Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969–1972

406. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State¹

Athens, February 18, 1972, 1614Z.

971. Subj: Cyprus: Present GOG Objectives on Cyprus. Ref: State 027708.²

1. Summary: Papadopoulos has staked a good bit of his prestige on his Cyprus initiative. His past history has shown him to be patient and careful. We believe he has other cards to play. After events of past week alternatives now available to GOG not particularly attractive. Those involving force or threat of force might have been successful last weekend but timing now bad. Makarios seems in fairly strong position against other forms of pressure. Greeks might be wise try to shift issue to that of immediate resumption of intercommunal talks. Possible compromise would be UN control of Czech arms and Greek guarantee that Grivasʼ forces will not disturb peace, followed by some personnel changes on Greek Cypriot side and Greek-Turkish agreement to move for immediate resumption intercommunal talks. Question is how GOT would react to various Greek options. Next danger point may be Turkish contingent rotation. End summary.

2. Papadopoulos has staked a good bit of his prestige and that of his regime on achieving a drastic resolution of the Cyprus issue, which was launched with fanfare and trumpets. I can hardly believe he will stop there. Although in Byzantium anything is possible, everything which occurs does not always mean what it should mean. The Prime Ministerʼs game plan is, therefore, probably not played out.

3. In judging what GOG will do next, we should keep several things in mind. First of all, Papadopoulos has a bit of patience and knows how to wait. The highlights of his career prove this. His method is to plan, wait, observe carefully, and if possible let the situation itself develop in his direction. He is also a man who prefers to avoid violence and solutions involving force. He prefers what appear to be agreed solutions and usually makes every effort to respect his opponentʼs philotimo in struggle of this kind, and takes appropriate measures to this end.

4. Thus I believe that Prime Minister will develop his tactics to meet current situation. It is hard to be convinced that Prime Minister put all his eggs in one basket, i.e., Panayotakosʼ appraisal of Greek Cypriot reaction. Papadopoulos simply not trained by his life experience to act in this way. Makarios could make a mistake by putting on large demonstrations of public support against Athens. If he continues to do this, pari passu, Prime Minister will be encouraged to sharpen his tactics to defend his own posture and objectives. We recognize, however, that Makarios is a master poker player, and while maneuvering to save his own position never neglects opportunity to take offensive.

5. Although Papadopolous will, we believe, make further moves, most of alternatives available to GOG at this point do not appear particularly attractive. Note was delivered to Makarios a week ago today. By avoiding an answer and demonstrating certain amount of international and local support, Makarios has left Greeks in position of having to take additional steps that will either escalate situation or lower the temperature. If Greece decides not to press its demands on disposition of Czech arms and formation of new government on Cyprus, Papadopoulos and GOG will have suffered serious loss of face that could have consequences here. It is our opinion, however, that GOG having finally thrown down gauntlet to Makarios is not likely to let matter rest there. Perhaps Papadopoulos now expects the Turks to increase pressure on Makarios.

6. GOG built up expectations of a spontaneous rallying of Greek Cypriots to Greek cause and intimated that major political figures in Cyprus would desert Makarios. So far this has not happened, and GOG is now tactically and legally on far shakier grounds in trying to force issue of Makarios government than in attacking problem of Czech arms. We assume therefore that whatever next step Greeks take will more likely involve arms. We see following among the options available to Greece.

A. Quarantine of arms. As Palamas has said this would be “awkward.” Archepiscopal Palace under heavy guard. If National Guard (which it must be remembered manned by Cypriots even though officered by Greeks) surrounded Palace, possibilities of violence considerable. Makariosʼ forces could also possibly wait this one out for lengthy period. Greeks cannot even be sure what proportion of Czech arms are in Palace. Moreover, simple quarantine, with Greeks guarding Greeks, may not satisfy Turks.

B. Provoke incidents by Grivas supporters as pretext for National Guard takeover. This alternative would have made some sense last weekend, when Czech arms issue was fresh. Now such tactic would appear blatant attempt to take over Cyprus Government, particularly if Makarios had entered into discussions with UN on disposition of arms. Any Grivas action following some other action threatening Greek Cypriots, such as Turkish introduction of both troops and arms, would of course be a different matter.

