Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969–1972

79. Telegram From the Embassy in Czechoslovakia to the Department of State¹

Prague, February 14, 1969, 1655Z.

340. Ref: A. State 242273, Sept 20, 1968, B. State 23242, C. Prague 312, D. A–54.²

1. State 242273 (para 3) poses two conditions for further action on implementation of planned US export liberalization measures: (a) reasonable measure of Czech sovereignty and (b) convincing assurances on end use.

(A) We doubt that Czechs are less sovereign than for example Poland, which has Group W status. Vigorous domestic forces are actively struggling, with considerable courage, against Soviet influence. We believe proposed gesture of good will by US would be helpful to better side in this internal struggle.

(B) For reasons set out in references (C) and (D), Ministry of Foreign Trade is not itself prepared give assurances on end use and re-export requirements. It takes position that these assurances are up to end users themselves and not matter which MFT can decide. In their view, compliance with contractual obligations is up to importer and end-user, and they state there is no FAR to contracts calling for impartial arbitration.

2. Even though it is therefore not possible to give unqualified response to two conditions posed in ref (A), we believe case for proceeding as planned can be made of following points:

(A) Measure, which concedes Czechs only what Poles already enjoy, does not greatly loosen US export control program;

(B) Particularly since it was discussed prior to August 20, Czechs will regard liberalization in present circumstances as positive step—they have recently said as much, in contradistinction to Tabacekʼs³ belittling remarks of pre-August period—but would regard retreat as discouragement. We believe we should treat victims of aggression better than aggressors.

(C) Without wishing exaggerate, we believe that trade tends to encourage decentralization of Czech economy, with some positive political fallout, by bringing Czechs into more frequent and purposeful contact with US businessmen and high level of quality of US system. In long run, dynamic and expanding US economy represents positive factor which may offset to some extent current weight of Soviet military and political power.

(D) US exports are manifold boon to US economy, and it makes little sense to sacrifice sales to European competitors.

(E) US controls, including inspection of end-use of exports may be assumed to be effectively guaranteed by assurances of importers and end-users until we have proof that this is not case. In effect MFT guarantee is unlikely to be more assuring than that of an end-user which has reason to fear being deprived of future exports for failure to comply.

3. My call on Minister Tabacek is scheduled for 10:00 a.m. Tuesday, February 18 but can defer until later in the week. In view of our inability to proceed on larger economic questions we would like authority to act expeditiously and positively on above matter and would appreciate early reply.⁴

Beam

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 672, Country Files—Europe, Czechoslovakia, Vol. I Jan 69–31 Jan 70. Confidential; Immediate.
2. Telegram 242273 to Prague, September 20, 1968, outlined policy for licensing agreements with Czechoslovakia. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, STR 7 CZECH) Telegram 23242 to Prague, February 13, requested information from the Embassy regarding changes in Czechoslovakiaʼs licensing status. (Ibid.) Telegram 312 from Prague, February 7, reported that the Czechoslovaks had signaled their interest in resuming licensing discussions. (Ibid.) Airgram A–54 from Prague, February 7, reported on initial discussions. (Ibid.)
3. Jan Tabacek, Minister of Foreign Trade.
4. The meeting was postponed on instructions from the Department of State. (Telegram 407 from Prague, February 24; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, STR 7 CZECH) Instructions for negotiations with the Czechs together with authorization to initiate the talks were transmitted in telegram 30643 to Prague, February 27. (Ibid.) The talks resumed that day.