Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969–1972

432. Letter From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) to Secretary of the Treasury Kennedy¹

Washington, June 29, 1970.

Dear Dave:

I know that your Department is extremely concerned, as are we all, over the drug problem in this country. You of course have a most important role to play through the Bureau of Customs in combatting the movement of drugs into the United States.

The most damaging drug, it goes without saying, is heroin. Since the illicit, as well as the legal, supply of heroin comes from abroad, the foreign policy implications of our domestic problem are considerable. An estimated eighty percent of the illicit heroin originates in Turkey, and therefore we have been conducting intensive negotiations with the Turkish Government with a view to controlling the legal crop or eliminating all production.

It is in our interest to induce the Turkish authorities to accelerate their steps to restrict or to eliminate all opium production and to improve their control over existing poppy crops, in order to stem the flow of illicit opium into France, where it is converted to heroin. Our negotiations and our three million dollar loan to provide equipment for enforcement and crop substitution are to this end.

However, I feel very strongly that any measures we take that are considered by Turkey to be punitive in nature would not advance our goal of stemming the illicit diversion of opium and would do extensive damage to other exceedingly important aspects of our relationship with Turkey. On October 20, 1969, Attorney General Mitchell and Elliot Richardson sent a memorandum to the President,² in response to his request for a report on the narcotics problem, which reviewed, among other subjects, the possibility of sanctions. In the case of Turkey, they pointed out the extensive foreign relations costs of withholding assistance to Turkey. In my opinion, the same situation exists today.

With this in mind, we have learned with some concern from members of your staff that, at the time Turkeyʼs recent request for 850,000 tons of wheat under PL 480 wheat comes up for interagency consideration, Treasury is prepared to delay approval of the request. The reason, as we understand it, is that the United States should provide no further assistance to Turkey until the Turkish authorities are more forthcoming on restricting, or eliminating, opium production.

I strongly urge you not to tie approval of Turkeyʼs request for PL 480 wheat to the steps the Turks are taking concerning their opium production. The following are my reasons for asking you to agree to this position.

1) Elliot Richardson has informed me that his recent conversations with Turkish officials³ have convinced him that we have already exerted about as much bilateral pressure as the traffic will bear. This is one of the reasons we have moved into a multilateral framework. Substantial further pressure will, in my opinion, get the Turksʼ backs up, not advance us any further down the road toward greater control or eradication, and do considerable damage to other aspects of our relationship.

2) Prime Minister Demirel has weathered an intra-party dispute in a weakened condition, following a very close vote of confidence in March. This makes it much more difficult for him to take dramatic steps in curtailing or eliminating opium production, since he faces a reaction from his rural constituency in the provinces concerned. It also makes him more vulnerable to criticism that he is bowing to foreign pressure. Our failure to ship wheat when the harvest has been unfavorable and the need becomes critical could affect the survival of his government, in the context of a domestic situation which shows considerable signs of instability. Any successor to Demirel would almost certainly be less cooperative on the opium question.

3) Taking into consideration the very high priority this Administration attaches to stemming the flow of illicit heroin into the U.S., there are still other vital aspects to the United States-Turkish relationship. Turkey is an essential element in NATOʼs southern flank. In a June 11 meeting of the Defense Planning Committee in Brussels, Defense Secretary Laird referred to the Presidentʼs February 18 foreign policy message, “in which (the President) reiterated that the security of NATO remains the most important foreign policy interest of the United States.”⁴ There are forces at work in Turkey seeking its withdrawal from NATO and from its western orientation, and a refusal of U.S. assistance considered to be critical would certainly accelerate this tendency. Furthermore, we wish not to affect adversely the continued existence of [less than 1 line not declassified] installations, our overflight arrangements (Turkish airspace is critical to our access to the Middle East), and Sixth Fleet access to Turkish ports. The continuation of a relatively stable and friendly Turkey in the volatile Middle East is certainly in our interest.

4) The Turks are cooperating with us in our mutual efforts to prevent the illicit diversion of their opium production. They are not progressing as rapidly as we would like, but they are progressing. Turkey is continuing to restrict the number of provinces where legal production is authorized. Efforts to tighten the collection of this yearʼs crop reportedly have been good, and the Government has committed itself to purchasing as much of the crop as possible. At considerable risk of public disapproval, the Turkish authorities have agreed to an augmentation of the number of our narcotics officials in Turkey to help with their enforcement efforts.

In conclusion, I believe that we are proceeding in the right direction by pursuing the narcotics problem in an international framework. It is not necessary, and it would be highly counterproductive, to adopt such drastic steps as withholding assistance in order to press the Turks to be more forthcoming. I hope that you will agree, and that we can allow the current Turkish request for wheat under PL 480 to be considered under the usual criteria.

Sincerely,

Alex

1. Source: Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Subject Files: FRC 330 73 A 1975, 000.1–333 Turkey, 1970. Confidential. A copy of the letter was sent to Packard. In an attached July 21 letter to Johnson, Laird noted that “I fully share the views and concerns you expressed in your letter [to Kennedy]” and offered his support.
2. A copy of the memorandum and accompanying report on the illegal international narcotics trade is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1244, Saunders Subject Files, Turkey 1969.
3. Richardson also described these conversations, April 22 and May 13, in a May 19 memorandum to Kissinger. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, INCO–DRUGS TUR)
4. For the text of the Presidentʼs message, see Public Papers: Nixon, 1970, pp. 116–190.