overall dominance in the world.
E. Another line of argument holds that, in Soviet thinking, the
question is much more open. It too perceives an increased Soviet
confidence, stemming much more from the achievement of parity in
strategic forces than from other, nonmilitary trends. But this
analysis holds that the Soviet leaders give greater weight than the
preceding argument allows to the handicaps represented by the USSR’s economic and technological
weaknesses and its conflict with China. It believes that they
attribute greater resilience to the capitalist economies and do not
discount the recent turnaround in US
defense spending as a short-term phenomenon. In this view, Soviet
military programming and research is bent upon keeping pace with
that of its adversaries as well as seeking margins of advantage
wherever feasible. But Moscow does not have a realistic expectation
of achieving a war-winning capability, particularly in the next
decade. Expecting Soviet foreign policy to be assertive, this
analysis nonetheless holds that Moscow’s experience with the
complexities of the external world does not at this point lead the
Soviets to expect a series of advances that, by the mid-1980s, will
cumulate into a finally decisive shift in the struggle. In short,
this analysis attributes to the Soviets not a programmatic design
for military superiority but a more pragmatic effort to achieve
advantages where they can, and thus a more patient approach to
continuing tough competition together with a dedication to high and
steady levels of effort in the elements of power. Moscow’s calculus
of the risks attending forward action may decline, but this has not
yet happened and, if it does, the process will be slow and subject
to cautious testing.
F. This Estimate is obviously not a net assessment, nor our judgment
of the likely outcome in East-West competition. It is a summary of
the range of Community perceptions of Soviet objectives and Soviet
views of the prospects for significant gains in this competition. We
agree on a wide range of Soviet objectives short of decisive
military superiority over the West. Our differences are over the
Soviet leaders’ perception of the feasibility of achieving such
superiority. Finally, we agree that Soviet risk-taking abroad in any
specific situation will con
[Page 810]
tinue to be governed by Moscow’s perception of interests and power
at the particular time and place.
THE PROBLEM
To analyze the strategic objectives underlying Soviet military and
foreign policy, with particular attention to the next ten years.
THE ESTIMATE
I. Introduction
1. The aims of Soviet global policy are far-reaching. The Soviet
leaders’ basic perception of the world still posits a struggle of
two great systems, in which theirs will ultimately prevail. This
ideological outlook is reinforced by both defensive and expansionist
impulses derived from Russia’s history and boosted by the remarkable
growth of Soviet power and prestige since World War II. Neither in
its foreign policy nor its military policy does the USSR aim at long-term equilibrium
between the two systems; instead it seeks a continual enhancement of
its own power and influence.
2. If there is disagreement in the Intelligence Community, it is not
over this basic judgment. Nor is there real dispute over the
important corollary that the Soviet leaders are prudent men, prone
to minimize risks and to seek to advance only when they judge the
chance of suc-cess to be high. Current disagreements focus instead
on two sets of questions:
—Has the last decade, to the Soviet leaders, been a watershed, a
period of decisive change in the competition of systems? Do they
believe that their programs and activities will lead in a systematic
fashion to the achievement of military-strategic superiority and a
position of overall dominance in the world? Do they expect to
achieve this position within the next ten years?5
—Translating this problem into the sphere of international behavior,
do the Soviets judge—or will they soon—that the USSR can push its interests harder
without facing higher risks? Granting their prudence, have they come
to believe—or will they soon—that aggressive actions on their part
carry less risk than earlier, and in fact now have become low enough
to be acceptable to prudent yet ambitious men?
3. In this Estimate, we consider the major factors that enter into
Soviet calculations of these matters, touching on the Soviet
appraisal of the elements of what they habitually refer to as the
“correlation of forces,” mainly military and economic strength,
political organization
[Page 811]
and
will, and social cohesion and morale. A final section seeks to
define, in the light of this analysis, Soviet strategic objectives
and to illuminate differences of judgment on this question.
II. Major Factors Entering into Soviet
Calculations
The Soviet View of the USSR’s Internal Situation
4. As they survey their own country, the Soviets see certain
strengths and weaknesses. These factors gain meaning for their
external outlook and objectives largely as they relate to Western
strengths and weaknesses.
—The Soviet leaders regard their political system as strong and
stable. They view political dissidence as an embarrassment to their
foreign policy, not a challenge to their rule. They see nationalist
sentiments among the minorities as a more serious problem, but are
confident of their ability to cope with it. Succession politics may
come to preoccupy them, but they do not expect succession to pose a
crisis for the system.
—Beneath this genuine feeling of confidence there seems to lie an
abiding worry that the Soviet system, while strong, may also be
brittle. Such matters as the harping on the legitimacy of party
rule, the very pervasiveness of control mechanisms, and the lively
fears about the penetration of Western influence suggests a
continuing anxiety about how the system might stand up to crisis. As
they contemplate Eastern Europe, Soviet fears of this sort are
doubtless much stronger. These concerns might be an inhibiting
factor in any Soviet decision about initiating major war.6
[Page 812]
—The Soviets regard their system as giving them a substantial
competitive advantage. Its rigorous centralization permits little
debate and altogether excludes challenge from outside a small
political elite. This, they believe, makes for steady, purposeful
decisionmaking and discipline and coordination in the execution of
policy. In particular, they regard their system as able to sustain
the priority of defense at present and perhaps even higher levels of
effort.