C. Instigate Turkish threat to ship arms or men into Cyprus as pretext for National Guard takeover. Threat already exists and no response of this kind in sight. Moreover, objection here is that it difficult to believe, unless there is a firm GOG–GOT agreement, that at this point Turks are going to let themselves be pushed out in front.

D. Play religious card. While Holy Synod may be anti-Makarios, GOG would be moving into an arena in which Makarios is the acknowledged all-time champion.

C. Play Hellenism card with Cypriot people. Makarios can play this game, too, and in fact by holding out for ultimate enosis he promises Greeks the whole pie of Cyprus.

E. Alienate Greek Cypriot political leadership from Makarios. We cannot be sure of state of play, but it seems that Greece may have missed whatever chance it had. Clerides growing increasingly cautious.

G. Press Makarios to broaden government. Makarios can spin this one out and eventually refuse. Nevertheless, this an objective which GOG undoubtedly will continue to pursue. Link to internal Communist problem and Soviet influence on the island will serve to keep this issue alive.

H. Retreat, claiming success on arms question by involving UN. This would eventually be seen as defeat for Greece.

I. Remove Makarios from scene physically. This would not be naked intervention, which could provoke strong reactions. Extremely risky.

J. Use Turkish rotation to provoke incident allowing National Guard to take over or declare martial law. Same objections as to (C), but not be excluded. If Turks decide to use rotation to put steam behind question of Czech arms, this could provide Papadopoulos with immediate next step.

K. Shift gears and make immediate resumption of intercommunal talks, with strong role for Greece and Turkey, the main issue. By changing the game Greeks just might be able both to save face and put Makarios on the defensive, particularly if UN involvement in arms question had partially neutralized that problem.

7. A vital factor, of course, which we are not in best position to judge from here is how Turkey would react to various Greek initiatives or failure of Greece to act. We share view in Nicosiaʼs excellent 370³ that Turkish contingent rotation potentially dangerous in this connection. In any case, if Czech arms not soon removed from Makariosʼ control Turkey may supply Turkish Cypriots with further weapons, possibly by air drop. If Greece and Makarios had at that point been unable to reach some compromise as outlined above, it might be necessary to accept introduction of Turkish arms as part of new situation. Supply of Turkish arms would be seen as element in achieving new equilibrium, which however would present greater risk to maintenance of peace on island.

8. We believe that option (K) above not only offers opportunities for defusing situation along lines we suggested in our original analysis (Athens 800),⁴ but would also be desirable from point of view of protecting U.S. interests. Events of past week have demonstrated to all parties how close we are to serious blow-up on Cyprus, and steam which has built up could possibly be used to generate some positive results from present crisis.

9. A possible compromise at this point might be for Makarios to enter into negotiations with UN for UNFICYP control of Czech arms. Greece would not attempt to remove Grivas from island but would agree to use National Guard to prevent Grivas supporters from disrupting peace. Next step would be for Makarios to make limited personnel changes, perhaps replacing Kyprianou, and certainly reducing influence of Lyssarides. Combined with firm commitment for an early resumption of revised intercommunal talks this approach holds some promise.

10. Finally, it would be necessary for Greece and Turkey to work closely together on getting intercommunal talks under way quickly. Makarios would have to accept significant role for GOG and GOT in these talks. Right of intervention under London-Zurich agreements would thus be brought out from the backroom into the shade, but visible, and might serve to induce greater realism on Makariosʼ part.

Tasca

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 594, Country Files—Middle East, Greece, Vol. III. Jan 72–Oct 73. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated immediate to Nicosia, Ankara, and USUN.
2. See footnote 2, Document 405.
3. Dated February 17, it noted a “small but distinct possibility” that the Greek or Turkish Governments might use the imminent Turkish troop rotation to stage an “incident” that would permit intervention against Makariosʼs government. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27–4 CYP/UN)
4. Dated February 12, it expressed the Embassyʼs view that Makarios held the key to a peaceful settlement of the crisis. (Ibid., POL 27 CYP)