Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969–1972

413. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State¹

Ankara, April 27, 1972, 1525Z.

3080. Subj: Meeting with Foreign Minister: Cyprus Intercommunal Talks.

Summary: While Government of Turkey in principle favors intercommunal talks, Bayulken says circumstances make it politically impossible for GOT agree resumption at present moment. These circumstances include (1) unsatisfactory settlement of Czech arms question (Bayulken credited UN SYG Waldheim with “great effort” and “step forward,” but not enough); (2) continuing bickering and disarray in Athens-Makarios relations which create feelings of insecurity in Turkish Cypriot community; (3) role of Grivas, in particular his reiteration, in concert with Makarios, of enosis as sole goal.

Bayulken said these conditions would make it political suicide for any Turkish Government to agree to resumption intercommunal talks at present. He said Turks were in process of making proposals to Waldheim aimed at eliminating these impediments. Proposals would be simultaneously made known to governments in Washington and London. While Bayulken did not spell out nature of proposals, appears Turks will seek great power (“U.S., U.K. and others”) backing of some kind. End summary.

1. During my meeting with Turkish Foreign Minister Bayulken on April 26, I asked him what he had to say about the current status of the Cyprus intercommunal talks question.

2. Bayulken began lengthy reply by observing that question was now at very difficult stage. Difficulties involve three major elements:

A. Czech arms. UN SYG Waldheim had made “great effort,” but his approach was limited by his need to treat Greek Cypriot administration (i.e. Makarios government) as full government. Turkey considers it “government in quotes.” Either Cypriot constitution exists or does not exist. Turkey had sought full UN custody or export of arms from island. Waldheimʼs solution was step forward but not far enough. Bayulken repeated that Waldheim had made “good effort.”

B. Continuing disarray in Athens-Makarios relations created sense of insecurity among Turkish Cypriot community. This was intensified when Greek Cypriot press announced that Czech arms were for use against the Turks. Position of Athens itself was confused. Were they or were they not seeking Makariosʼ departure? Well-being of Turkish community was at stake.

C. Third element rendering current situation unsuitable for resumption of talks from Turkish vantage point was role of Grivas, Bayulken continued. It had been clear all along that his sudden flight from Greece to Cyprus must have been connived at by GOG. Grivas had surfaced several days ago and met Makarios, then announced last weekend in his public message to Makarios that bonds between himself and Makarios had been strengthened. Grivas also made clear that the two were in full accord on enosis as sole goal.

3. Bayulken then described history of earlier efforts to arrange intercommunal talks. He stressed two points. First, major consideration for GOT was to carry along Turkish Cypriot community. This was not easy. Second, Greeks had played games with Turks. Bayulken illustrated this with instance in which Olcay, after approach by Palamas, had agreed on how two governments would present proposals on modalities of intercommunal talks to UN, only to have Greeks back off subsequently from their jointly agreed position.

4. Bayulken painted picture of heavy domestic political pressure in Turkey, particularly on arms issue. Parliament and elements of Turkish military were accusing Government of softness and asking why GOT had not shipped arms to Turkish community, thereby forcing UN to deal with arms of both sides, not just one. He concluded that any government agreeing to resumption of talks under current circumstances would be toppled.

5. Bayulken said Ministry would on April 27 instruct Turkish Mission UN approach Waldheim with suggestions aimed at clearing atmosphere so that intercommunal talks could take place. These proposals would at same time be communicated to USG and HMG in Washington and London. Their adoption would make Turkish acceptance resumption intercommunal talks defensible before Parliament and Turkish community Cyprus.GOT hoped great powers, U.S., U.K. and others, would support Turkish proposals and “give assurances” that would enable talks to resume. In a few weeks Turkey would have a government and Waldheim would have had opportunity to move forward with Turkish proposals. What was needed now was a cooling-off period and action by Waldheim “with your help.”

6. Throughout his comments, Bayulken expressed great impatience with Government of Greece, which he said constantly shifted position and had deplorable tendency leak key developments to press. As to Makarios, at one point Bayulken remarked with sly smile that Turks knew him well and had private channels of communication with him.² Difficulty was that what he said through private channels was not reflected in his public statements.

7. I confined myself to noting that as Bayulken had observed in Washington, U.S. favored intercommunal talks, and that it was my personal view that Waldheim formula on Czech arms had been a major step in literally defusing problem.

Handley

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 633, Country Files, Middle East, Turkey, Vol. III Jan 72–Dec 73. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated immediate to Nicosia, Athens, London, USNATO, and USUN. Another copy is ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 CYP.
2. In telegram 3130 from Ankara, April 28, the Embassy reported more fully Bayulkenʼs comments on Makarios, Denktash, and Grivas. (Ibid.)