—The Soviet leaders do not discount their economic problems. They
know that their agriculture is backward and that industrial
productivity is low. They acknowledge a general lag in the
application of advanced technology in the economic sector and fear
that it may be growing. The Soviets see these problems as becoming
more complex and more difficult to solve and, while they expect a
moderate rate of growth, they no longer speak of overtaking the
leading capitalist economies in a stated period of time.
5. Particular importance attaches to the question of whether the
Soviet economy can sustain current or higher rates of growth in
military spending in coming years.7 In addition to the general
economic problems mentioned above, modern military spending is
increasingly driven by the technological complexity and quality
requirements of advanced weapons, and these are, in general, areas
in which the Soviet economy does not enjoy an advantage over the
US. The Soviet leaders worry
about this problem. But it seems clear from their present military
programming, and from the research and development efforts that
herald production and deployment of future systems, that they do not
now feel compelled to reduce the priority of defense for the sake of
other economic goals. Their concentration upon military power is so
strong that only severe and prolonged economic stringencies could
force them to relax this priority. On this matter, the shared
background and values of Soviet political and military leaders leave
little room for internal dispute.
The Soviet View of Military Power and War
6. For the Soviet leaders, ideology legitimizes all means, including
military means, in the prosecution of the political struggle; it
also posits the danger of imperialist attack. Force plays a central
role in Soviet thinking, and military power bulks large in Soviet
policy. The Soviets explicitly state that their military
doctrine—which they define as “official views and positions
determining the direction of military development and the
preparation of the nation and its armed forces for war”—is premised
upon the notion that war is an instrument of policy, and
[Page 813]
success in war, even a
nuclear war, is attainable. While there is disagreement over the
extent to which military doctrine determines political decisions on
military matters, we do not believe that the Soviets aim at war. In
fact, they aim to avoid not only general nuclear war, but also
direct armed conflict with the US
that risks escalation to nuclear war. They recognize that, even if
they enjoyed military advantages that seemed to constitute, in their
perceptions and those of others, a general strategic superiority,
nuclear attack on the USSR would
put at risk all their achievements and prospects.
7. But the Soviets strongly believe that the implied or actual threat
of the use of force is a way to influence the attitudes and
decisions of states and to attain strategic objectives without war.
Moreover, they see military power as a means of ensuring that their
gains in the world will not be reversed. They intend their military
might to secure their homeland and their position in Eastern Europe
and to deter their opponents from interfering against those
processes of political change, particularly in the Third World, that
they are promoting, in part with their own military resources. With
regard to North America, Western Europe, and Japan, they see their
military strength as having political utility in enforcing respect
for Soviet power and receptiveness to Soviet policies.
8. In a world characterized by struggle, the Soviets expect conflict,
most probably arising out of local disputes but often involving the
superpowers and, at least implicitly, their total military strength.
In this context, Soviet military doctrine sets a goal of creating
war-winning capabilities and then defines this posture as the best
deterrent. The Soviets have never accepted the concept of mutual
assured destruction, with its connotation that some finite level of
force is sufficient for deterrence, although they recognize mutual
deterrence as a present reality that will be very difficult to
alter. Moreover, trying to forge ahead of the US and at the same time fearful of
falling behind it, they are little disposed to adjust their military
programs unilaterally so as to foster strategic stability, or to
moderate them lest they provoke US
program reactions. Beyond these points, however, there are
differences of view in the Intelligence Community as to whether the
Soviets see as an achievable objective a strategic relationship in
which they escape the constraints of mutual deterrence. These
differences are discussed in paragraphs 56 and 57.
9. Finally, it is difficult, and in the end perhaps not fruitful, to
try to separate offensive and defensive elements and purposes in the
Soviet approach to military power, as Soviet military doctrine looks
at them in an integral fashion. For example, the Soviets see nuclear
weapons and the long-range means of delivering them as both
offensive and defen
[Page 814]
sive, in
that they can attack the enemy’s military forces, thereby reducing
his capability to attack the USSR.
The Soviet View of the US
10. On this subject there are within the Intelligence Community
points of agreement and divergence.
11. There is agreement that the Soviets admire and fear American
economic capacity and technological prowess. Further, they have a
respectful appreciation of US
military strength, current and potential. The Soviets see the US as having considerable advantage
over the USSR in the economic and
military potential of the NATO
Alliance in comparison with the Warsaw Pact. At the same time, they
see weaknesses in US society that
they attribute to the factors of individualism and materialism in
American culture: a reluctance to make sacrifices for state goals
and an inconstancy in policy deriving from the play of plural
interests. They are scornful of what they see as a public appetite
for sensation and a general disrespect for authority.
