Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969–1972

92. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the Presidentʼs Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, October 13, 1972.

SUBJECT

• Secretary Rogers on US–Czechoslovakia

The Secretary has sent the President a memorandum about his October 5 meeting with the Czechoslovak Foreign Minister in New York City.² The central point is the Secretaryʼs report that he welcomed his counterpartʼs proposal to negotiate on several issues in US-Czechoslovak relations.

The Foreign Minister:

• —proposed to solve the complex of US and Czechoslovak claims;
• —suggested we sign a Science and Technology Agreement and a consular convention and reopen consulates in Chicago and Bratislava;
• —wished for a better atmosphere so that Czechoslovakia might eventually obtain MFN; and
• —invited the Secretary to visit Prague, perhaps to sign the consular convention.

Replying to this presentation, the Secretary agreed to discuss the details in diplomatic channels and thanked the Foreign Minister for his invitation.

The Secretary points out to the President that the Czechoslovaks are afraid of being left behind the Soviets, Poles, and Hungarians in the race to improve relations with us. He believes we have been given a good opportunity to settle bilateral problems advantageously and to coax the Czechoslovak government out of its shell.

The Secretaryʼs wish to move ahead with the Czechoslovaks again illustrates, I think, the pressing need for us to get our negotiating priorities straight in Eastern Europe.

I am recommending separately (my memorandum on this is forthcoming) that Secretary Rogers be asked to organize a NSSM/CIEPSM study that would recommend a coherent plan for conducting negotiations with the individual East European countries.³ Until this study has been completed and analyzed, I think the Secretary should be requested not to embark on new negotiations with Czechoslovakia and the other East European countries.

If you agree, you should:

a. Sign the memorandum at Tab B to Secretary Rogers asking him to delay negotiations with the Czechoslovaks pending completion of the NSSM/CIEPSM study and issuance of policy decisions based upon it. This memorandum should not go forward, however, until you and Peter Flanigan have actually requested the study.⁴

b. Sign the memorandum to the President at Tab A, which forwards the Secretaryʼs memorandum but notifies the President that the Secretary has been asked not to commit us further on negotiations with the Czechoslovaks until we have made policy decisions on how to treat the East Europeans generally.⁵

Recommendation

1. That, after you and Flanigan have signed the NSSM/CIEPSM to the Secretary of State requesting a study of our East European policies, you sign the memorandum to the Secretary of State at Tab B.

2. That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab A.⁶

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-194, National Security Study Memoranda, NSSM 163. Confidential. Sent for action.
2. Document 90.
3. See Documents 25 and 26.
4. Attached but not printed. On October 27 Haig signed the memorandum for Kissinger. It reads as follows: “The President would like to review the issues involved in our relations with Czechoslovakia in light of a NSSM/CIEPSM study of our economic and other relations with all the East European countries. This is being requested separately. Negotiations with Czechoslovakia should await the outcome of this study.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–194, National Security Study Memoranda, NSSM 163)
5. Attached but not printed. On October 16 Haig signed the memorandum to the President for Kissinger. The memorandum informed Nixon that Kissinger had asked Rogers to delay talks with Czechoslovakia pending the NSSM/CIEPSM study. It reads in part: “It would probably be premature to begin negotiating with the Czechoslovaks until we have developed a coherent plan for all the East European countries. (When we do begin, I have serious doubts whether we should give priority to Czechoslovakia, whose regime is among the most repressive in Eastern Europe and has been hostile to our foreign policies.)” A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it. (Ibid.)
6. This option is circled.