Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969–1972

71. Telegram From Secretary of State Rogers to the Department of State¹

New York, September 29, 1972, 2034Z.

Secto 27/3575. Memorandum of Conversation: FM Rudolf Kirchschlaeger (Austria) September 27, 1972; 11:45 a.m. Waldorf 30A.

1. Participants: Austria—FM Rudolf Kirchschlaeger, Ambassador Dr. Karl Gruber, Permanent Rep. Dr. Peter Jankowitsch, Dr. Schallenberg; US—The Secretary, Mr. Stoessel, Mr. Blankinship (reporting officer).

2. Summary: The FM said Austria soon will recognize North Vietnam but it will maintain same level of representation in Hanoi and Saigon. FM was noncommittal on whether action would be delayed in response Secretaryʼs suggestion that delay would be helpful. The Secretary reviewed the status of CSCE and MBFR and stressed need to act on terrorism.

3. Norwegian Referendum:² The FM said that the Norwegian referendum on the EEC might have serious consequences—raise doubts in Denmark and lead the EEC to reject Finnish agreement. From the point of view of a united Europe, the outcome is serious.

4. US Consulate in Salzburg: The Secretary said that he hopes the Department of State will be able to reopen the Consulate at Salzburg as soon as some financial problems are worked out.

5. CSCE: The FM inquired about CSCE. The Secretary responded that the allies are discussing a date for beginning preparatory talks; Nov. 22 seems a likely date. He said that SALT talks may also resume in November in Geneva. He noted that shifting the location of SALT I between Vienna and Helsinki had caused some problems.

6. Recognition of Hanoi: FM said that in late October or early November the Austrian Government intended to contact Hanoi with a view of establishing relations with North Vietnam. The channel had not yet been determined, but the Austrians wished to follow the Swiss example of recognizing Hanoi. He said that he thought it was advisable to inform the US first before taking such action. The Secretary expressed regret about the decision particularly when peace negotiations are proceeding. He said that he hoped that the Austrians would find it possible to delay until at least the end of November.

7. Representation in East Germany: The FM said that the Austrians also intend to follow the Swiss example in opening up the commercial representation in East Germany by the end of the year.

8. Terrorism: The Secretary stressed the importance of acting against terrorism. The FM said that Austria would ratify the Hijack Convention³ but that Austrians were concerned about the problem which would arise if a hijacked plane flew into Austria from the Soviet Bloc with passengers claiming asylum. The Secretary said that the Hijack Convention made allowance for this situation; the country where the hijacker landed could prosecute him without returning him. The Secretary emphasized that commercial aviation is so important to everyone everywhere that hijacking a commercial aircraft could not be justified on any grounds.

9. 25 Percent Assessment:⁴ The Secretary expressed hope that Austria would help out on this problem.

10. MBFR: The FM inquired about negotiations on MBFR. The Secretary responded that the Soviets want no linkage and no parallelism. Hence, we do not use these words. However, we will carry on preparatory work for CSCE and MBFR in the same time frame. The negotiations will not necessarily occur at the same place for both subjects. The FM asked who would participate in MBFR. The Secretary responded “those primarily concerned.” As a practical matter those who have troops are the ones that should be primarily involved in the negotiations; others have only a peripheral interest—though they must be kept informed. He wished, however, to assure the FM that the US would make no decisions which would undermine Europe security. This is why the US has insisted upon the world “balanced.” FM inquired whether in CSCE the US anticipated negotiating a treaty or coming out with a declaration. The Secretary replied this is undecided. But he thought that a clause such as para 11 of the Moscow Declaration of Principles⁵ might well be included. We also intended, he said, to press for an undertaking on freedom of movement. The FM agreed to the usefulness of such a provision.

Rogers

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL AUS–US. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Vienna. Rogers and Kirchschlaeger were in New York attending the UN General Assembly meeting.
2. In September a binding referendum on Norwegian accession to the EEC resulted in a 53 percent vote in favor of rejecting membership in the Community.
3. For text of the December 16, 1970, Hague agreement on suppression of air piracy, see 22 UST 1641.
4. The United States paid 31 percent of the UN budget and was pressing to get other states, most notably the Soviet Union, to shoulder a greater share of the burden, while reducing its own percentage of the costs.
5. For text, see Public Papers: Nixon, 1972, pp. 633–635.