12. In foreign affairs, the Soviets see the US as enjoying great influence by virtue of its
economic and military power, and they lay special stress on US ability to impose its views on its
Allies because of that power. In the Third World the Soviets see the
US as enjoying stronger economic
and political ties than they do, as well as having substantially
greater potential for projection of military power. But they also
clearly perceive differences between the US and its Allies. And they are eager to discover how
much—in the wake of Vietnam and Angola—the US is determined to uphold its interests and
commitments abroad when these are challenged.
13. The divergencies within the Intelligence Community arise from
different emphasis upon these themes.
14. One line of analysis holds that the Soviets have probably
concluded that the US has already
passed its zenith as a competitor and that, given skillful Soviet
policies, the chances are that this trend can be made irreversible.
While acknowledging countervailing factors, the Soviets believe that
in the long run the US will be
forced by inherent defects in the American and international economy
to be a progressively less effective competitor. They believe they
are gradually overcoming the US
advantage in technology. They expect continued long-run erosion,
relative to their side, in the Western military, political,
economic, social, and moral spheres. They think they will be able to
plan their programs and conduct their policies in the expectation of
greater opportunities resulting from this continued slow improvement
in the global “correlation of forces.” In particular, they see
US vulnerabilities—to the denial
of oil and other raw materials, among others—growing in the Third
World, and they expect increasingly to be able to exploit these
[Page 815]
vulnerabilities. A final
element of this interpretation of their view is, however, that the
Soviets fear that as the US sees its
position weakening, it may strike out to redress the balance. In
this period, therefore, the Soviets require superior military forces
and a careful weighing of risks.
15. Another line of analysis holds that, even when these factors are
taken into account, the Soviet view of these matters is much less
optimistic. It notes that nothing in the Soviet outlook posits a
weakening of US advantages in the
area of science and technology. Recognizing the vigor and scope of
Soviet military programming, this analysis adds that, in Moscow’s
eyes, the US is a formidable
military competitor that is seeking to improve its counterforce
capabilities, and even thinking about strategic superiority,
considering such US programs as the
B–1, Trident, M–X ICBM, and strategic cruise missiles.
It argues that the Soviets perceive indications of US recovery from the disillusionments
of recent years, are impressed by the recuperative powers of the
US and the world economies, and
appear genuinely concerned that the current defense budget and
political discourse in the US augur
a more than temporary increase in competitiveness vis-à-vis the
USSR. By this reading, the
Soviets may hope for a continued slow improvement in their relative
position, but not at a pace that justifies new global calculations
or substantial new departures in their own behavior.
The Soviet View of China
16. On this subject, the Intelligence Community shares some
uncertainties but has no major disagreements.
17. The aims of the USSR’s China
policy are clear enough:
—to combat and reduce Chinese influence both among nations and within
the international Communist movement;
—to limit Sino-US rapprochement;
—to exert military pressure designed to deter Chinese jabs along the
border while impressing upon Chinese leaders the folly of making the
Soviet Union their enemy;
—meanwhile to maintain a public posture of readiness to normalize
relations against the time when Mao’s successors might unfreeze China’s implacable
hostility.
18. The schism with China has severely heightened the Soviet sense of
insecurity and undercut its ideological position. We have
considerable evidence indicating that Moscow sees no prospect of a
complete restoration of the relationship of the 1950s; this is our
analysis as well. As for the possibility of an early amelioration of
active competition, the Soviets appear to be more glum than
hopeful.
19. Nevertheless, this will be the aim of Soviet policy, and indeed
their tactical moves in the weeks after Mao’s death have been intended to begin this
process. The roots of the dispute are deep, and the USSR in
[Page 816]
its conciliatory approach is not prepared to
give up the option of military pressure. But if we try to look a
decade ahead, there is a good chance of some normalization, probably
at the level of state relations, which would make the conflict less
burdensome to Soviet global policy.
20. In military-strategic terms, however, we doubt that the Soviets
during this period will judge that they can afford to reduce the
forces devoted to the Chinese problem, or to exempt them from the
normal pace of modernization. We feel confident that, at least, that
is their own present outlook. And depending upon China’s
post-Mao course, it is
entirely possible that fears of Chinese collusion with the West, or
even of a stab in the back in the event of war elsewhere, will
continue to burden Moscow’s policy as heavily as they do today.
The Soviet View of Europe
21. Ultimately the Soviets would like to become the dominant power in
Europe through the breakup of the NATO Alliance and the elimination of US influence and forces in Western
Europe. Viewed in the light of what is achievable in the next
decade, however, they intend to work to reduce US power and influence and to undermine
the cohesion of NATO, thereby
creating more room for the expansion of their own influence. The
Soviets hope to manage this process in a way that avoids the
emergence of West Germany or a united Europe as a strong,
independent rival to their policies. Moscow’s détente posture has
particular application to this region, and to the related Soviet
objectives of acquiring technology and credits from the developed
industrial states and encouraging reduced defense efforts. The
Soviets meanwhile seek military forces that will increasingly
influence Western European attitudes through the reality and
proximity of Soviet power.
