Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXXII, SALT I, 1969–1972

217. Backchannel Message From the Chief of the Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (Smith) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Vienna, December 16, 1971, 1443Z.

34. Re WH11186. Dear Henry:

Please tell the President that I regret that my personal estimate to Semenov that the Indian situation might have a negative effect on Soviet/American relations caused him alarm.² I will certainly steer well clear of this subject in the future.

I trust you will recall for the President the instructions to me in WH11135:³ “The situation in South Asia is such that it is most important that the US Delegation maintain a cool and somewhat more reserved attitude towards their Soviet counterparts … . President, of course, leaves up to your best judgment the manner in which this perceptible shift in US attitude should be conveyed. But he anticipates your complete cooperation in this endeavor until the situation in South Asia clarifies.”³

To avoid conveying the implication that without relationship to the South Asia situation our basic attitude toward SALT was changing, it had seemed to me that a personal allusion to “South Asia” effect on Soviet/American relations in general was the best manner of conveying the desired “perceptible shift in US attitude.”

I am especially concerned and puzzled about reasons why passing my personal view to Semenov that Indian situation did not help prospect for improvement US/Soviet relations in general should have “alarmed” the President. Would appreciate anything further on this score which you can give me.

Warm regards.

Gerry Smith

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 427, Backchannel Files, Backchannel Messages, 1971, SALT. Top Secret; Eyes Only. A handwritten notation at the top of the message reads: “HAK via Hicks, Haig.”
2. In backchannel message 32 to Kissinger, December 15, Smith reported that in a post-plenary discussion he told Semenov that the Indo-Pakistani crisis “could have a prejudicial effect on the prospect for improvement in Soviet/American relations in which SALT progress had had a part.” In backchannel message WH11186 to Smith, December 15, Kissinger replied that “the President was alarmed that you had raised directly the issue of South Asia and linkage with Semenov.” (Both ibid.)
3. Backchannel message WH11135 to Smith is dated December 13. The sentence omitted at the ellipsis reads: “This demeanor should be adopted immediately and maintained until further notice.” (Ibid.)
3. Backchannel message WH11135 to Smith is dated December 13. The sentence omitted at the ellipsis reads: “This demeanor should be adopted immediately and maintained until further notice.” (Ibid.)