22. While the Soviets applaud the growing strength of Communist
parties in Western Europe, they are concerned about their increasing
independence. They tolerate the anti-Soviet gestures of these
parties only with great difficulty; they are concerned that
power-sharing between Communists and non-Communists would undermine
orthodoxy in Eastern Europe; they worry about a rightist backlash if
the process moves too fast. On balance, however, they see more gains
than losses for themselves in this trend, realize that it is not
within their control, and will assist it cautiously. As for
Yugoslavia, they would like to bring that country closer to their
own camp after Tito’s death but are also concerned to ensure that it
not move westward. They may apply military pressure to this problem,
but they probably see major local dangers and international risks in
the actual use of force.
The Soviet View of Détente
23. In its broadest aspect, détente is looked upon as a framework for
nurturing changes favorable to Soviet interests while avoiding di
[Page 817]
rect challenges to the
US and its Allies that would
provoke them into concerted and effective countermeasures. Détente
provides for limited spheres of cooperation and relaxation of
tensions within a larger context of continued competition. It is
meant to facilitate more specific policies designed:
—to give the West, and particularly the US, a stake in fruitful relations with the USSR as a means of limiting Western
interest in collaboration with China against Soviet interests;
—to develop precedents and mechanisms for consulting with the US during crises and influencing its
behavior, thereby reducing the likelihood of nuclear war;
—to develop an atmosphere that would serve to reduce public and
parliamentary support for Western defense efforts;
—to create a political climate in which economic relations, and
particularly a flow of Western credits and technology, can improve
the Soviet economic base and provide militarily useful
technologies;
—to sustain formal Western acknowledgement of the USSR’s postwar gains in Eastern
Europe, to extend Soviet influence in Western Europe, and to weaken
alliance cohesion.
At the same time, the Soviets have stated from the outset—and
emphasized recently in response to Western criticism—that détente,
like “peaceful coexistence,” in no way involves a renunciation of
Soviet support and assistance to “progressive forces,” including
those engaging in armed struggle in the Third World, but in fact
creates a political climate that enhances the prospects for these
forces.
24. Since this is a fairly durable set of Soviet interests, we expect
Moscow to continue to adhere to the détente line. They regard the
improvement of their position, and particularly their gains in
strategic weaponry, as having forced the West to accept the détente
framework and enter into negotiations with the USSR. Specific policies are another
matter; Moscow has been reluctant to accept Western prescriptions
about the proper content of a détente relationship. The Soviets have
suffered their own disappointments with it, particularly in US trade legislation and Middle Eastern
diplomacy. They are sensitive to increasing Western skepticism about
détente, and evidently would like to see this trend reversed. But
their diplomacy is extremely patient, and if they do eventually make
concessions to Western demands, these will usually be forthcoming
only after prolonged bargaining, during which the Soviets will have
thoroughly tested the Western position and discovered the response
needed on their part to sustain momentum.
Arms Control Policy
25. The Soviets have both strategic and political objectives in
pursuing arms control negotiations. On the political side, the
USSR is assiduous in
initiating proposals in this area in order to appear as the champion
of disarmament and to determine as much as possible the
[Page 818]
subjects chosen for
negotiations. Moscow has at times seen Soviet security objectives
served simply by propaganda on possible arms control arrangements.
The Soviets, for example, evidently calculate that proposals to ban
use or first use of nuclear weapons might appeal to public opinion
and affect Western policy and strategy even in the absence of
negotiations. The very process of negotiations, the USSR believes, strengthens its image
as a superpower equal to the US and
increases the chances that the West will reduce the vigor of its
military programs.
26. In disarmament negotiations the Soviets are zealous in protecting
their military and security interests, and have a proven record of
being very hard bargainers. They view SALT as a means through which
the USSR may be able further to
improve its strategic position vis-à-vis the US, particularly if they succeed in limiting US weapon systems now in development.
In negotiating on ABM, Moscow
evidently judged that, in view of the US technological lead and potential, severe limits on
deployment would be to its military benefit. The Soviets have sought
to use MBFR largely as a vehicle
for constraining German as well as US force levels, and encouraging a decrease in defense
spending in NATO. They probably
hope thereby ultimately to affect NATO strategy and to obstruct possible future European
defense cooperation. Security concerns have also accounted for the
seriousness of the Soviet approach to nuclear proliferation.
27. Nevertheless, the Soviets recognize that the process of arms
control negotiations is continuous, that periodic agreements are
needed to sustain it, that they cannot always count on a favorable
outcome at each stage, and that partial agreements can often advance
their interests. And while they are prepared for prolonged
bargaining, they would be highly dismayed at the prospect of a
breakdown in the negotiating process, not only for its military
consequences but also for its implications for détente and for
Western concerns about Soviet military programs. These
considerations played an important part in Moscow’s agreement to the
Vladivostok understanding;8 they proved willing to accept equal
quantitative ceilings, requiring a slight reduction in their own
forces, and to defer the question of forward-based systems, largely
in order to sustain the momentum of SALT and détente after the
US changed presidents in
mid-1974. It is possible that such considerations also might lead
the Soviets to be more forthcoming on SALT II after the new US administration comes into
office.9
[Page 819]
28. The Soviets will seek in coming years to draw the US and others into specific
negotiations on some of the broad array of arms control proposals
that they regularly purvey. These efforts will be meant to pursue
the same political and military ends that SALT and MBFR now serve for them, plus
broadening the agenda as insurance against the consequences of
failure in any single forum.
III. The Pace and Objectives of Current
Soviet Military Programming
29. In this section we examine Soviet military programing to see what
definable objectives emerge from the evidence and whether the pace
in recent years has increased, slowed down, or remained constant. We
do not attempt a thorough description of these programs, which is
available in other Estimates. From this standpoint we examine
strategic offensive and defensive forces, ground and air forces
facing NATO and China, naval
forces, forces for distant intervention, and research and
development activities.
Strategic Forces
30. The USSR, having succeeded over
the past decade in overcoming a marked inferiority, continues to
press forward with a broad and vigorous program for improving its
strategic capabilities. In offensive forces:
—The ICBM force is becoming more
survivable and flexible and better able to attack hard targets
through deployment of a new generation of ICBMs (many with MIRVs) and through modifications to
deployed systems and development of yet newer ones.
—The introduction of successive new models with longer-range missiles
has increased the capability and survivability as well as the size
of the SSBN force. Soviet SSBNs will, in the near future,
acquire MIRVed missiles, and a
new, large ballistic missile submarine may be under
construction.
—In bomber aviation, older aircraft are being retained in service,
the Backfire is being
deployed, and there is evidence of the development of a new
long-range bomber.
On the defensive side, the USSR
continues:
—to expand capabilities for obtaining early warning of missile
attack;
—to pursue developmental work on ABM
systems;
—to improve capabilities against air attack, especially low-altitude
attack;
—to search for ways to solve the antisubmarine warfare problem,
including those based on novel possibilities;
—to improve, by hardening and other means, the protection of command
and control facilities;
—to carry forward a civil defense program that is more extensive and
better developed than was previously believed and that includes
measures that, if effectively carried out, would have a significant
im
[Page 820]
pact on both US and Soviet perceptions of the likely
outcome of a nuclear exchange;10
—to acquire capabilities to interfere with US space systems.
31. The striking thing about these programs is not that they have
accelerated in the last few years but that they have grown at a more
or less steady pace for two decades. We expect this growth to
continue. Neither the creation of an acknowledged deterrent nor the
achievement of acknowledged strategic parity has caused the effort
to falter. Soviet military doctrine calls for capabilities to fight,
survive, and win a nuclear war. There is disagreement regarding the
extent to which Soviet strategic policy and force developments are
determined by this doctrine, but these programs are compatible with
efforts to achieve these objectives. Soviet positions at SALT, in
turn, do not rule out these same doctrinal objectives.11 But at the same time it must
be recognized that, from the USSR’s point of view, US
military technology is so dynamic that constant Soviet efforts are
needed even to keep pace, that US
SALT positions do not constrain that dynamism, and that arms control
measures to limit many qualitative advances appear in any event
infeasible. Thus the Soviet stress has shifted considerably from
quantity to quality.
32. We are divided in our views as to what objectives the Soviets
have set for themselves in adding to their strategic
capabilities.
33. In one view, Soviet strategic programs are fundamentally the
result of decisions in support of Soviet strategic doctrine and
objectives of obtaining a war-winning capability, and are not merely
reactions to individual US weapon
programs. These programs are extensive, embracing improvements in
survivability and in counterforce capabilities, air defense and
ABM development programs, and a
broad hardening and civil defense effort, and each complements the
others. The Soviets see their extensive and growing research and
development effort as supporting these programs in an increasingly
effective fashion, and as enhancing the chances of technological
breakthroughs.
34. In this view, Soviet strategic programs represent a serious
Soviet commitment to obtain a strategic posture vis-à-vis the United
States sufficient to win a nuclear war should it occur and to
survive as a viable national entity. While it is uncertain when the
Soviets expect to
[Page 821]
gain
such strategic superiority, they now view this objective as
practical and attainable in a programed fashion. They expect to move
closer to this goal over the next ten years.12
35. Another view holds that the Soviet leadership does not at present
regard the achievement of decisive strategic superiority as a
feasible objective, particularly over the next decade. This view
puts more stress on Soviet respect for present and potential US strategic strength as an ingredient
in Moscow’s projections. It also notes that failure thus far to
solve such key problems as strategic missile defense and
antisubmarine warfare are bound to have a discouraging effect on
Soviet expectations.
36. Those who hold this view believe that the Soviets will be active,
driving competitors in the strategic arms race, and will aim at such
margins of superiority as are available. Their programs aim at the
development of capabilities to fight and to survive nuclear war. But
despite the comprehensive and vigorous character of these programs,
the Soviet leaders know that the US
need not concede the USSR a
meaningful overall advantage, and they probably do not now count on
gains that would be substantial enough to give them confidence about
their ability to survive and win an all-out nuclear war. Nor can
they now confidently expect to move substantially closer to these
goals over the next ten years.
37. Beyond differing views about goals for strategic forces, there
are differences about the broader goals of the USSR in the global balancing of
forces in which strategic forces are only one factor—albeit probably
the most important one. We consider these broader issues further in
the final section of this Estimate.
Forces Facing NATO
38. In the European theater, the Soviets aim at a capability that
will enable them, should war occur, to prevail quickly at either the
conventional or theater nuclear level. They see themselves as having
superiority in conventional forces in Central Europe, but they are
aware of the complexities and uncertainties that tactical air power
and nuclear weapons introduce into such assessments. They are
substantially improving forces for defending the seaward approaches
to the Soviet Union and conducting offensive operations against
NATO’s northern and southern
flanks and against the North Atlantic lines of communications. They
are preparing for the possibility that, in the event of war,
[Page 822]
the Warsaw Pact would
conduct major offensive operations without prior reinforcement from
the USSR—and therefore with a
minimum of warning; a forthcoming Estimate will examine this problem
in detail.13 But, mindful of the unpredictability of nuclear conflict in
particular and of the uncertainties about expansion to a broad
European or intercontinental scale, they are inclined to be very
cautious in considering the use of military force in Europe.
39. Enjoying a substantial quantitative advantage over NATO in such elements as divisions,
tanks, artillery, and combat aircraft, the USSR conceives of future competition between the Warsaw
Pact and NATO primarily in
qualitative terms. In this regard, the Soviets are impressed by
NATO’s strengths and potential
in such areas as antitank weapons, tactical nuclear weapons, and
combat aircraft. Their own modernization programs cover a broad
spectrum and feature greatly improved air defense systems,
self-propelled artillery, and tactical aircraft with greater range
and payload. The Soviets also have substantially increased the
nuclear strike capabilities of their theater forces, providing them
with new options for limited nuclear warfare at the theater level
and reducing their dependence on USSR-based nuclear forces.
40. We assess the overall pace of Pact programs for improvement of
conventional forces as steady and high. We doubt that the Soviets
now expect a marked change in the present complex balance in the
next decade. Their hopes for any such change rest primarily on
political factors, such as a flagging of West European efforts or a
weakening of the US commitment to
NATO.14
Forces Facing China
41. The main Soviet objectives in this region are:
[Page 823]
—to deter the Chinese from provoking armed incidents or incursions in
a region where Soviet cities and railroads are close to the
border;
—to be capable of making a major ground thrust across the border,
although not of occupying all China;
—to maintain a large lead in tactical and strategic nuclear
capabilities;
—to maintain military pressure on Peking for a change in its hostile
policies.
42. The buildup that began in the 1960s has evidently met these
requirements, and the growth of Soviet forces in the Far East has
slackened. The Soviets are, however, continuing to improve their Far
Eastern naval forces capable of operations against Chinese domestic
and foreign sea lines of communication. Throughout its course, this
buildup was not allowed to affect significantly the development of
forces facing NATO. Given their
concerns over China, we doubt that the Soviets feel themselves able
to plan to draw on these forces in the event of a European war, or
vice versa; they seem instead to regard it as necessary to be able
to fight on either front—or both together—with the forces already
there. The future growth of Chinese nuclear capabilities will
reinforce Soviet motivations to maintain and modernize their forces
facing China.
General Purpose Naval Forces
43. In the decade following World War II, the Soviets’ main objective
in developing their general purpose naval forces was to acquire
capabilities to defend Soviet coastal waters and key approaches from
the open oceans against any naval force threatening the Soviet
Union. Since the early 1960s, however, a pronounced shift in
emphasis has taken place. The Soviets are now also developing forces
capable of offensive action throughout the world oceans, maintaining
a continuous long-term presence in the Mediterranean Sea and the
Indian Ocean and increasing the range of their overseas
involvements. These developments strongly suggest that the Soviets
hold, as a continuing objective, the development of an open-ocean
force capable of performing, to varying degrees, the traditional
functions of major naval powers. The pace of this expansion has been
measured and evolutionary, and is expected to continue unabated over
the next decade, with somewhat greater emphasis on correction of
their present deficiencies in logistic support forces to permit more
flexible employment of their growing global capability. The result
will be a broader range of options available to Soviet policymakers
to use or threaten to use naval forces in pursuing their global
interests.
Forces for Distant Operations
44. Soviet military objectives in this category derive from the
USSR’s view of the Third World
as an arena of East-West struggle. The
[Page 824]
Soviets are convinced that, despite setbacks,
these regions are shifting from the capitalist to the socialist
camp, and that this process is contributing to Soviet national
security. Two decades’ experience of successes and failures,
however, have given them a realistic view of the complexities of the
Third World, and their behavior is pragmatic and alert to
opportunities to exploit Western vulnerabilities.
45. Among the means for expanding Soviet influence in this arena,
military instruments have proven by far the most effective.
—Military assistance programs have built ties with a number of
important states and political movements, resulting in dependence
upon the USSR that has often,
though not always, provided political leverage.
—Naval deployments into new waters have manifested the global scope
of Soviet might and affected regional calculations of power.
—The USSR is able to airlift and
sealift military aid to clients at war.
—It has some potential—as yet only marginally utilized—for
intervening with its own forces in distant conflicts.
46. The Soviets have used these military instruments to provide
assistance to its clients in Third World crises and have even
intervened abroad with their own military forces. The Soviets have
also endeavored to inhibit possible US actions and to provide a visible symbol of Soviet
support by interposing naval forces. They have been concerned,
however, not to confront Western interests in the Third World
directly; thus they are working for change by providing military aid
to legitimate governments and a number of guerrilla movements
throughout the world.
47. The Soviets will continue to strongly support the process of
change in the Third World and will expand their military instruments
at a steady but moderate pace. Over the next decade, force
improvements will continue to enhance Soviet capabilities to assist
clients by supplementing local defenses. The USSR will be able to make more
credible demonstrations of force and the Soviet navy will have
better capabilities for interposition. The Soviets will also improve
their capabilities for direct assault. But beyond the range of
land-based air support, Soviet capabilities will still be deficient
to carry out a direct assault against determined opposition by
sizable armed forces.15
[Page 825]
Research and Development
48. The inherent limitations of evidence present us with more
uncertainty about the scope and progress of Soviet military research
and development than about programs that have reached the stages of
testing and deployment. It is nevertheless clear that R&D enjoys a particularly high
priority.
49. The Soviets are well aware of the importance of basic scientific
research, and they support it generously. They also have devoted
major resources to building up industrial technology in support of
R&D goals for the
military and in space. They have decreased, but not eliminated,
their dependence on foreign technology in such key areas as
instrumentation and computers. Recent Soviet statements reflect
special attention to the impact of technological developments on the
strategic military balance.
50. In their approach to weapons development, the Soviets have
traditionally emphasized long-term evolutionary development of
existing system concepts or narrowly focused efforts to develop
specific types of systems. While some of their programs in the past
have involved innovative concepts and some of their deployed systems
are technically advanced, until the mid-1960s they tended to
concentrate on programs that had direct weapon system
applications.
51. Since the mid-1960s, however, the Soviets have in addition
embarked on a broader range of exploratory military R&D programs. This approach,
while it runs the risk of a lower percentage of successful
applications, offers the Soviets a better basis for evaluating
Western technological efforts, a better base for the evolutionary
development of existing systems, and improved chances for
technological breakthroughs.
52. Prime examples of Soviet interest in revolutionary technological
concepts are in the areas of ASW sensors and directed-energy
weapons. In both ASW and high-energy lasers (HEL), the Soviets have
an extensive R&D effort in
progress, even though the potential in terms of practical weapons
development is uncertain. The ASW efforts involve investigation of a
variety of techniques that seemingly have limited prospects for
success—[3 lines not declassified] The
Soviets are also conducting basic research in technologies relevant
to the nonnuclear electromagnetic pulse and particle beam weapon
concepts. Although there is a large body of evidence for the
existence of a Soviet HEL weapons program, there is no such body of
evidence on the other directed-energy concepts. Some of the laser
work is being done under sponsorship of the air defense forces, but
the development of HEL for practical applications is not likely
before the 1980s.
53. There is little doubt that both their own ambitions and their
fears of US advances will sustain a
high-priority Soviet effort in mili
[Page 826]
tary R&D
during this period. The Soviets know a great deal more about the
direction and progress of our military R&D than we do about theirs. Even so, the
scientific and technological uncertainties that abound in this area
almost certainly prevent them from reaching any confident judgment
now as to whether, over the next ten years, either side will achieve
breakthroughs that will be perceived as altering the strategic
balance.
IV. Synthesis
54. What, then, of the questions with which we began?
—Do the Soviet leaders now base policy—and the programs and
activities which flow therefrom—on a belief that the USSR will become the world’s
strongest single power? Within the next ten years?
—Have they come to believe—or will they soon—that aggressive actions
on their part carry lower risks than earlier, and that these risks
have become low enough to be acceptable to prudent, yet ambitious
men?
There is disagreement on some matters and agreement on others. In the
latter category:
—The Soviet approach to the external world remains one of struggle
between two systems, in which Moscow believes it will ultimately
prevail.
—In prosecuting the struggle on multiple fronts, the Soviets see
military power as a key instrument which can be used to attain
strategic objectives without war.
—The Soviets aim at advantage in their military forces. However, they
worry that they may fall behind in the qualitative military
competition, and this further reinforces the priority of their
research and development effort.
—In the struggle, they are conscious of weaknesses on their own side,
particularly those arising from economic and technological
deficiencies and conflict with China. They are working to overcome
these weaknesses, but they do not presently expect to remove them in
the next decade.
—On the other hand, beyond their obvious military strength, they
credit themselves with other important assets: disciplined
policy-making, social cohesion, and perseverance.
—Since the Soviet strategies are not the same as those of the US, they do not seek to build forces
corresponding to those of the US
across the entire spectrum. For example, they place much higher
priority on strategic forces and forces opposite NATO than on forces for distant
military intervention.
Among our disagreements:
—Some judge that the Soviets are persuaded that the US and the West, despite periodic
rebounds, are in a long-term decline that will be reflected in a
flagging of political resolve, military efforts, and economic
growth. Others think the Soviets hope for this but do not count
[Page 827]
on it, and indeed may
think the US and Western military
effort is again on the rise.
—Some believe that, in improving their military forces, the Soviets
pursue the acquisition of a war-winning capability as a realistic
objective. Others believe that the Soviets have no realistic
expectation of attaining such a capability.
55. These disagreements lead to conclusions that, while not
diametrically opposed, present significant differences of emphasis.
The following discussion simplifies these differences by grouping
them into two syntheses.
56. One line of argument holds that, in the Soviet view, the global
correlation of forces has in the 1970s shifted in the USSR’s favor and that this trend is
likely to continue. The US and its
Allies have entered upon a new stage in the “general crisis of
capitalism” that will prove irreversible even if there are periodic
recoveries. The problems of the Soviet economy and the dispute with
China are serious but, on the plane of international competition,
not debilitating. In this situation, the Soviets aim to achieve the
degree of military superiority over the West needed to permit them
to wage and win a conventional or nuclear war. The Soviets see their
improvements in survivability and in counterforce capabilities, air
defense and ABM development, and
broad hardening and civil defense programs in particular, and their
improvements in conventional forces in general, as all contributing
to this objective. While it is uncertain when the Soviets expect to
gain such a decisive strategic superiority, they view this objective
as practical and attainable in a programed fashion. They expect to
move closer to this goal over the next ten years. Although Soviet
capabilities for the projection of military power will continue to
have significant shortcomings within the foreseeable future, Moscow
not only is prepared to employ its present naval, merchant, and air
forces in seeking objectives in areas of high Soviet interest but
also is developing additional forces more capable of influencing
events in distant areas. This growing propensity to use military
forces as instruments of foreign policy, coupled with the perceived
favorable trend in the strategic balance, will, in the Soviets’
view, increasingly enable them to deter US initiatives and to inhibit US opposition to Soviet initiatives, thereby advancing
the overall Soviet strategic objective of gaining a dominant
position in the world.
57. Another line of argument holds that, in Soviet thinking, the
question is much more open. It too perceives an increased Soviet
confidence, stemming much more from the achievement of parity in
strategic forces than from other, nonmilitary trends. But this
analysis holds that the Soviet leaders give greater weight than the
preceding argument allows to the handicaps represented by the USSR’s economic and technological
weaknesses and its conflict with China. It believes that they
attribute greater resilience to the capitalist economies and do not
[Page 828]
discount the recent
turnaround in US defense spending as
a short-term phenomenon. In this view, Soviet military programing
and research are bent upon keeping pace with that of its adversaries
as well as seeking margins of advantage wherever feasible. But
Moscow does not have a realistic expectation of achieving a
war-winning capability, particularly in the next decade. Expecting
Soviet foreign policy to be assertive, this analysis nonetheless
holds that Moscow’s experience with the complexities of the external
world—and particularly with the intractable force of
nationalism—does not at this point lead the Soviets to expect a
series of advances that, by the mid-1980s, will cumulate into a
finally decisive shift in the struggle. In short, this analysis
attributes to the Soviets not a programmatic design for military
superiority but a more pragmatic effort to achieve advantages where
they can, and thus a more patient approach to continuing tough
competition together with a dedication to high and steady levels of
effort in the elements of power. Moscow’s calculus of the risks
attending forward action may decline, but this has not yet happened
and, if it does, the process will be slow and subject to cautious
testing.
58. This Estimate is obviously not a net assessment, not our judgment
of the likely outcome in East-West competition. It is a summary of
the range of Community perceptions of Soviet objectives and Soviet
views of the prospects for significant gains in this competition. We
agree on a wide range of Soviet objectives short of decisive
military superiority over the West. Our differences are over the
Soviet leaders’ perception of the feasibility of achieving such
superiority. Finally, we agree that Soviet risk-taking abroad in any
specific situation will continue to be governed by Moscow’s
perception of interests and power at the particular time and
place.
